ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JEGANATHAN PATHMANATHAN
Before Justice Paul F. Monahan
Pleas of Guilt entered on January 13, 2026
Sentencing Submissions on June 10, 2026
Reasons for Sentence released on July 14, 2026
Ms. L. Abdalla Counsel for the Crown
Mr. N. Abdullah Counsel for the defendant
MONAHAN J.:
Introduction
1The defendant Jeganathan Pathmanathan (the “defendant”) pled guilty before me on January 13, 2026 to three charges as follows:
(i) that on or about the 7th day of February in the year 2023 at the City of Toronto in the said Region did operate a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all the circumstances, was dangerous to the public, and as a result, caused bodily harm to Tharun Antony contrary to section 320.13 (2) of the Criminal Code;
(ii) that on or about the 7th day of February in the year 2023 at the City of Toronto in the said Region did operate a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all the circumstances, was dangerous to the public, and as a result, caused bodily harm to Bens Bessymon Koloth contrary to section 320.13 (2) of the Criminal Code; and
(iii) that on or about the 7th day of February in the year 2023 at the City of Toronto in the said Region did operate a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all the circumstances, was dangerous to the public, and as a result, caused bodily harm to Binu Augustine Vincent contrary to section 320.13 (2) of the Criminal Code;
Exhibits on the Sentencing
2An agreed statement of facts was marked as Exhibit 1. Exhibit 2 is a video of the incident from the Ministry of Transportation; Exhibit 3 is the Ministry of Transportation driving record of the defendant. Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 are victim impact statements; Exhibit 7 is the presentence report and Exhibits 8 and 9 are letters of support filed by the defence.
Timing of Pleas and the Sentencing Submissions
3The pleas were entered on January 13, 2026. The sentencing submissions were to be heard on April 23, 2026 but the defendant sought an adjournment. The sentencing submissions went over to June 10, 2026 and I reserved judgment sentencing until July 14, 2026.
Agreed Statement of Facts
4On February 7, 2023 at approximately 11:04 PM members of the Toronto Ontario Provincial Police responded to a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 401 Westbound Express near Leslie St. in the City of Toronto.
5At approximately 11:21 PM, PC Bhogiwal arrived on scene and observed two motor vehicles involved in the collision. The officer observed a white 2017 Freightliner Cascadia truck with Ontario licence plate PA49916. During this time, the Freightliner truck had an attached White 2009 hyundai trailer with Ontario licence plate M3874S. The tractor-trailer had significant front end damage.
6The second involved motor vehicle was a Honda Civic bearing Ontario licence plate CVDF 894. The Honda motor vehicle had severe exterior and interior damage. Exhibit 1 filed with the court included a picture of the Honda Civic after the collision.
7There were three occupants in the Honda motor vehicle, all suffering from serious injuries. The driver was extricated from the motor vehicle by Toronto FIRE. He was identified as Bens Bessymon Koloth (1997-10-26). The front seat passenger was identified as Tharun Antony (1994-01-26). The right rear passenger was identified as Binu Augustine Vincent (1999-05-10). All three occupants of the Honda motor vehicle were transported to Sunnybrook Hospital via emergency services (EMS).
8The following is a summary of the injuries sustained by the three occupants of the Honda motor vehicle according to the agreed statement of facts and supplemented by the victim impact statements.
Tharun Anthony
9He suffered a traumatic brain injury with bleeding in his brain, including an epidural hematoma, subdural hematomas, subarachnoid hemorrhage and bifrontal contusions. He also suffered abrasions to his face, a nasal bone fracture, a large 16 cm posterior boggy scalp laceration (back of head) that required stitches.
10He was hospitalized for approximately one week and then transferred to Toronto Rehab Institute where he remained for approximately three weeks. After being discharged home, he has continued with ongoing treatment including physiotherapy, psychotherapy and medical follow-ups.
11According to his victim impact statement Mr. Antony has ongoing medical issues caused by the accident including headaches, dizziness and fatigue; sleep disturbances; permanent loss of smell and significant reduction in taste; depression, anxiety, emotional instability and anger; difficulty with concentration, memory and multitasking which has affected his work performance; fear and anxiety when driving or seeing transport trucks on the road; social withdrawal and reduced enjoyment of activities previously enjoyed. He was required to return to work in a modified role with fewer responsibilities and he requested a demotion from his leadership position to manage his emotional and cognitive difficulties.
Bens Bessymon
12He sustained bilateral frontal bone fractures; multiple facial fractures, including fractures of the bilateral frontal sinuses, bilateral orbital roof and medial walls, and bilateral nasal bones with septal hematoma; facial and scalp lacerations; a grade II blunt cerebrovascular injury of the right vertebral artery; left posterior displaced fractures of ribs six and seven; a trace left hemopneumothorax; a left lung contusion and a left scapular body fracture and left rib fractures. He sustained a skull injury and underwent a nine hour surgery which included administering staples. Due to his head injury, he was advised by the doctor that he should not enter deep sleep. He sustained lasting scarring from some of these injuries.
13After his discharge from the hospital he was on rest for more than four months. Prior to the accident he had managed all household tasks independently including cooking, cleaning, laundry and grocery shopping. Following the accident he has become dependent on his friends for these activities. He has been apprehensive about resuming physical activity. He has been unable to enjoy photography and playing the piano to the extent that he did so before the accident.
Binu Augustine Vincent
14He sustained a traumatic brain injury, facial fractures, and a neck fracture. When he regained consciousness 20 hours after the collision, he experienced severe headaches as well as neck and shoulder pain. He vomited blood twice after waking up in the hospital. During his hospitalization, he underwent two surgeries for facial reconstruction because he had a comminuted and depressed frontal bone, frontal sinus and facial bone fractures. He was admitted to hospital from February 7, 2023 to March 10, 2023. After being discharged, he continued with physiotherapy, occupational therapy and speech therapy until May 2025.
15He endured surgery for facial reconstruction. He continued with physiotherapy, occupational therapy and speech therapy until May 2025 when his accident benefits ended and all treatment stopped.
16He still suffers from severe headaches and is taking medication for them. He has sensitivity to sound and light which often triggers irritability and anger. He has not had a full night’s sleep since the accident. He has lost his sense of smell and taste. He continues to experience neck pain and shoulder muscle pain due to the neck fracture. He has trouble with prolonged standing or sitting. He suffers from anxiety and depression. He may need further surgery to deal with a 6 by 8 mm meningocele. He has experienced hair loss and is unable to participate in physical activities for more than 15 minutes.
The Driver of the Tractor Trailer: Jeganathan Pathmanathan
17The driver of the tractor-trailer identified himself with an Ontario driver’s licence as Jeganathan Pathmanathan (1977-02-15). The drivers licence photo matched the male. The officer was satisfied with the identification. MTO and CPIC queries identified the registered owner of the tractor as ETRUCKFIX Inc. (CVOR # 202-889-787).
18The accused, Jeganathan Pathmanathan, sustained no injuries as a result of the collision. In the agreed statement of facts filed with the court there is a photograph of the tractor-trailer after the collision.
19A witness at the scene Gurudas Thakkur advised that he witnessed the transport truck dragging the Honda sedan in lane three. The Honda sedan then contacted the right side concrete barrier and spun out. Another witness, Aruna Dissanayake, reported hearing a loud noise and then observing the transport truck and the heavily damaged Honda motor vehicle.
20The video surveillance of the collision, obtained through the Ministry of transportation, corroborated the witness’s statements. The footage showed the Honda motor vehicle travelling westbound on Highway 401 W. Express, near Leslie Street in the City of Toronto. The Honda motor vehicle had slowed down due to the traffic congestion ahead. The tractor-trailer failed to slow, and rear-ended the Honda. The tractor-trailer then manoeuvred to the right and came to a stop on the right shoulder. The brake lights on the semitrailer did not illuminate prior to the collision.
21Furthermore, according to the Technical Collision Investigation Report authored by Sgt. Michael Chapman (#10380) the tractor-trailer was driving at approximately 78 km/h at impact and the brakes were not activated.
22An examination and analysis of the tractor’s Heavy Vehicle Event Data Recorder showed that the tractor’s brakes were not applied prior to the collision. The examination also showed that the brakes were in working order.
23During a cautioned interview with the accused, it was determined that a proper pretrip inspection was not conducted.
24A criminal summons was issued for Criminal Code 320.13(2)x 3 with the first appearance of November 1, 2024 at 11 AM in courtroom 203 and to attend Toronto detachment on the 21st of October 2024 for the purpose of identification.
Victim impact
25I have read and considered the victim impact statements from the three victims. Part of them are reflected in the injuries described above. There is no doubt that the impact on all three victims has been profound and is ongoing. When I see the picture of the wreckage of the Honda Civic it is hard to believe that anyone in the Honda survived the collision.
Presentence report/letters of support
26The presentence report is a positive one. Sources for the information contained in the presentence report of the defendant were himself, his wife, and a family friend. The author also had regard to the OPP case file synopsis. The defendant is 49 years old and he supports his wife and two children (age 15 and 11). He became a Canadian citizen in 2024. He came to Canada from Sri Lanka in 2009. He has a grade 9 education. He lives in a one-bedroom apartment with his family.
27He obtained his AZ truck licence in about 2022. He has no addiction issues. If he is incarcerated, this will have an impact on his wife and children. It will also impact his mother and his siblings residing in Sri Lanka who rely on the defendant to some degree for support.
28Letters of support which the defendant has filed from a friend and a cousin both of which demonstrate that the defendant is a hard-working man who is devoted to his family.
Positions of the Parties
29Counsel for the parties take the same position on the ancillary orders including a section 110 for five years and a driving prohibition for three years. Where they differ is on the issue of custody. The Crown seeks three years in institutional custody and the defence seeks a conditional sentence of two years less a day.
30Throughout the course of the sentencing process, the Crown’s position has always been that institutional custody is required although the Crown’s overall position on the length of the sentence has fluctuated. The defence’s position has consistently been to request a conditional sentence.
31On one attendance before the court prior to the sentencing submissions the Crown indicated they would seek 2 to 3 years custody.
32When oral sentencing submissions were heard on June 10, 2026, the Crown initially said it would seek only two years less a day apparently because it was under the impression that because the Crown had proceeded summarily, the maximum sentence available was two years less a day. I indicated to the Crown that I did not think that was the correct position as a matter of law because there were three counts that the defendant had pled guilty to and there could be an order that the sentences be served consecutively. Depending upon the length of each sentence, the total sentence could well exceed two years. The Crown sought a brief recess to consider this point which was granted. After Crown counsel returned to court they indicated that they had consulted with senior Crown counsel and they would be seeking consecutive sentences of institutional custody totaling three years.
33To summarize on this point the Crown is seeking three years institutional custody and the defence is seeking two years less a day as a conditional sentence. The requested ancillary orders are as previously indicated.
Dangerous Driving
34In this case there was a plea of guilt to three counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. According to the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Kelly 2025 ONCA 92 at para 52 the mens rea for dangerous driving “requires the trier of fact to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of all of the evidence, including the evidence about the accused’s state of mind, if any, that the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the accused’s circumstances” citing R. v. Beatty 2008 SCC 5 at para 43.
35In R. v. Roy 2012 SCC 26 at paras 40 to 42, the SCC had this to say about the mens rea and actus reus for dangerous driving:
“Generally, the existence of the required objective mens rea may be inferred from the fact that the accused drove in a manner that constituted a marked departure from the norm. However, even where the manner of driving is a marked departure from normal driving, the trier of fact must examine all of the circumstances to determine whether it is appropriate to draw the inference of fault from the manner of driving… [T]he underlying premise for finding fault based on objectively dangerous conduct that constitutes a marked departure from the norm is that a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have been aware of the risk posed by the manner of driving and would not have undertaken the activity: Beatty, at para. 37
In other words, the question is whether the manner of driving which is a marked departure from the norm viewed in all of the circumstances, supports the inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited
Driving which, objectively viewed, is simply dangerous, will not on its own support the inference that the accused departed markedly from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances (Charron J., at para. 49; see also McLachlin C.J., at para. 66, and Fish J., at para. 88). In other words, proof of the actus reus of the offence, without more, does not support a reasonable inference that the required fault element was present. Only driving that constitutes a marked departure from the norm may reasonably support that inference.” (my emphasis).
Dangerous Driving Case Law/Conditional Sentence Availability
36Part of the exercise of arriving at a fit and proportionate sentence requires the consideration of other similar cases recognizing that no two cases are perfectly alike. I have reviewed an extensive number of authorities including those set out below. I am aware that conditional sentences were potentially available for dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm between 1996 and December 1, 2007: see for example R. v. Ryazanov et al. 2008 ONCA 667. From December 1, 2007 until November 2022 conditional sentences were not available for dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm because “serious personal injury” offences were excluded. Since November 2022 conditional sentences have potentially been available for dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm provided the threshold requirements of section 742.1 are met.
Commercial Truck Cases
37The case before this Court involves a commercial truck driver. As discussed below, when a commercial driver commits the offence of dangerous driving it is aggravating that the defendant was operating a large vehicle and being remunerated for his work. Therefore, I have considered, among other cases, commercial truck drivers committing the offences of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.
38In R. v. Boyle 2016 ONCJ 337 the defendant pled guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm; failure to stop and drive suspended. The accused drove his commercial truck on the highway and fell asleep while driving. She struck a pickup truck and the occupant of that truck suffered life altering injuries. The accused was sentenced to 18 months jail plus 4 months jail consecutive on the failure to stop and 30 days jail consecutive on the drive suspended.
39In R. v. Singh 2010 ONSC 3398 the accused was driving a Commercial Dump Truck on Kingston Rd. in Toronto. The accused was driving more than 90 km/h in a 70 km/h zone. He entered an intersection on a red light. The defendant had a criminal record including multiple drinking and driving offences. The defendant hit a vehicle and the driver of that vehicle was not at fault. The driver of that vehicle died as a result of the accident. The defendant was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary for dangerous driving causing death and given a five-year driving prohibition.
40In R. v. Bhangal 2016 ONCA 857 the defendant was a commercial truck driver who drifted into oncoming traffic and hit another car killing the driver. The defendant was convicted by a jury of dangerous driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death. The accused breached the rules on sleep requirements and falsified driving logs and fell asleep behind the wheel. The dangerous driving causing death conviction was stayed due to the principles laid down in R. v. Kienapple 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729. On the criminal negligence causing death, the accused was sentenced to five years imprisonment and given a 15 year driving prohibition.
41The defence relies heavily on R. v. Beedawia 2024 ONSC 3247 in support of its submission that a conditional sentence should be imposed in the case at bar. In that case, after a five day trial the defendant was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The accused was operating a tractor-trailer as a commercial driver. He failed to stop at a stop sign. He hit another vehicle killing one of the occupants and causing significant injuries to another occupant. There was no evidence of alcohol or drugs; the accused was not driving above the speed limit; there was no street racing; no falsification of logbooks or failure to comply with safety regulations. The Court said that the offending conduct was acts of “omission or negligence” which attracted criminal liability in the context of the enhanced duties on a commercial truck operator. The Court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for dangerous driving causing death and a two-years less a day conditional sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm concurrent to the first sentence. The Court also imposed three years probation.
Other Cases
42I have also reviewed and considered R. v. Obermok 2023 ONCJ 401 including a discussion in that case of the potential availability of conditional sentences in driving cases: see paras 48 to 51. In Obermok the defendant drove through a stop sign at 105 km an hour in a 60 km/h zone. He collided with another vehicle killing an infant in the other vehicle and causing bodily harm to the mother of the child. There was alcohol in the system of the defendant but no proof that he was beyond the legal limit at the time of the collision. A five year sentence was imposed and a 15 year driving prohibition. The defendant had pled guilty. He had one entry on his record from 40 years earlier.
43In R. v. Marko 2017 ONSC 1497 affirmed 2019 ONCA 80 the defendant was riding his motorcycle and speeding and weaving in and out of lanes on Yonge Street. He collided with another vehicle which turned left in front of him. The motorcycle then struck a pedestrian who was seriously injured. A 12 month sentence in custody was upheld on appeal.
Recent Ontario Court of Appeal Authority
44I turn now to recent pronouncements from the Ontario Court of Appeal on dangerous driving causing bodily harm or death.
45In R. v. Georgopoulos 2026 ONCA 27, the defendant was sentenced to 2.5 years custody and a six year driving prohibition for dangerous driving causing bodily harm. He was driving his sports car in the City of Toronto on Queen St. East. He tried to pass a streetcar and struck a parked car and hit the streetcar and another car. The speed limit was 40 km/h and the defendant was driving between 52 to 112 km/h. The defendant received minor injuries but the passenger in his vehicle, a 31-year-old woman, was severely injured with injuries to her knees, pelvis, back, neck and carotid artery. Her brain tissue was exposed and she suffered a stroke. She was in a coma for 15 days and now lives with permanent seizure disorder. The Court reviewed the amendments to the Criminal Code in 2018 which raised the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm or death to 14 years from 10 years. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Georgopoulos rejected the argument that by making conditional sentences available for dangerous driving in 2022, it should temper any inclination to increase the range of sentences for dangerous driving causing bodily harm (see paras 25-26). The Ontario Court of Appeal said that when Parliament decided to increase maximum sentences for dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm, this should be seen as Parliament seeking to have the courts impose higher sentences for these offences: see para 26.
46The 2.5 year sentence imposed by the trial judge in Georgopoulos was not demonstrably unfit and was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Further, the court stated that Bill C-5 in 2022 which made conditional sentences available in a wider range of circumstances did not have the effect of rendering conditional sentences appropriate or inappropriate in any particular circumstances.
47In R. v. Gomez 2026 ONCA 330, the accused pled guilt to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. He was sentenced to six years for the offence of dangerous driving causing death and four years concurrent for dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The accused was speeding 164 km an hour in a 60 km an hour zone. He tried to “beat” a yellow light and struck a vehicle killing an occupant of that vehicle and seriously injuring the driver of that vehicle. The trial judge had said that previous cases prior to Parliament’s decision to increase the maximum sentences for driving offences should be approached with caution. The trial judge in Gomez also rejected a conditional sentence: see the trial decision at 2025 ONSC 2039. He said that the most significant factor in dangerous driving cases is general deterrence and denunciation citing R. v. Rawn 2012 ONCA 487 at para 33. The trial judge in Gomez stated that conditional sentences do not have the same denunciatory effect as a period of actual imprisonment. The point here is that the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence in Gomez given the defendant’s egregious conduct and the devastating impact his actions had on the victims and their families. The Court of Appeal also noted that the sentence was “a response to a legislative increase to the maximum sentences for the offences”: see para 11 of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gomez.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in This Case.
48I turn now to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. I will examine the aggravating factors first and then consider the mitigating factors. In this case there are a number of statutorily aggravating factors.
49First, the offences here caused bodily harm to more than one person. In this case there were three victims: s. 320.22(a) of the Code.
50Second, the defendant was being remunerated for the operation of his vehicle: s. 320.22 (b) of the Code.
51Third, the defendant was operating a large motor vehicle: s. 320.22 (f) of the Code.
52As concerns the remuneration point and the large vehicle point, it is obvious that Parliament expects that drivers who are permitted to operate large motor vehicles on our highways for profit will do so in a manner that is not dangerous. The vehicles they are operating are so large that they can do considerable damage to persons and property if they are not operated correctly. That is precisely what happened here. The Defendant drove a huge tractor-trailer at 78 kilometres per hour into a small Honda Civic sedan occupied by the three victims. The defendant drove his vehicle without ever braking before the collision and his actions caused serious personal injury to the occupants of the Honda Civic. The truck’s brakes were in good working order. There was some damage to the front of the tractor-trailer but not surprisingly, the defendant was not injured. He had the protection of a large tractor-trailer.
53The defence argues in this case that while there was a marked departure from the standard of care, the conduct was at the low end of the marked departure cases. Defence counsel points in particular to Beedawia at para 49 which he suggests is similar to the case at bar because in both cases the speed was not greater than the posted speed limit; there was no street racing and no falsification of logbooks among other points.
54It is true that the conduct here was not as egregious as in some cases but it was not at the low end of the marked departure cases. There was a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited. Here, while the speed of the vehicle was less than the posted speed limit, that misses the point. The vehicle was driving too fast in the circumstances particularly the closer he got to the Honda Civic. But the speed was not the main problem. The marked departure from the standard of care was the failure to see and respond to the large, obvious and significant slowdown in front of the defendant in this case with multiple tail lights showing. The defendant plowed right into the back of the Honda Civic without ever putting his brakes on which brakes were in good working order as I have already said.
55It is obvious that the defendant did not see the slowdown of vehicles right in front of him. Otherwise, he would have stopped. We don’t know why he did not see the slowdown. Defence counsel suggests that the defendant must have or might have been distracted by other traffic around him. I reject that argument entirely. There was nothing about the traffic around him that could have been distracting. If he took the time to look at the roadway right in front of him, he could have and would have avoided the accident. The agreed statement of facts is silent with respect to the defendant’s perspective or explanation as to why the accident happened. To state the obvious, the defendant was either unconscious and therefore he did not see the stoppage in front of him or he was conscious but paying zero attention to what was in front of him for a considerable period of time because as I’ve said he took no steps to stop or slow down. In either case, his conduct was egregious and was a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the circumstances. The slow down in front of him, with many rear taillights illuminated, was like a beacon warning him of the situation. He paid no heed because as I say he was either unconscious and not aware of anything or conscious but not observing the roadway right in front of him as he barrelled down the busiest highway in Canada.
56The defendant told the PSR author (see page 4 and 5 of the PSR) that as concerns the accident “[t]ruck accident first time. Driving trucks from November 27, 2022. Driven to Montréal more than 15 times. I am very careful with driving. That day even though I was driving carefully accident happened”. The defendant’s statement as to what happened and the suggestion that he was driving carefully is patently ridiculous and could not be further from the truth.
57I recognize that when determining whether there is dangerous driving, it is the nature of the driving not the consequences of the driving that matters. However, where there is a finding of guilt, the consequences of the driving is very much a consideration on sentencing. I will not repeat all the injuries suffered by the victims due to the actions of the defendant. The injuries have been devastating and ongoing. By his actions, the defendant has fundamentally altered the lives of three innocent victims. All three are young men with much of their lives ahead of them. This is a seriously aggravating factor.
58While the defendant does not have a criminal record, he does have a Ministry of Transportation driving record. That includes speeding findings in 2011 and 2020 and a finding of guilt for a “unsafe move” in 2014.
59He has four records of collisions on his Ministry of Transportation record. One of them was for speeding too fast for the conditions and that relates to the offences before me of colliding into the Honda Civic in this case. In 2023, after the incident in this case, he was involved in a collision for following too closely. I appreciate that this came after the incident in this case and I only note it because it may undermine his ability to be rehabilitated. In 2010 he was involved in a collision for following too closely and in 2014 there was a collision due to “inattentive” behaviour.
60While I repeat that the Ministry of Transportation record is not criminal in nature it is somewhat aggravating particularly the collisions and the speeding findings.
61In the case at bar, the defendant failed to follow a basic rule of driving namely be aware of your surroundings including being aware of what is directly in front of you. He did so while driving a large commercial heavy truck on what is probably the busiest highway in Canada. His actions had severe consequences for the young men who were the victims in this case.
62There are two significant mitigating factors here: the first is that the defendant has no criminal record. Second, he has pled guilty and taken responsibility for his actions. A plea of guilt is always seen as a sign of remorse.
63While I don’t consider it to be mitigating per se, the circumstances of the offender are relevant and need to be taken into account on sentencing. I have already indicated that he has a positive presentence report. He has good prospects for rehabilitation. Further, as I’ve indicated, if he is incarcerated it will have significant impact on his family including his children and his spouse. The Court is required and does take into account the impact of a sentence on the family of the defendant: see R. v. Habib 2024 ONCA 830 at paras 41 to 50.
The Appropriate Sentence in This Case
64The legal landscape I have reviewed above demonstrates that Parliament has urged higher sentences in dangerous driving cases and this point has been accepted by the Ontario Court of Appeal (see Georgopoulos, supra at para 26). I appreciate that in the case before me the Crown proceeded summarily. Nevertheless, the general direction from Parliament remains the same.
65As I have said earlier, since November 2022, provided the total sentence is under two years, conditional sentences have potentially been available for the offences of dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm. However, cases where the courts have imposed a conditional sentence for the offences of dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm are not common including because the overall sentence is often more than two years and therefore a conditional sentence is not available (see Georgopoulos, supra; Gomez, supra; and Obermok, supra).
66In this case the defendant pled guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm with respect to the three separate counts/charges on the information. There is a count/charge for each victim.
67In R. v. Bertrand Marchand 2023 SCC 26 at paras 90-91, the Supreme Court of Canada directed that when sentencing judges are dealing with multiple offences, the judge should first determine the just and appropriate sentence for each offence individually. Then the judge should determine whether the sentences ought to be consecutive or concurrent. After taking this step, the Court considers the principle of totality.
68In this case, before considering the principle of totality, it is my view that the sentence for each offence should be 12 months. I say that based on a consideration of all of the circumstances in this case and my review of the case law and the sentences imposed in similar cases. In my view, each sentence should be served consecutively to the previous sentence. Clayton Ruby et al in Sentencing (10th edition) at paras 14.1 to 14.27 explains when sentences should be consecutive or concurrent. When there is a close nexus between the offences, a concurrent sentence may be imposed: see Ruby et al on Sentencing at paragraph 14.14. However, where there are “separate legal interests” a consecutive sentence may be appropriate (see Ruby et al on Sentencing para 14.19). Where there are multiple victims, consecutive sentences are appropriate (see Ruby on Sentencing para 14.21). The inquiry into whether a sentence should be concurrent or consecutive remains “fact specific”: see Bertrand Marchand at para 95. In this case, there are multiple victims and separate legal interests namely the legal interest of each victim. In my view, it is just, fair and appropriate that the sentences be served consecutive to one another.
69In this case, I would reduce each of the sentences of 12 months by three months to take into account the principle of totality. That means there will be three sentences of nine months each. The sentences I am imposing also take into account the impact that the defendant’s incarceration will have on his family. Therefore, in this case, each sentence will be 9 months and each sentence will be served consecutively. Adding the three sentences together totals 27 months. This is a fair and just sentence taking into account all the circumstances.
70The Crown and the defence both propose a three-year driving prohibition. While I consider this to be a low driving prohibition, I will accept it because it is supported by both parties. I accept the proposal from the Crown and the defence with respect to a five year section 110 no weapons. These ancillary orders will attach to only one of the counts. A probation order is not available in this case given that the total of the sentences imposed exceed 2 years (see the cases discussed in Martin’s Criminal Code Judicial Edition 2026 under section 731).
A Conditional Sentence is Unavailable
71In my view a conditional sentence is not available here. The Court of Appeal had this to say in R. v. Ploumis 2000 CanLII 17033 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. 4731 (Ont. C.A.) at para 26:
when an accused is being sentenced for more than one offence, it is legally permissible to blend a custodial sentence with a conditional sentence as long as the sentences, in total, do not exceed two years less a day and the court is also satisfied that the preconditions in s.742.1(b) have been met in respect of one or more but not all offences”.
See also R. v. Alfred (1998) 1998 CanLII 5634 (ON CA), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 213 at para 6 (Ont. C.A.)
72The point here is that for a conditional sentence to be available, the consecutive sentences cannot exceed two years (see R. v. Frechette 2001 MBCA 66, [2001] M.J. No 197 (C.A.).
73If a conditional sentence was available here, I would not impose it. I recognize that the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Proulx 2000 SCC 5 said in the course of its reasons in that case that a conditional sentence can provide significant denunciation and deterrence. However, I am of the view that a conditional sentence would not sufficiently express society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct in this case. Denunciation and general deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives in this case. Further, I agree with Justice Richetti in Gomez, supra, that a conditional sentence does not have the same denunciatory effect as a sentence involving institutional custody. In short, I would not impose a conditional sentence in this case even if it was available.
Summary
74By way of summary, there will be a nine month sentence in respect of each of the charges. The sentences will be served consecutive to one another. The total of the three sentences together is 27 months. There will be a three year driving prohibition and a section 110 for five years.
Released: July 14, 2026
Signed: Justice Paul F. Monahan