9 total
Appeal dismissed; buyer of imported shrimp bore the risk of foreseeable import permit denial.
The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding it liable for breach of contract.
The appellant had ordered shrimp from Panama through the respondent, but the Canadian Food Inspection Agency denied the import permit.
The appellant refused to pay for the shipment, arguing frustration of contract.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the permit denial was foreseeable and that the appellant, as the importer, bore the responsibility and risk of obtaining approval before placing the order.
Appeal allowed in part; appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to remit settled custody order to trial judge.
The appellant father brought a second appeal regarding a trial judgment that awarded custody of a three-year-old child to the respondent mother and allowed her to relocate to England.
The first appeal judge upheld the trial judge's decisions on custody and relocation but remitted the final order back to the trial judge to correct errors and inconsistencies.
The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in remitting the matter, as the trial judge had properly settled the order and was functus officio.
The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the remitted order and restore the original trial order.
Interim access granted; fostering relationship with non-custodial parent outweighs three-year-old's nursery school attendance.
The appellant father brought a motion for interim access to his three-year-old child for a three-week block in Toronto, which was heard alongside his appeal of a custody and relocation order.
The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing it would interfere with the child's half-day nursery school attendance and conflict with a prior access order.
The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that fostering a meaningful relationship with the non-custodial parent and his family outweighed the importance of nursery school attendance, and noting that the prior access order restricting access to one-week blocks was a nullity.
Summary judgment Crown wardship upheld where no genuine issue requiring trial existed.
Parents appealed a summary judgment order making their children Crown wards without access in a child protection proceeding.
The appeal challenged the motion judge’s conclusion that there were no genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether Crown wardship was the least disruptive alternative in the children’s best interests under the Child and Family Services Act.
The court held that the evidentiary record revealed no material factual disputes, but rather disagreements about the interpretation of undisputed facts concerning the parents’ commitment and capacity to parent.
Given the statutory time limits on society wardship and the children’s need for permanence and stability, summary judgment was appropriate.
The appeal from the denial of post‑Crown wardship access was also dismissed because the parents failed to adduce evidence satisfying the statutory test requiring proof that access would be beneficial and would not impair adoption prospects.
Appeal dismissed; Crown wardship order upheld after summary judgment in child protection case.
An appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice decision granting summary judgment in a child protection proceeding and making two children Crown wards.
The appellants argued that the motions judge erred in law by failing to follow the statutory pathway under the Child and Family Services Act and by not properly considering a parental plan involving support from a grandparent.
The appeal judge reviewed the record and admitted fresh evidence concerning the parent’s continued substance abuse and instability.
The court found that the motions judge applied the correct legal test, considered less disruptive alternatives, and properly evaluated the proposed family support plan.
The appeal was dismissed and the Crown wardship disposition upheld.
Tribunal grants reconsideration to admit omitted settlement agreement and removes personal respondents from human rights application.
The applicant filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination in housing accommodation on the basis of disability and reprisal.
The respondents requested reconsideration of an earlier Interim Decision, seeking to introduce a Parking Agreement they inadvertently omitted, which they argued settled the accommodation issues.
The Tribunal granted the reconsideration request, allowing the respondents to make oral submissions on the effect of the Parking Agreement at the outset of the hearing.
The Tribunal also granted the respondents' request to remove four personal respondents from the applications, finding no compelling reason to continue the proceedings against them as the corporate respondents assumed responsibility for their actions.
Preliminary objections dismissed as prior Small Claims Court action was withdrawn without determining the merits.
The applicant filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination in accommodation regarding condominium parking.
The respondents raised preliminary objections, arguing the applications were barred because the applicant had previously commenced and then consented to dismiss a Small Claims Court action regarding the same issues.
The Tribunal dismissed the preliminary objections, finding that the Small Claims Court did not deal with the substance of the applications, the matter was not settled, and there was no abuse of process.
The Tribunal directed the parties to provide further submissions on the respondents' request to remove the personal respondents.
Leave to appeal costs order granted due to potential misapprehension of facts and errors in principle.
The applicant Children's Aid Society sought leave to appeal a costs order requiring it to pay the respondent stepfather's costs on a full recovery basis in a child protection and status review proceeding.
The motion judge granted leave to appeal, finding reason to believe the costs judge misapprehended facts regarding whether the Society withheld expert reports from the respondent, and erred in principle by treating a status review application as an extension of a protection application for costs purposes.
Judicial review by way of certiorari is not available against a decision of a Superior Court judge.
The applicant sought judicial review of an order made by a Superior Court judge sitting in Family Court in a child protection proceeding.
The applicant argued that the judge should be deemed a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice under the Courts of Justice Act, making the decision subject to judicial review.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the judge was sitting as a Superior Court judge and that certiorari does not lie against a decision of a Superior Court judge.