ODC 2014

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Police Civilian Commission finding the applicant police officer guilty of insubordination.

The officer had failed to comply with an order from the Chief of Police, arguing that a portion of the order requesting tax information was unlawful.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that even if the tax information request was unlawful, the officer was still obliged to obey the remaining lawful aspects of the order, and his failure to do so constituted insubordination.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her application to set aside a judgment related to a mortgage default and power of sale, claiming damages of $98,000.

The Divisional Court found it lacked jurisdiction, as its jurisdiction is limited to claims of not more than $50,000 under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal, noting the appeal lacked merit and the appellant had taken no steps to transfer it despite notice.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant seeking to have it heard in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her action for unpaid wages against the respondent's corporation.

The trial judge found the claim was statute-barred because the appellant discovered her claim when she quit her employment due to unpaid wages, more than two years before commencing the action.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the limitation period began to run when the appellant quit, not when her employment insurance claim was finalized.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the self-represented respondent.

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their residential tenancy and ordering eviction for non-payment of rent.

The tenants argued they were denied procedural fairness when the Board Member made an interim order requiring rent payments into trust and subsequently refused to hear their applications against the landlord when they failed to comply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Member had the statutory authority to control the hearing procedure and that her actions were a model of procedural fairness.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondent sought costs of $1,036.13, including in-house counsel fees.

The self-represented appellant opposed the costs award on several grounds, including that the trial judge ordered each party to bear its own costs and that the appeal was brought as a matter of social responsibility.

The Divisional Court rejected the appellant's arguments, noting that costs on appeal follow the event.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $925 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant City brought a motion to stay a construction lien proceeding pending its appeal of the trial judge's liability determination in a bifurcated trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the liability decision was an interlocutory order under the Construction Lien Act, which cannot be appealed until the damages phase is completed.

Furthermore, the court held that even if it had jurisdiction, it would not exercise its discretion to grant a stay because the City failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favored proceeding with the scheduled damages trial.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his professional negligence claim against his former solicitors.

The appellant argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding factual errors, applied an incorrect standard of proof, and created a reasonable apprehension of bias through excessive interventions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the factual findings were supported by evidence, the correct standard of proof was applied, and the trial judge's interventions were appropriate attempts to understand the evidence rather than evidence of bias.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The applicant mother sought an urgent stay of an interim access order made by the trial judge.

The trial judge, who had reserved judgment after a 20-day trial, unilaterally issued an order granting the respondent father unsupervised access over the Christmas holidays without notice, evidence, or a hearing.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding that the trial judge's order, while likely motivated by the lengthy delay in releasing the trial decision, constituted a profound violation of natural justice and was not in the best interests of the children.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding her personally liable for unpaid paralegal invoices.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of personal liability because the appellant failed to disclose she was contracting on behalf of a corporation.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired before the appellant was added as a defendant.

The court held that the limitation period began to run 30 days after the invoice date, not after subsequent demands for payment.

The action against the appellant was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 in damages and $4,000 in costs for malicious prosecution and defamation arising from false allegations of sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, relied on stereotypes, and improperly awarded costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by the evidence and that the costs award was reasonable given the six-day trial.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order that stayed their proposed class action (the Labourers Action) and granted carriage to a competing proposed class action (the DALI Action).

The underlying actions alleged securities misrepresentations by Barrick Gold Corporation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's approach to assessing the complexity of claims and the state of preparation conflicted with established case law and provided good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

The appellants, residents living near three proposed wind turbine farms, appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) that confirmed the Director's issuance of Renewable Energy Approvals (REAs) for the projects.

The appellants argued that the statutory test requiring them to prove the projects would cause 'serious harm to human health' violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statutory test aligned with the jurisprudential threshold for section 7 claims and did not depart from the consensus scientific view on wind turbines.

The Court also upheld the ERT's treatment of lay witness evidence, its finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Director's REA issuance process for Charter compliance, and its discretionary decisions denying adjournments.

The defendants sought leave to appeal two interlocutory orders compelling their witness to answer questions refused on cross-examination and refusing to vary the initial order.

The court found that the first category of questions was moot because the witness had already answered them without condition.

The court also held that the defendants failed to satisfy the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) for both categories of questions, as there were no conflicting decisions and the issues were not of such importance to warrant leave.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating his tenancy and requiring him to pay for damages to an electrical panel.

The tenant argued he was denied an opportunity to participate because he mistook the date of the continuation hearing, and that the Board was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the tenant had received proper notice of the hearing and the Board was entitled to proceed in his absence under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Court also found ample evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the tenant wilfully damaged the electrical panel.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his application for judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding his termination.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because his union failed to provide a Somali interpreter at the arbitration hearing, which he claimed fell under the deficient representation exception to the rule against individual standing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the evidence did not support the need for an interpreter and noting the applicant's proper remedy was before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that rejected his claim that s. 43(1)(c) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The impugned section limits loss of earnings benefits to two years for workers injured at age 63 or older.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the provision did not discriminate on the basis of age as it did not create a disadvantage based on prejudice or stereotyping.

The court further held that even if the provision violated s. 15(1), it would be saved under s. 1 of the Charter.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a registered nurse, was found unconscious at work after using narcotics misappropriated from the hospital.

He admitted to a drug addiction.

The College of Nurses of Ontario's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordered him to undergo an independent medical examination.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing that a report from his treating addiction specialist was sufficient and that the order violated his Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the ICRC's statutory requirement to find 'reasonable and probable grounds' before ordering an examination adequately balances Charter values, and that a treating physician's report does not substitute for an independent medical examination.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the respondent's Notice of Appeal from a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division.

The moving party argued the grounds of appeal lacked definiteness and that the order appealed from was interlocutory because it ordered a new hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the grounds were sufficiently detailed and the order was final as it finally disposed of the appeal proceeding.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision that dismissed parts of her appeal regarding a municipal Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy.

Specifically, the applicant failed to request a review or rehearing under section 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, which provides a statutory mechanism to address her claims of procedural unfairness.

The court noted that allowing the judicial review would undermine the legislative scheme, which requires leave to appeal Board decisions.