Deborah McPhadden

The appellant, a lawyer, sought to appeal a decision of an Appeal Panel of the Law Society that dismissed his appeal from an Appeals Management Tribunal's refusal to extend the time to appeal a professional misconduct finding.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Appeal Panel's decision was reasonable.

The court agreed that the appellant failed to meet the criteria for an extension of time, noting a lack of bona fide intention to appeal, no reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the Law Society, and no merit to the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding a finding of professional misconduct and a six-month suspension.

The misconduct arose from the appellant's breach of a bail condition prohibiting him from practicing criminal law without supervision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Law Society's jurisdiction, the application of the civil standard of proof, the assessment of credibility, or the rejection of arguments based on res judicata and abuse of process.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Hearing Panel decision and an Appeal Panel's interlocutory decision refusing a stay.

The Divisional Court quashed the application as premature, holding that the applicant must exhaust his internal remedies before the Law Society Appeal Panel before seeking review by the Court.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The Law Society of Upper Canada brought a motion to quash a summons to witnesses issued by the appellant, who sought to examine discipline counsel and investigators regarding their motivations in his disciplinary hearing.

The court granted the motion, finding the proposed questioning to be a fishing expedition, irrelevant under Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and an abuse of process.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review as premature, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The self-represented applicant argued that costs should be awarded against the successful respondent due to alleged improper conduct in its prosecution of her.

The court found that these allegations were matters still before the Law Society Committee and it would be premature to consider them.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $1,500.

The applicant sought urgent leave to have a single judge of the Divisional Court hear an application for judicial review to halt an ongoing Law Society Discipline Committee hearing.

The applicant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction due to procedural defects in authorizing the prosecution.

The court dismissed the application as premature, applying the principle that courts should avoid piecemeal judicial review and allow administrative proceedings to run their full course before intervening.