Youri Tessier-Stall

The defendants, having succeeded on their motions for summary judgment, sought costs.

The plaintiff, Andrew Walker, argued for no costs or significantly reduced costs due to his impecuniosity and inability to test medical evidence, or for a suspension of the costs decision pending appeal.

The court considered Walker's financial hardship but balanced it against the objectives of cost awards, including indemnification and deterrence.

The court noted that the action was not diligently pursued and that the defendants had offered to dismiss the action without costs prior to the summary judgment motions.

Ultimately, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000 to the Crown defendants and $15,000 to the physician defendants, finding these amounts fair and reasonable given all relevant factors, including access to justice and hardship considerations.

The plaintiff, an inmate, brought an action against the Crown and two physicians alleging negligence and medical malpractice resulting in the amputation of his leg.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff failed to adduce expert medical evidence to support the malpractice claims against the physicians.

The claims against the Crown were dismissed as there was no evidence of the alleged workplace injury, the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the Crown was not vicariously liable for the independent contractor physicians.

A federal inmate brought an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid seeking transfer from a maximum security institution back to a medium security facility following an involuntary transfer related to an inmate assault investigation.

The applicant alleged breaches of procedural fairness, inadequate disclosure under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, and violations of section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed confidential sealed material relied upon by the warden and held that limited disclosure was justified under s. 27(3) of the CCRA to protect the safety of confidential sources.

The court concluded that the security reclassification and transfer decision were reasonable and lawful, and that the respondent satisfied its burden to justify the deprivation of liberty.

The habeas corpus application was therefore dismissed.