Charles Maher

Following the applicant's discontinuance of a judicial review proceeding against the respondent, the respondent sought an assessment of costs.

The applicant did not file any responding materials.

The Assessment Officer held that while the respondent could not be awarded costs for its motion to strike under Item 5 as the motion was not decided by the Court or abandoned by the moving party, it was appropriate to allow 2 units under Item 27 for the considerable work performed in preparing the motion.

The respondent's claim for 4 units for the assessment of costs was allowed as claimed.

The respondent's bill of costs was assessed and allowed in the amount of $900.

Following the applicant's discontinuance of a judicial review application shortly before a scheduled hearing, the respondent requested an assessment of costs.

The Assessment Officer assessed costs payable to the respondent in the amount of $900.00.

While the respondent claimed costs under Item 5 for the preparation of a contested motion, the Assessment Officer held that because the motion was not abandoned by the moving party and was not disposed of by the Court, costs could not be awarded under Item 5.

However, exercising positive application of costs provisions, the Assessment Officer allowed 2 units under Item 27, in addition to 4 units for the assessment of costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Appeal Division of the Social Security Tribunal denying her leave to appeal a decision refusing to antedate her employment insurance claim.

The applicant delayed filing her claim because she was waiting for her Record of Employment and was unaware of the timeline to file.

The Federal Court found the Appeal Division's decision reasonable, noting that ignorance of the law and waiting for a Record of Employment do not constitute "good cause" for delay under the Employment Insurance Act.

The applicant, an inmate, sought an order for habeas corpus to challenge his administrative segregation at Millhaven Institution and his impending involuntary transfer to Atlantic Institution.

He argued that his initial segregation was unlawful and that the subsequent transfer decision, based on the same facts, was also illegal, constituting a deprivation of liberty and breaching the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The respondent contended that the court lacked habeas corpus jurisdiction because the applicant's segregation had become voluntary pending the court's decision, and a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions does not amount to a deprivation of liberty.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's current segregation was voluntary, thus not engaging habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.