P. Theodore Matlow

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that awarded her $5,000 for discrimination.

The applicant argued the award was unreasonable because it did not compensate her for lost wages akin to a wrongful dismissal claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the HRTO's award was based on a procedural failing in the duty to accommodate and was distinct from common law wrongful dismissal damages.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the court found the HRTO's decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable, and defensible outcomes.

The successful defendants/appellants sought costs of $63,158 following an appeal that set aside an order and a certificate of pending litigation.

The Divisional Court found the requested amount excessive and fixed costs at $45,000 all-inclusive for the motion to set aside the certificate, the motion for leave to appeal, and the appeal itself.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a Notice of Garnishment served on a law firm invalid and unenforceable.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge erred in law by holding that funds in the lawyers' trust account were not subject to garnishment, as the funds were advanced to satisfy a mortgage debt and could have been withdrawn by the debtor.

However, the court upheld the motions judge's decision based on his equitable discretion, finding no error in his conclusion that the garnishment was an oppressive step in the context of the family dispute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The tenants appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board on review, which had reversed an earlier order dismissing the landlords' application to terminate the tenancy for personal use.

The original Board Member found the landlords' notice was not given in good faith and that they were in serious breach of their responsibilities.

The reviewing Board Member found the original member erred by considering the reasonableness of the landlords' motives.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the reviewing member unreasonably restricted the meaning of 'good faith' by excluding consideration of motives, and unreasonably failed to address the landlords' serious breach of responsibilities.

The original order dismissing the termination application was restored.

The appellant landlords appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that their mobile home park was subject to rent control.

The landlords argued that the property was exempt under section 6(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act because it was not used as a trailer park before November 1, 1991.

The Board found that because a bungalow on the property had been used for residential purposes before 1991, the exemption did not apply.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's interpretation, dismissing the appeal.

The plaintiff appealed an order of a Master dismissing a motion seeking to compel a hospital to produce a specific individual as its corporate representative for examination for discovery.

The proposed representative was no longer an officer, director, or employee of the corporate defendant but acted as an independent contractor.

The court held that Rule 31.03(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure limits corporate representatives on discovery to officers, directors, or employees, and the court lacks discretion to compel other individuals.

The judge found the rule’s language clear and rejected attempts to expand its scope through case law.

The appeal was dismissed and the Master’s order upheld.

The applicant sought an order requiring the respondents to de-register shares held in his RRSP and transfer them in kind without withholding tax.

The respondents refused to process the withdrawal without first determining the fair market value of the privately held shares in order to calculate withholding tax under the Income Tax Act and Income Tax Regulations.

The court held that the regulatory provisions relied upon by the respondents concerning withholding tax on remuneration between employers and employees did not apply to withdrawals from a privately administered RRSP where no employment relationship existed.

As no prescribed rule requiring withholding tax in the circumstances was identified, the respondents had no legal basis to refuse the withdrawal or insist on a valuation letter.

The court ordered that the shares be de‑registered without deduction for withholding tax.

The appellant in a wrongful dismissal action sought to review a single Divisional Court judge's order dismissing her motion to admit fresh evidence on her pending appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to allow amendments to the statement of claim, finding the limitation period had expired and rejecting the appellant's argument that she was incapable due to mental health issues.

The Divisional Court panel held that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by applying the Palmer test to reject the fresh evidence before the appeal was heard on its merits.

The panel set aside the order, directing that the admissibility of the fresh evidence be determined by the judge hearing the appeal.

The applicant, a former student, sought judicial review of York University's actions, including issuing a trespass notice and a cease and desist letter, and its handling of his records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that judicial review is a public law remedy and the University's actions were taken as a private landowner.

The court also held that the Charter did not apply to the University's actions as they were not governmental in nature, and noted that complaints regarding criminal conduct, human rights, or privacy must be pursued in other forums.

The appellant, a chiropodist, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he breached professional standards by attempting to induce teachers to purchase orthotics during presentations.

He challenged the panel's findings, its refusal to grant an adjournment to retain a new expert, and the penalty imposed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the panel's decision reasonable and the refusal of an adjournment within its discretion.

The court allowed the appeal in part regarding the penalty, imposing a $5,000 cap on the costs of supervision, but otherwise upheld the $38,000 costs order and awarded $15,000 in appeal costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay rent arrears, arguing the motion judge was biased.

The appellant alleged institutional bias because the respondent's counsel also served as a Deputy Judge in the same region as the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional bias, noting that Deputy Judges are permitted to practice law and are not accorded special status.

The court also rejected the allegation of actual bias, finding the motion judge's order was a proper exercise of discretion.

The applicants, a non-Catholic student and his father, sought an exemption from mandatory attendance at liturgies and religious retreats at a Roman Catholic secondary school.

The school board refused, arguing these activities were not 'programs or courses of study in religious education' under section 42(13) of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court held that liturgies and retreats are planned series of events with a central purpose of religious education and experience, thus qualifying as programs under the Act.

The application for judicial review was allowed, and the student was granted the exemption.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against their homeowners' insurance provider for the theft of medical marijuana plants from their backyard.

The insurer had paid out a limited amount under the 'landscaping' extension but denied full coverage under the 'personal property' provision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while the stolen plants became personal property upon being detached from the ground, they were not 'usual to the ownership or maintenance of a dwelling' as required by the policy.

The appellant appealed an order determining the distribution of net proceeds from the sale of a joint venture winemaking business.

The appellant argued that all shareholder loans, whether secured or unsecured, should be repaid pro rata based on a shareholders agreement, which would effectively ignore the respondents' collateral mortgage and give the appellant almost all the proceeds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that absent a clear provision to the contrary in the shareholders agreement, secured debts are properly payable in priority to unsecured debt.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to set aside an ex parte order granting a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) to the plaintiff.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by applying the wrong test for materiality regarding the plaintiff's failure to make full and fair disclosure on the ex parte motion.

The court held that under Rule 39.01(6), failure to disclose material facts—defined as facts that might reasonably affect the outcome of the motion—is in itself sufficient ground to set aside the order.

The appeal was allowed and the CPL was vacated.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding her $47,500 in damages and costs against her former husband for spousal abuse.

She sought a new trial or an increased award of $276,000, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing damages, rejecting expert psychiatric evidence, and denying her claims for lost income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of damages or his conclusion that the appellant's inability to work was unrelated to the abuse.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to reinstate his former spouse as a beneficiary under his extended medical benefit coverage.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant complied with the order, rendering the appeal moot.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting it also lacked jurisdiction as the order was not final, and awarded $5,000 in costs to the respondent, reduced due to both counsel's failure to recognize the appeal's futility earlier.

The applicant, an economic development corporation, sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner finding it to be an 'institution' under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

The Commissioner ordered the applicant to respond to a freedom of information request.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's original decision, finding it was reasonable to interpret the relevant regulation as capturing the applicant, despite the repeal of the underlying statutory provision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant law firm appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for unpaid legal fees.

The motion judge found the action was a nullity under section 2(1) of the Solicitors Act because it was commenced before the final account was delivered, and that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no error in law in allowing the defendants to amend their pleadings, finding the action a nullity, and concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.