Joel Phillip Freedman

The applicant sought interim spousal support and an order for a business evaluation of the respondent's personal service corporation, Finnie Consulting.

The court found the applicant unable to obtain work due to age, educational background, and health issues, while the respondent maintained a stable income.

Interim spousal support of $2,800 per month was ordered, effective January 1, 2017.

The court granted leave for the applicant to obtain an opinion on the corporation's value, rejecting the respondent's argument that it was a joint asset requiring shared evaluation costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 7 for approval of a $6,625,000 settlement in a medical negligence action arising from severe birth injuries to the minor plaintiff.

The court approved the overall settlement amount but found the solicitor's proposed contingency fee of over $1.5 million to be unreasonable given the time expended and the results achieved.

The court reduced the legal fees to $1,000,000 and also reduced the proposed allocation of funds to the parents' Family Law Act claims to ensure the minor plaintiff received adequate funds for his lifelong care needs.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order granting a Mareva injunction and a Certificate of Pending Litigation against his home.

The plaintiff had sued the defendant after being shot by him.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order because the requirements for a Certificate of Pending Litigation were not met, and the evidence of dissipation of assets for the Mareva injunction was based on the defendant's ill-health and need to pay legal fees rather than an intent to avoid judgment.

The court also found the matter to be of sufficient importance as the order expanded the circumstances in which such injunctions are granted.

Following an arbitration decision where the applicant was partially successful in claiming statutory accident benefits, both parties sought their expenses of the proceeding.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was entitled to her expenses because she was partially successful and reasonably proceeded to a hearing to preserve her claim for future medical benefits, despite the insurer's offer to settle.

The insurer was ordered to pay the applicant's expenses of the arbitration and the expense hearing, fixed at $8,764.14 plus HST.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for caregiving, housekeeping, and home maintenance.

The insurer terminated these benefits, arguing the applicant failed to provide requested information under section 33 of the Schedule and that she was no longer disabled.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's pre-existing chronic pain was significantly exacerbated by the accident, resulting in a substantial inability to perform her pre-accident caregiving and housekeeping duties.

The arbitrator also held that the insurer's requests for additional medical information and an Election of Benefits were unreasonable, as the insurer already had sufficient information to determine entitlement.

The applicant was awarded the claimed benefits and interest on the overdue amounts.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, noting the Tribunal's strong privative clause.

The court found that the Tribunal reasonably relied on the lack of temporal linkage between the applicant's employment and his diagnosis, as well as credibility findings and medical evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The insurer brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's arbitration proceeding for statutory accident benefits due to her failure to pursue the claim and attend pre-hearings.

The applicant, who had difficulty retaining counsel due to personal circumstances, finally retained a lawyer who attended the motion and undertook to produce requested documents.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion to dismiss, ordered the applicant to produce the specified documents within 30 days, and awarded the insurer $250 in costs thrown away for the applicant's previous non-attendance.

The appellant was blinded in the eye by a bungee cord while helping the respondent secure a mattress to the roof of a van.

The appellant sued the respondent for negligence.

The respondent sought coverage under the appellant's automobile insurance policy and his own homeowners' policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was not an 'occupant' or in 'possession' of the van, so the automobile insurer had no duty to defend.

However, the Court found that the homeowners' insurer did have a duty to defend, as the allegations of negligence (failing to warn about or test the bungee cord) could constitute concurrent non-auto related causes, meaning the claim did not clearly fall within the policy's exclusion for injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle.

The applicant union applied for certification in the construction industry.

The intervenor unions argued the application should be dismissed on grounds of estoppel, fraud, and abuse of process, alleging the applicant breached a prior settlement agreement by failing to negotiate a collective agreement with the employer.

The Board dismissed these arguments, holding that estoppel cannot prevent the operation of a public statute like the Labour Relations Act, and that the applicant's conduct did not amount to fraud or an abuse of process as there was no misrepresentation or violation of the Act.

The applicants alleged that the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers violated the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by imposing a receivership on the Ontario Provincial Conference.

The Board found that the parent union lacked just cause to impose the receivership, as it was attempting to use its constitutional power to force the local union to abandon its statutory rights and surrender in an ongoing dispute over local autonomy.

The receivership was declared null and void.

The applicant local unions applied under section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging that the respondent international union violated section 150 by refusing to recognize the locals' right to appoint trustees to the Canadian pension plan.

The Board found that the Canadian Plan was a separate plan from the American Plan and constituted an 'employment benefit plan' under section 150.

The Board declared that the international union violated section 150 by refusing to accept the right of the applicant local unions to appoint trustees, and determined that the locals were entitled to appoint 58.33% of the trustees.