ODC 2013

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessment of its rail yard.

The applicant argued the Board erred in law by failing to find a nearby rail yard was a comparable property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the 'all points of comparison' test and made no overriding or palpable factual error in concluding the two rail yards were not comparable due to significant differences in size, building area, and daily train traffic.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that reduced her spousal support and ordered its termination, arguing the trial judge erred in finding she was able to work and had not been diligent in seeking employment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence, including the appellant's failure to provide objective medical evidence of her inability to work and her non-compliance with previous court orders to document her job search.

The court upheld the imputation of income and the spousal support order.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to reinstate his former spouse as a beneficiary under his extended medical benefit coverage.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant complied with the order, rendering the appeal moot.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting it also lacked jurisdiction as the order was not final, and awarded $5,000 in costs to the respondent, reduced due to both counsel's failure to recognize the appeal's futility earlier.

The applicant, an economic development corporation, sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner finding it to be an 'institution' under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

The Commissioner ordered the applicant to respond to a freedom of information request.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's original decision, finding it was reasonable to interpret the relevant regulation as capturing the applicant, despite the repeal of the underlying statutory provision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the father's motion for leave to appeal a temporary joint custody order, the self-represented mother sought her costs.

The court found the father's motion was unreasonable and should not have been brought.

The court awarded the mother costs on a substantial indemnity scale, valuing her time at $200 per hour, recognizing that self-represented litigants who perform work normally done by a lawyer are entitled to be compensated fairly.

The father was ordered to pay costs of $12,091.85.

The applicant moved for leave to appeal a motion judge's decision declining to determine whether Ontario or Georgia law applied to child and spousal support issues, reserving it for the trial judge.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of deferring the issue, as both parties requested an advance determination and the respondent had already appealed the jurisdiction finding to the Court of Appeal.

The defendant franchisor sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to transfer the action from Hamilton to Kitchener.

The defendant argued that leave should be granted under Rule 62.02(4)(a) due to conflicting decisions regarding the proper test for venue transfers under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b).

The court found that there were indeed conflicting lines of cases in Ontario—specifically the 'Siemens' threshold approach versus the 'Hallman' holistic approach—and granted leave to appeal to the Divisional Court to resolve the inconsistency.

The applicants filed complaints regarding police conduct during the G20 summit.

The Director initially directed the Chiefs of Police not to seek extensions of time to serve Notices of Hearing, effectively closing the matters.

The applicants sought judicial review.

Following a Divisional Court decision in another case, the Director reversed his decision and directed the Chiefs to seek extensions, which they did.

The Director then brought a motion to quash the judicial review application on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion, finding that the dispute had disappeared and there was no compelling reason to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) Chair dismissing their Request for Review of a Hearing Officer's decision.

The Hearing Officer had approved an Official Plan amendment allowing residential development on lands, parts of which were designated as a cultural heritage landscape.

The moving party argued the OMB erred by not giving deference to the factual findings of the Conservation Review Board (CRB) regarding the extent of the heritage landscape, raising issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no question of law, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB decision, and that the matter was not of sufficient general importance.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision which found that the plaintiffs' right of action for personal injuries sustained in a parking lot motor vehicle accident was not taken away under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in its treatment of post-hearing evidence and in its factual findings regarding the employment status of the defendants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, it did not breach procedural fairness, and its weighing of the evidence was entitled to deference.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board for non-payment of rent.

After failing to comply with an order by Wilton-Siegel J. to pay rent arrears, the appeal was dismissed by the Registrar.

The tenant obtained a stay and a peremptory hearing date before a full panel of the Divisional Court.

At the hearing, the tenant requested an adjournment, which was denied.

The court dismissed the appeal and lifted the stay, noting the tenant had filed no materials, continued to live in the premises without paying rent, and failed to comply with previous orders.

The self-represented appellant tenant requested an adjournment of his appeal because he had not received the hearing transcript and lacked assistance from an amicus.

The Divisional Court denied the request, noting that a previous order had made the hearing date peremptory.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring them to produce a partially redacted copy of a Mary Carter Agreement to a non-settling defendant prior to trial.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there were conflicting decisions on the extent to which the terms of Mary Carter Agreements must be disclosed to non-settling parties, and that there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on settlement privilege.

The court held that the issue was of general public importance.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim that a painting she purchased from the respondents, attributed to Norval Morrisseau, was a fake.

The trial judge found the painting was authentic based on expert handwriting analysis and fact witnesses, rejecting the appellant's evidence which included a statutory declaration by the artist.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and no reversible error of law regarding the admission of hearsay or opinion evidence under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which had issued amended orders correcting a typographical error in a 2002 assessment decision six years later, resulting in a back tax bill of over $500,000.

The Board held it lacked jurisdiction to overturn the amended decisions and that correctness outweighed any prejudice to the taxpayer.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by concluding it lacked jurisdiction and by failing to balance the objective of correctness with the delay and prejudice suffered by the taxpayer.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted Board for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her action for delay.

The action had been struck from the trial list due to the inaction of her first lawyer, and a subsequent motion to restore it was delayed by her second lawyer, who concealed his neglect from her.

On appeal, the Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence detailing the second lawyer's neglect.

The court found the Master made reversible errors by inferring intentional delay without considering the appellant's instructions to her lawyers, and by presuming prejudice due to the expiry of a limitation period.

Applying the conjunctive test from Nissar, the court held the appellant had an acceptable explanation for the delay (solicitor negligence) and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the action restored to the trial list.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an adjudicator at the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.

The applicant had requested information from the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation regarding a $20 million winning lottery ticket he claimed was stolen from him.

The adjudicator upheld the OLGC's redaction of a Draw Report and found that the OLGC had conducted a reasonable search for records in its custody or control.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the OLGC was not required to obtain records from third parties like Lotto Québec or the Interprovincial Lottery Corporation, as it did not have control over those records.

The Landlord and Tenant Board brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review filed by the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario.

The application sought to prohibit the Board from applying its rule 32, which gives adjudicators discretion to allow a legal representative to act as both an advocate and a witness.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding it plain and obvious that the application would fail because procedural fairness must be assessed in the specific context of a case, not in a vacuum.

The appellant appealed a summary trial decision dismissing her claim for $32,000 under an equity-splitting agreement related to the sale of the respondent's house.

The trial judge had found the agreement unenforceable because the appellant was not a licensed real estate agent under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, and because the agreement was unconscionable due to the respondent's vulnerability and unequal bargaining power.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the bargain was unfair and unconscionable.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay $10,000 to the respondent.

The respondent claimed the money was a loan, while the appellant claimed it was an investment in a joint business venture.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the deputy justice had improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to prove the money was an investment rather than requiring the respondent to prove it was a loan.