Laura Jane Hillyer

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the jury notices filed by the defendants in two related actions: a motor vehicle accident claim and a broker negligence claim.

The plaintiffs argued the trial was too complex for a jury and cited uncertainties regarding jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court dismissed the motion, adopting a modified 'wait-and-see' approach, holding that it was premature to strike the jury notices for a trial scheduled seven months away, and that the actions were not too complex for a jury.

The plaintiff, an experienced horseman and stable operator, suffered severe facial injuries while leading the defendant's horse.

There were no witnesses to the incident.

The plaintiff sued the defendant in strict liability (scienter) and negligence, alleging the horse had a dangerous propensity to rear and that the defendant used improper training techniques.

The court dismissed the action, finding no evidence that the horse had a prior dangerous propensity to rear vertically or that the defendant's training methods were negligent.

The court also assessed damages provisionally and held that the plaintiff's illegal immigration status did not bar his claim under the ex turpi causa doctrine.

The defendant in a personal injury action brought a motion to stay an order striking out the parties' jury notices pending her appeal.

The trial was scheduled to proceed before a judge alone due to COVID-19 pandemic delays affecting civil jury trials.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the motion judge found that the appeal lacked merit as the order was likely interlocutory, the defendant would not suffer irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favoured proceeding with the long-delayed trial.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's civil jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause a delay of 12 to 18 months if the matter proceeded before a jury.

The defendant opposed the motion, advocating for a 'wait and see' approach.

The court granted the motion, finding that the delay caused by the pandemic outweighed the defendant's right to a jury trial, and that justice would be better served by allowing the 10-year-old action to proceed more expeditiously before a judge alone.

This costs endorsement followed a ruling on a status hearing where the plaintiffs' proposed timetable for the action was accepted, and the defendants' request for dismissal was denied.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $10,668.15.

The physician defendants argued for no costs, while the hospital defendants accepted the quantum but requested apportionment.

The court found the plaintiffs were the successful party on the status hearing and were entitled to costs.

The court deemed the claimed costs reasonable and apportioned them, with the hospital defendants paying $2,668.15 and the physician defendants paying $8,000.00.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to prevent the dismissal of their medical malpractice action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the two-fold test from *Kara v. Arnold*, requiring an acceptable explanation for delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, citing the complexity of medical malpractice actions, financial difficulties of the lead plaintiff, and some lack of cooperation from defendants in scheduling discoveries.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as documents were exchanged and witnesses were available.

The motion was granted, and a timetable was set for the action to proceed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order that the trial of a motor vehicle negligence action against the provincial transportation authority proceed in Hamilton rather than Peterborough, where the accident occurred.

The claim alleged highway disrepair under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The court considered the statutory presumption under s. 33(9) that such actions be tried in the county where the default occurred, alongside the discretionary factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After weighing the location of witnesses, the plaintiffs’ disabilities, the location of treating professionals, and the comparative convenience and costs of each venue, the court concluded that the interests of justice favoured Hamilton.

The presumption in favour of the accident location was rebutted due to the significant hardship and logistical inefficiencies associated with holding the trial in Peterborough.