M. Jarmoc

The accused renewed his section 11(b) Charter motion for unreasonable delay, arguing that the delay between conviction and sentencing violated his rights.

The court dismissed the renewed motion, noting that the Jordan framework does not apply to post-trial delay.

Furthermore, the court found the 9-month delay between conviction and sentencing was reasonable, as it was primarily caused by the preparation of pre-sentence reports and the accused's own unsuccessful Charter motions.

The defendant, facing drug trafficking and criminal organization charges, brought a mid-trial application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of wiretap evidence, alleging a breach of Crown disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The issue concerned whether Monitor Post Reports (MPRs) alone constituted sufficient disclosure of wiretap intercepts, or if all audio recordings were required, and whether the disclosure method was misleading.

The court found that while the Crown did not wilfully breach its obligations, the disclosure method was insufficient due to a lack of clear explanation regarding the relationship between the MPRs and the disclosed audio recordings.

Despite some lack of diligence by defence counsel, the court determined that the defendant's trial fairness rights were compromised.

Given the extensive time required for the defence to review the newly disclosed audio recordings and the judge's impending compulsory retirement, an adjournment was deemed impractical.

The court granted a mistrial, allowing for a new trial where previous pretrial decisions and admitted evidence could be incorporated.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from a one-party consent wiretap authorization that was previously found to violate s. 8.

The court first determined that viva voce evidence of the conversation between the police agent and the defendant was inextricably linked to the recording and must be considered in the s. 24(2) analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach was not at the higher end of the continuum, the defendant's expectation of privacy in a public restaurant was low, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court concluded that excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore admitted the evidence.

The defendant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through a series of wiretap authorizations, arguing the initial Information to Obtain (ITO) was inadequate and misleading.

The court reviewed the ITO, noting material omissions regarding the police agent's criminal record and financial compensation agreement.

After editing and amplifying the ITO, the court found that while there were reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been or would be committed, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that information relating to the offences would be obtained through the interception sought.

The initial authorization was set aside, rendering the evidence obtained a presumptive violation of s. 8 of the Charter.