Court File and Parties
CITATION: Grant v. Stockey, 2014 ONSC 2243
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 410/13
DATE: 20140408
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
THEN, MATLOW AND LEDERER JJ.
BETWEEN:
GARY GRANT Appellant
– and –
ROBERT STOCKEY, MAUREEN QUINN & MAUREEN HARRIS Respondents
-and –
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO Intervener
In Person
Ian K. Latimer, for the Respondent, Robert Stockey
Daniel Huffaker and Joshua M. Hunter, for the Intervener
HEARD at Toronto: April 8, 2014
Oral Reasons for Judgment
LEDERER J. (ORALLY)
[1] On August 7, 2012, Wein J. made an order. It ordered that the appellant, Gary Grant, pay rent, both arrears and on-going rent. Wein J. required that the payments be made to Robert Stockey through his counsel. She directed that in the event of a failure to pay the rent, any of it, Robert Stockey would be able to move ex parte for an order for termination of the tenancy, vacant possession and for permission to sell the property.
[2] On the motion, the appellant moves to set aside the order on the basis of bias. There are two grounds. The first is based on an allegation of institutional bias. This arises because counsel for Robert Stockey also serves as a Deputy Judge of the Small Claims Court. He serves in the same region as Wein J. The appellant says that a reasonable person in possession of all the relevant facts would find there must be bias. There would be an inherent tendency to show favour to a fellow judge.
[3] The argument arises because, on an earlier motion, Daley J. determined he should recuse himself from hearing this matter because he was the supervisor of Deputy Judges in the region. As we understand it, he was the supervisor of the Deputy Judge who appeared as counsel in this matter. Wein J. is not a supervisor of Deputy Judges. Daley J. went on to order the trial be heard by a judge from another region.
[4] We find that there is no institutional bias in this case. Having a shared occupation does not create such a bias. There are safeguards in place to ensure judges remain impartial. Judges are required to swear an oath of office and are required to adhere to a code that requires them to avoid conflicts of interest.
[5] When assessing a claim of bias against a judge, the reasonable person will keep in mind the “traditions of integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and “the fact that impartiality is one of the duties that judges swear to uphold” (R. v. R.D.S., 1997 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 at paras. 111 and 117).
[6] Deputy Judges have a dual role. Their judicial role is part-time. They are permitted to pursue other occupations including the practice of law. In the role of lawyers, they are not accorded any special status. The decision of Daley J. that the matter be heard by a judge from another region was an exercise of discretion. It is not a precedent and not binding on this Court.
[7] We do not accept that institutional bias is inevitably raised just because a judge is from the same region as the Deputy Judge. This is supported by s. 32 of the Courts of Justice Act, which is the section by which Deputy Judges are appointed. It places no restriction on where Deputy Judges may appear as lawyers.
[8] The second allegation of bias is made against Wein J. in respect of her decision in this matter. The appellant has made lengthy submissions as to the evidence before her. He says it does not support the order she has made and this is demonstrative of bias. It is not. There is nothing in the decision made that is inconsistent with the case, or situation, with which she was presented. It was a discretionary order she was entitled to make. Even if there was some inconsistency, or it was not a discretionary order, it would not matter. Judges can be wrong without being biased.
[9] On all the evidence, we are not satisfied that bias has been proved. The appeal is dismissed.
THEN J. (ORALLY)
[10] I have endorsed the Appeal Book and Compendium as follows, This appeal is dismissed for oral reasons delivered this day by Lederer J. on behalf of the Court.
[11] In our view, it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances to award costs in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive to the Respondent Stockey. The Crown does not seek costs and none are awarded. It is further ordered that the subject property not be sold and that rent in the amount of $1,550 per month be continued to be paid into Court pending trial on June 16, 2014, subject to further order of the Court.
THEN J.
MATLOW J.
LEDERER J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: April 8, 2014
Date of Release: April 29, 2014
CITATION: Grant v. Stockey, 2014 ONSC 2243
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 410/13
DATE: 20140408
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
THEN, MATLOW AND LEDERER JJ.
BETWEEN:
GARY GRANT Appellant
– and –
ROBERT STOCKEY, MAUREEN QUINN & MAUREEN HARRIS Respondents
-and –
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO Intervener
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEDERER J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: April 8, 2014
Date of Release: April 29, 2014