Introduction

[1] This is the third motion for interlocutory injunctive relief brought by the parties arising from this action. On this motion, the defendant, Remax Premier Inc. (“ReMax”), seeks an interlocutory injunction requiring the plaintiff, Jerry Celenza (“Mr. Celenza”), to vacate a storefront office located at 9600 Islington Avenue, Unit #6, Vaughan, Ontario (the “Premises”), and granting exclusive possession of the Premises to ReMax. Alternatively, ReMax seeks an injunction preventing Mr. Celenza from posting notices at or within 300 metres of the Premises.

[2] For the reasons set out below, I am not prepared to grant an injunction that would require Mr. Celenza to vacate the Premises, but I am granting an injunction limiting the posting of any notices in front of the Premises as specified more fully in the reasons below.

Procedural history

[3] I originally heard this motion on November 3, 2017. Following the hearing of the motion but before the release of my decision, on November 14, 2017, the Court was contacted by ReMax’s counsel requesting an opportunity to file additional evidence in support of the motion.

[4] Based on the availability of counsel and the Court, I convened a conference call with counsel for the parties on November 29, 2017, to address the request by ReMax to file additional evidence. I also advised the parties that I would not release my decision until after the issue had been addressed. In advance of the call on November 29th, I received the affidavit ReMax proposed to file and a responding affidavit Mr. Celenza sought to file. Counsel for both parties indicated that they mutually consented to the filing of the additional affidavits, and I have therefore considered them in reaching this decision. The content of the affidavits is addressed below.

Facts leading up to the motion

Relationship between the parties

[5] The dispute between the parties arises from a Joint Venture Agreement between Mr. Celenza and ReMax.

[6] In Reasons for Decision issued January 26, 2016, reported as Celenza v. Remax Premier Inc., 2016 ONSC 628 (Sup. Ct.) (the “First Court Order”), at paras. 1-5, Justice Faieta described the formation and purpose of the Joint Venture Agreement as follows:

The plaintiff, Jerry Celenza, and the defendant, Gabriel Bianchi, are real estate agents. Bianchi owns and operates a real estate brokerage under the name Remax Premier Inc. ("Premier"). Premier operates under a franchise agreement with RE/MAX Ontario -- Atlantic Canada Inc. ("Re/Max Canada"). Premier has a number of branch offices within an exclusive territory. At that time, Celenza owned and operated a real estate brokerage under the name Home at Ease Realty Inc.

In 2012 Celenza approached Re/Max Canada about obtaining a Remax franchise within Premier's territory. Re/Max Canada directed Celenza to Bianchi.

Celenza and Premier entered a joint venture agreement on January 7, 2013 to open a new Premier branch office in Vaughan, Ontario ("JVA"). Under the JVA, 2354918 Ontario Inc. ("235") was to be the bare trustee for the purpose of holding and dealing with any and all of the assets of this joint venture ("JV"). Bianchi and Celenza are the directors, officers and equal shareholders of 235. Under the JVA, Celenza and Premier were required to equally fund the costs of the JV.

Premier leased premises for the Branch Office by agreement dated March 6, 2013.

Celenza and Premier entered an Independent Contractor Agreement dated June 1, 2013 ("ICA"). Under the ICA, Premier agreed to pay Celenza the full amount of any real estate commissions paid to and received by Premier in respect of the sale of a property listed by Celenza or a property sold as a result of his negotiations.

[7] From early on, it appears that the relationship between Mr. Bianchi and ReMax on the one hand and Mr. Celenza on the other hand was rocky. They each take the position that the other party has failed to meet its respective obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement and under the Independent Contractor Agreement.

[8] On November 23, 2015, Mr. Celenza commenced this action against Mr. Bianchi, ReMax and 2354918 Ontario Inc., which was to be the bare trustee under the Joint Venture Agreement. The claim alleges that the defendants did not live up to their obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement, by amongst other things, failing to make leasehold improvements to the Premises in a timely way and by failing to sign agents up to work out of the Premises under the Joint Venture. Mr. Celenza also claims that the defendants have improperly withheld commissions to which he is entitled.

[9] On January 4, 2016, the defendants served their statement of defence and counterclaim, in which they claim that Mr. Celenza did not live up to his obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement. They allege that it was Mr. Celenza who was responsible for the renovations and that he improperly delayed getting the work started. They also allege that, as branch manager, Mr. Celenza was responsible for growing the office and signing on new agents, but that he failed to do so. The defendants advance a counterclaim seeking damages and declaratory relief based on allegations that Mr. Celenza failed to advance the interests of the Joint Venture.

[10] As the litigation has progressed, the parties have attempted to continue to operate in the Premises as though the Joint Venture Agreement remains in place. However, as evidenced by the conduct reviewed below, their attempts to do so have failed miserably.

Two previous motions for injunctive relief

[11] On January 22, 2016, Mr. Celenza brought a motion for injunctive relief seeking inter alia a recognition that he was the branch manager and requiring the release of part of his unpaid commissions. In what I have already defined above as “the First Court Order”, Justice Faieta denied the motion on various grounds, including that there was no need to recognize Mr. Celenza as branch manager given that this was already provided for in the Independent Contractor Agreement and also finding that Mr. Celenza was not at risk of suffering irreparable harm. At the conclusion of his decision, Justice Faieta directed the parties to participate in a case conference with him for the purpose of attempting to settle the case. In making this order, Justice Faieta commented “[A]t the hearing of this motion, counsel for the parties acknowledged that the expense of this action may not be proportionate to the interests at stake if this action proceeds further”.

[12] There were a number of meetings with Justice Faieta, but there has been no resolution and the acrimony between the parties has continued to escalate.

[13] On February 1, 2017, the defendant ReMax brought a motion before Justice Gilmore for an injunction preventing Mr. Celenza from changing the locks to the Premises. By that point, it appears that the parties had each changed the locks a number of times. The dispute appears to have arisen from Mr. Celenza’s view that agents employed by ReMax, but not by the Joint Venture, were improperly seeking to use the Premises. In her unreported decision released on February 6, 2017, Justice Gilmore described the history of the changed locks as follows:

On November 1, 2016, staff discovered that the locks at the Premises had been changed. ReMax arranged for a locksmith to attend and change the locks back. When the locksmith arrived to do the work, Mr. Celenza told him that if he changed the locks back “things would get ugly”.

On November 7, 2016, ReMax re-opened the office. On November 14, 2016, the locks were changed again.

Mr. Celenza does not dispute that he changed the locks and removed certain equipment from the Premises including computers, a keyboard and cables. The locks have once again been changed back and no further lock changes have taken place.

[14] By Order dated February 6, 2017, Justice Gilmore granted an injunction precluding Mr. Celenza from changing the locks of the Premises and from excluding the defendants from entering the Premises (the “Second Court Order”).

[15] At same time, she also made an order addressing the conduct of both sides of the dispute for the purpose of avoiding further escalation:

This case requires some parameters to allow it to proceed to cross-examinations without further escalation. Both parties appear to have taken certain unilateral actions which have necessitated litigation. As such, in addition to the injunction requested at paragraphs 1 a) and b) of the defendants’ Notice of Motion, the following orders shall issue:

(a) The defendants shall not permit any agents who do not work pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement or who do not pay “desk fees” to work out of the Premises pending trial or further court order.

(b) Mr. Celenza shall not be required to pay more than 50% of any office expenses including the cost of secretarial assistance pending trial or further court order.

(c) If not already in place, a detailed accounting is to be provided to Mr. Celenza of all commissions earned and expenses of the premises each month commencing February 1, 2017, pending trial or further court order.

Parties’ conduct since the Second Court Order

[16] Unfortunately, the Second Court Order did not put an end to the acrimonious conduct between the parties and there has been further escalation since the order was made. While there is some dispute between the parties about what exactly has occurred and what has motivated the conduct, it is evident that, at a minimum, the parties have engaged in the following conduct:

a. Following the issuance of the Second Court Order, Mr. Celenza dismissed the receptionist. While the parties do not agree on the extent to which the Premises are open to the public, it is evident that the Premises are locked for periods of time during the business day, and that when Mr. Celenza is present, he works in the back with the front lights off and the Premises therefore look unattended. Mr. Celenza has also made arrangements to discontinue the telephone landline and internet service.

b. Starting in July 2017, Mr. Celenza started posting copies of the Second Court Order in the front window of the Premises. All six pages of the decision were taped separately in the window, thereby partially obstructing the view into the office. In response, ReMax removed the decision, after which Mr. Celenza posted it again in the same fashion. Ultimately, the parties engaged in a game of cat and mouse, where ReMax placed duct tape over the parts of the window displaying the Second Court Order, after which Mr. Celenza posted the pages of the decision in another part of the window. Needless to say that the photos included in the motion record make the Premises look particularly uninviting.

c. Mr. Celenza claims that ReMax changed the card access code to the Premises, after which he was forced to change the locks again despite the Second Court Order. After changing the locks, he did make a key available to ReMax.

[17] On August 28, 2017, ReMax’s counsel sent a letter to Mr. Celenza’s counsel giving notice of its intent to terminate the Joint Venture Agreement and the Independent Contractor Agreement, alleging that Mr. Celenza has defaulted under both agreements, including with respect to hid obligation to operate the Premises. In the letter, ReMax purports to require Mr. Celenza to vacate the Premises.

[18] Besides the issues involving the use and appearance of the Premises, on the motion before me the parties also raised issues related to the renewal of the lease to the Premises. The lease was entered into on March 28, 2013, by ReMax Premier Real Estate Inc., which is a company controlled by Mr. Bianchi but that is not a party to the Joint Venture Agreement. One of the issues between the parties is whether the Joint Venture Agreement required the lease to be signed by the trustee, which is the defendant numbered company. Mr. Celenza takes the position that the Joint Venture agreement required the trustee to be the signatory to the lease, and that Mr. Bianchi acted surreptitiously and improperly in having his company enter into the lease. In response, ReMax argues that the landlord required a tenant with a financial track record to sign the lease, and that Mr. Celenza was aware that Mr. Bianchi’s company had signed the lease.

[19] On the motion, both parties argued that the other party is acting improperly in relation to the option to renew the lease. The lease expires on May 31, 2018, and the option to renew the lease was to expire on November 30, 2017. On September 15, 2017, Mr. Celenza wrote to the landlord to renew the lease on behalf of the trustee numbered company. However, on September 20, 2017, the landlord responded that it would not accept the renewal because the trustee numbered company was not the tenant on the lease.

[20] On September 21, 2017, the landlord notified Mr. Bianchi that Remax Premier Real Estate Inc. is in default under the lease providing the following reasons:

Pursuant to your lease with Islington Village Centre Inc., this will confirm that you are in default of your lease obligations as per Section 6.1(d) and Section 13.1 (h), accordingly, notice is hearby [sic] provided.

6.10 Tenant’s Signs

(d) Except as permitted above, the Tenant shall not at any time cause or permit any sign, picture, advertisement, notice, letter, flag, decoration or direction to be painted, displayed, inscribed, placed, affixed or maintained within the Premises and visible outside the Premises or in or on any windows or the exterior of the Premises not anywhere else on or in the Shopping Centre.

13.1 Events or [sic] Default

(h) the Tenant abandons or attempts to abandon the Premises or the Premises become vacant or substantially unoccupied of the Tenant ceases to conduct business from the premises.

Kindly govern yourselves accordingly.

[21] During the course of the motion, given that ReMax has given notice of its intention to terminate the Joint Venture Agreement, counsel for the defendants candidly acknowledged that his clients’ objective would be to renew the lease for their own benefit. For his part, Mr. Celenza purports to want to renew to the lease for the purpose of continuing to operate the Premises under the Joint Venture Agreement.

Evidence filed following hearing of motion

[22] The additional evidence filed by the parties following the hearing of the motion relates to the operation of the Premises and the continued posting of the Second Court Order. ReMax’s affidavit contains evidence that following the hearing of the motion, the Premises were closed during business hours and the pages of the decision remained posted in the window. In response, Mr. Celenza has sworn an affidavit stating that the Premises were closed at that time referred to by the affiant because Mr. Celenza was attending the hearing of the motion at the time. He further states that he has since removed the decision from the front window on his lawyer’s advice pending the outcome of this motion.

Issues between the parties

[23] On this motion, ReMax once again seeks injunctive relief. This time, it asks that the Court make an order precluding Mr. Celenza from being within 500 meters of the Premises or, alternatively, precluding Mr. Celenza from posting any notices in or within 300 metres of the Premises. Remax’s position is that Mr. Celenza has effectively abandoned his responsibilities under the Joint Venture Agreement and the Independent Contractor Agreement, and that his conduct is harming ReMax’s reputation.

[24] Mr. Celenza justifies his conduct claiming that ReMax’s agents continued to attend the Premises despite the Second Court Order, and that he therefore had to post the decision in the window of the Premises to preclude them from entering. He also claims that, while he continues to operate out of the Premises, he has no obligations to keep the Premises open continuously during business hours or to maintain the Premises at any specific level of operation.

[25] The issues raised by ReMax’s motion are as follows:

Is the injunctive relief sought mandatory or interlocutory?
Does ReMax meet the three part test for injunctive relief?
Does ReMax come to the Court with clean hands?
If ReMax is entitled to injunctive relief, what relief is appropriate in these circumstances?

Analysis

General principles

[26] In his decision, at para. 13, Justice Faieta described the purpose of an interlocutory injunction as follows:

The aim of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve that court’s ability to do justice for the plaintiff or applicant until the trial or hearing of the action or application. The problem for the law is how to achieve this purpose fairly when it will be unclear whether the plaintiff or applicant will eventually succeed, and where a pre-trial or pre-hearing remedy might do harm to the defendant or respondent should it turn out later that the interlocutory order should not have been granted.

[27] In 674834 Ontario Ltd. v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2007 CanLII 8014 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 979 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 22, Justice Patillo emphasized that an injunction is extraordinary relief aimed at preserving the status quo, pending the disposition of the trial:

An injunction is an extraordinary remedy to be granted by the court only in the clearest cases and in accordance with what are now well established principles. The purpose of an interim or interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo until the legal right asserted by the plaintiff can be dealt with by a trial court.

[28] The three part test as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR – MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, at para. 43, for an interlocutory injunction is as follows:

a. Is there a strong prima facie case with respect to the mandatory relief sought, or otherwise is there a serious issue to be tried?

b. Will the moving party suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is refused?

c. Does the balance of convenience favour granting an injunction?

Strong prima facie case/Serious issue to be tried

[29] For interlocutory injunctions in the nature of a mandatory order, the requesting party must show a strong prima facie case rather than a serious issue to be tried. As held by Justice Faieta, at para. 15, in his earlier decision dealing with this matter, the rationale for this distinction is as follows:

There are two reasons for this higher standard: (1) an interlocutory, mandatory injunction is very intrusive given that the ultimate merits of the plaintiff’s claim remains undetermined; (2) it is more feasible for a court to restrain a defendant’s conduct than to compel it.

[30] The compulsive nature of a mandatory interlocutory injunction was described by the Court of Appeal for Ontario as follows in 1711811 Ontario. Ltd. v. Buckley Insurance Brokers Ltd., 2014 ONCA 25, at paras. 57-58:

A mandatory injunction is one that requires the defendant to act positively. It may require the defendant to take certain steps to repair the situation consistent with the plaintiff’s rights, or it may require the defendant to carry out an unperformed duty to act in the future… Mandatory injunctions are rarely ordered and must be contrasted with the usual type of injunction relief, which prohibits certain specified acts.

Because of their nature, mandatory injunctions are often permanent.

[31] In my view, the relief seeking to remove Mr. Celenza from the Premises is in the nature of a mandatory order, while the relief seeking to prevent him from posting notices at or within 300 meters of the Premises is not. Removing Mr. Celenza would have the effect of replacing him with another manager at the Premises. Accordingly, in order to obtain such relief, ReMax must demonstrate that it has a strong prima facie case.

[32] A strong prima facie case is one on which a party is almost certain to succeed: Barton-Reid Canada Ltd. v. Alfresh Beverages Canada Corp., 2002 CanLII 34862 (ON SC), [2002] O.J. No. 4116 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 12.

[33] In my view, ReMax does not have a strong prima facie case for the removal of Mr. Celenza. Ultimately, in order to succeed on this argument, ReMax would have to demonstrate that it is almost certain to succeed on its counterclaim and that this is relief that it is entitled to in the action. However, in my view, there is no basis for such a finding. First, neither the Joint Venture Agreement nor the Management Agreement clearly define Mr. Celenza’s responsibilities, and they certainly do not specify the amount of time he is expected to spend in the Premises or how he is to operate the Premises. On the contrary, the Joint Venture Agreement stipulates that Mr. Celenza is to operate the Premises in accordance with a performance plan, but no such plan was ever developed.

[34] In addition, both sides in the litigation assert that the other side has not met its obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement. In my view, given the evidence and the contrary positions taken by the parties, it is not possible at this stage to find that the ReMax has a strong prima facie case that only the plaintiff is in default of his obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement or the Independent Contractor Agreement, and there is certainly no basis for finding that ReMax has a strong prima facie case that would ultimately entitle it to take over the Premises and operation of the branch office without Mr. Celenza’s participation.

[35] In fact, one of my concerns with the relief sought by ReMax is that it would give ReMax an advantage in taking over the lease of the Premises, when the Joint Venture Agreement does not create any such entitlement in the event of a default.

[36] Another way of looking at this issue is that the purpose of an injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a trial. To allow ReMax to take over the Premises while excluding Mr. Celenza does not preserve the status quo nor does it even anticipate a remedy to which ReMax may be entitled if it is entirely successful in defending the claim and in advancing its counterclaim.

[37] In contrast, while I do not find that ReMax has a strong prima facie case justifying Mr. Celenza’s removal, I am satisfied that ReMax’s counterclaim nevertheless raises a serious issue to be tried. As explained by Justice Faieta in his decision, at para. 20, the threshold is low to demonstrate that a case raises a serious question to be tried. The claim must not be frivolous or vexatious. On its face, ReMax’s counterclaim is clearly neither frivolous nor vexatious. There are serious issues between the parties in relation to whether Mr. Celenza has met his obligations in relation to work to be done on the premises and the recruitment of agents. More immediately, as considered by Justice Gilmore in her decision at para. 6, there is also a serious issue to be tried in respect of whether Mr. Celenza’s behavior is having a detrimental impact on ReMax’s business and reputation.

[38] While I have found that there is no prima facie case but that there is a serious issue to be tried, my determinations on these issues are made only for the purpose of this interlocutory motion. They have no bearing on the outcome at trial where the parties will have an opportunity to present a full evidentiary record in support of their respective claims.

Irreparable harm

[39] Irreparable harm is harm that “cannot be quantified in monetary terms”: RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, at para. 59.

[40] In her decision, at paras. 8 to 10, Justice Gilmore addressed the irreparable harm that would be caused to ReMax if an injunction precluding Mr. Celenza from changing the locks was not granted:

Part II – Would the Failure to Order an Injunction Cause Irreparable Harm?

The short answer to this question must be possibly. While I agree that a confrontation between Mr. Celenza and ReMax employees or agent is unlikely, it is possible given the clear and ever escalating animosity between these parties. What is more likely is the potential for a breach of the lease or reputational harm to ReMax. I agree with the defendants that the back and forth of changing locks has not doubt created an environment of tension with parties taking sides and rumors swirling about the community.

With respect to the lease, there has already been an enquiry from the landlord as to why the office was closed during regular business hours. The defendants point out the possibility of a breach if the office does not operate in the normal course. A breach would risk the large investment into the leasehold improvements.

While the irreparable harm is somewhat inchoate at this point, it still exists. Preventing Mr. Celenza from changing the locks will not affect his claims for repayment of commission. If Mr. Celenza has overpaid his share of expenses, those damages can be assessed at trial.

[41] In my view, similar considerations come into play on this motion. In this case, Mr. Celenza’s persistence in papering the front window of the premises with the Second Court Order has the potential to damage ReMax’s reputation. It has the effect of defacing the public view of the Premises and it has already caused the landlord to send out a notice of default under the lease.

Balance of convenience

[42] In assessing the balance of convenience on the last motion for injunctive relief, Justice Gilmore made the following finding:

The balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction. Such an order will not affect Mr. Celenza’s ability to carry on his business as a real estate agent. He is not being prevented from earning an income, just from engaging in certain behavior.

[43] Again, in my view, the same considerations are at stake on this motion. Requiring Mr. Celenza to refrain from papering the front of the Premises with the Second Court Order will not prevent him from earning an income or continuing to operate the business.

Clean hands

[44] The plaintiff argues that I should not grant any injunctive relief because ReMax does not come to court with clean hands. In particular, the plaintiff argues that ReMax improperly signed the lease agreement rather than having it in the name of the trustee. In addition, the plaintiff argues that ReMax’s misconduct in this regard is evident from the fact that it has changed its explanation for signing the lease more than once during the course of this litigation.

[45] It is not clear on the record before me that ReMax acted improperly in signing the lease. This is an issue more properly decided at trial. In any event, given that the relief I am granting on this motion is very limited and does not have the effect of removing Mr. Celenza from the premises, I am satisfied that it is not necessary for me to decide this issue.

Remedy

[46] As indicated above, I am not granting any injunctive relief requiring Mr. Celenza to vacate the Premises. However, I am satisfied that injunctive relief addressing Mr. Celenza’s conduct in papering the front of the Premises with the pages of the Second Court Order is appropriate. In this respect, I want to make it clear that there is nothing inappropriate about posting or making public a judicial decision. What is at issue in this case is the manner in which Mr. Celenza has chosen to publicize the Second Court Order, which amongst other issues appears to be in contravention of the lease.

[47] Mr. Celenza’s stated purpose in posting the Second Court Order is to let ReMax’s other agents who are not entitled to use the Premises know about the decision. However, the manner in which he has chosen to disseminate the decision is clearly fueled by the ongoing anger and acrimony between the parties. If Remax’s agents are in fact not complying with the order, it is appropriate to let them know about the decision. However, there is no need to plaster each page separately in the window facing out onto the parking lot, which is a clear violation of the terms of the lease; a one page notice would be more than sufficient. If Remax’s agents persist in attempting to use the office, then returning to court to enforce the order is the appropriate remedy.

[48] Accordingly, I am granting an injunction precluding Mr. Celenza from posting any signs or notices that contravene the terms of Article 6.10(d) of the lease set out at paragraph 20 of these reasons. However, in order to ensure compliance with the Second Court Order, Mr. Celenza is permitted to post a small notice displayed at or near the front entrance – no bigger than an 8” by 11” sheet of paper – setting out paragraph 12(a) of Justice Gilmore’s decision to the effect that agents who do not work pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement or who do not pay “desk fees” are not permitted to work out of the Premises.

[49] While I have not granted the mandatory relief sought as I was not satisfied that Remax met the strong prima facie case requirement, I do note that one of the grounds on which the landlord has indicated there is default is the failure to operate the Premises during business hours. I urge Mr. Celenza to take necessary steps to ensure that this default is cured to avoid the need for any future intervention by the Court.

Conclusion

[50] The motion for injunctive relief is dismissed, except to the extent of the relief granted in paragraph 48 of these reasons.

[51] As part of the motion materials filed by ReMax, there was a motion to amend the statement of claim. As indicated at the hearing of the motion, I have not decided this issue as it was not addressed in the parties’ facta or arguments, and it is a motion more properly brought before a Master.

[52] At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for both parties indicated that while the matter is not yet ready to be set down for trial due to some post discovery motions, they believe that given the manner in which the matter has been proceeding, the parties would benefit from an early judicial pre-trial. I agree, and can advise that Justice Sanfilippo will be available to conduct an early pre-trial. Counsel are to contact his assistant to make arrangements.

[53] If the parties are not able to agree to the costs of this motion, the moving party can make submissions no longer than three pages within 10 days of the issuance of these reasons, and the respondent can make responding submissions no longer that three pages within 10 days of receiving the moving party’s submissions.

FAVREAU J.

RELEASED: December 7, 2017

CITATION: Celenza v. Remax Premier Inc., 2017 ONSC 7334

COURT FILE NO.: CV-15541064

DATE: 20171207

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N :

JERRY CELENZA

Plaintiff

(Defendant by Counterclaim)

– and –

REMAX PREMIER INC., GABRIEL BIANCHI AND 2354918 ONTARIO INC.

Defendants

(Plaintiff by Counterclaim)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FAVREAU J.

RELEASED: December 7, 2017

Celenza v. Remax Premier Inc., 2017 ONSC 7334

Case Summary