Serena Lein

The court fixes costs following an undefended trial in a family law matter where the respondent repeatedly ignored court orders and failed to participate in the proceedings.

The applicant sought full recovery of costs due to the respondent's bad faith conduct.

The court found that the respondent's actions—deliberately ignoring orders and withholding parenting time to leverage financial issues—constituted bad faith.

Costs were fixed at $45,000, to be paid from the respondent’s share of the matrimonial home.

This decision addresses a high-conflict family law matter involving parenting time, decision-making authority, and financial issues following the separation of S.M. (applicant) and N.E. (respondent).

The court reviews the respondent's repeated non-compliance with court orders, her failure to participate in proceedings, and the resulting orders for an undefended trial on financial issues.

The court ultimately denies the respondent's motion to set aside the undefended trial, grants the applicant sole decision-making authority for the child, and sets out detailed orders regarding child support, the matrimonial home, and costs.

The Applicant sought an adjournment of a Trial Scheduling Conference (TSC) and leave for a second Settlement Conference, citing outstanding disclosure and the need for expert reports.

The Respondent opposed, seeking dismissal of the Applicant's requests, costs, and orders regarding travel consent and in-person questioning.

The court dismissed both the Applicant's and Respondent's 14B motions, emphasizing the parties' history of non-compliance with court orders and the Family Law Rules.

The TSC was ordered to proceed as scheduled, and no costs were awarded due to both parties' conduct.

Both the Applicant and Respondent brought motions seeking an interim variation of the summer parenting time schedule established by a final order.

The court applied the test for interim variation, which requires strong prima facie proof of a material change in circumstances, an important parenting issue, urgent circumstances, and the remedy being in the child's best interests.

The court found that neither party had demonstrated a strong prima facie proof of a material change in circumstances.

Consequently, both motions were dismissed, and the provisions of the original Final Order were directed to govern the summer schedule, with specific timelines for the parties to make their selections.

This trial concerned parenting issues, including decision-making and parenting time for a seven-year-old child.

The father sought 50-50 parenting time, joint decision-making, or sole decision-making, while the mother sought primary parenting and sole decision-making.

The court found the father's communication abusive and controlling, and his credibility low, concluding that joint decision-making or parallel parenting would be contrary to the child's best interests due to the high conflict initiated by the father, his lack of cooperation, poor judgment, refusal to pay child support, and disregard for court orders.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority and adjusted the father's parenting time to be less disruptive for the child, while ensuring maximum contact consistent with the child's best interests.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a final consent order on an interim basis to increase his parenting time with the parties' 12-year-old daughter to an equal week-about schedule.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing the father failed to prove a material change in circumstances.

The court found that a review provision in the final order allowed for a review without proving a material change.

Relying on the first of two conflicting Voice of the Child reports, the court determined that an equal parenting schedule was in the child's best interests and granted the father's motion.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the Respondent successfully obtained an order resuming parenting time with the parties' daughter, necessitated by the Applicant's non-compliance with a previous order.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found the Respondent to be the successful party on the underlying motion.

The Respondent sought full indemnity costs, while the Applicant sought partial indemnity.

The court denied full indemnity costs, finding no bad faith by the Applicant and noting the Respondent's offer to settle did not meet the criteria for full recovery under Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court awarded the Respondent partial indemnity costs of $3,000, all-inclusive.

The Applicant brought an urgent motion seeking a temporary parenting order for her two young children, requesting primary care and specific access for the Respondent.

The Respondent opposed, raising concerns about the Applicant's mental health and parenting ability, initially seeking limited/supervised access, and later proposing a 50/50 schedule.

The court found the Respondent's credibility deeply flawed due to inconsistencies and strategic use of criminal charges.

The court granted the Applicant's request, returning the children to her primary care, citing the children's best interests, the pre-separation status quo, and the Respondent's failure to prioritize the children's needs post-separation.

The Applicant's request for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home was dismissed without prejudice.

The respondent brought an urgent motion to resume parenting time with the parties' daughter, which the applicant had withheld due to COVID-19 concerns.

The applicant sought to suspend the parenting schedule.

The court affirmed that existing parenting orders should continue unless there are compelling reasons for change, emphasizing the child's best interests and the need for parental cooperation during the pandemic.

The court dismissed the applicant's request to suspend the schedule and ordered both parties to adhere to the existing agreement and order, along with strict COVID-19 health protocols.

The applicant sought costs of $27,750 on a substantial indemnity basis following a motion where she successfully proved the respondent breached a prior court order, though she was unsuccessful on other claims.

The respondent sought costs of $8,458.05, claiming success on a contested adjournment.

The court found the respondent was not entitled to costs as he was unsuccessful on the principal issue of his breach.

However, the court reduced the applicant's costs claim, noting over-lawyering, unnecessary case law, and excessive costs submissions.

The court ordered the respondent to pay costs of $10,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment settling the division of matrimonial property following a marriage breakdown.

The central issue was whether the respondent was a beneficial owner of the matrimonial home held solely in the appellant's name.

The trial judge found the respondent was a beneficial owner based on the parties' pattern of joint financial ventures in real estate.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding beneficial ownership, in denying an adjournment request, in failing to assist her as a self-represented litigant, and in refusing an unequal division of net family property.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child from Toronto to Ottawa to live with her new husband, a diplomat.

The respondent father opposed the relocation and sought joint custody with parallel parenting arrangements.

The court granted sole custody to the mother and permitted the relocation to Ottawa, finding that the mother was the primary caregiver since the child's birth and that the proposed move was in the child's best interests.

The court established a detailed access schedule for the father including alternate weekends and extended holiday access, and ordered child support and section 7 expense contributions.

This costs endorsement followed motions where the applicant sought to change a spousal support order and the respondent sought to strike the applicant's motion and other relief.

The court largely dismissed both the respondent's strike-out motion and the applicant's interim relief motion.

Neither party met their settlement offers.

The respondent sought costs, arguing partial success, but the court found her strike-out motion largely ill-advised and unnecessary, failing to resolve issues or significantly advance the matter.

Consequently, no costs were awarded to either party.

The Applicant sought to change a spousal support order and reduce costs enforceable as support, citing bankruptcy and the time-limited nature of the support.

The Respondent sought to strike the Applicant's motion, obtain security for costs, and lift a stay on her cross-appeal.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to strike the Applicant's pleadings, her request for security for costs, and her request to lift the stay of her cross-appeal.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the Applicant's claim to reduce costs enforceable as support and dismissed the Applicant's request for an interim stay of the support and costs orders.

The court declined to make an interim determination on the termination of ongoing spousal support, leaving it for the main motion to change.

In the context of a motion to change spousal support, both parties brought cross-motions seeking to compel the other to provide answers to outstanding undertakings and refusals from questioning.

The respondent claimed a catastrophic change in financial circumstances, including bankruptcy and the sale of his business, while alleging the applicant had undisclosed wealth.

The court reviewed the extensive lists of requested financial and corporate documents, applying the principles of relevance and proportionality under the Family Law Rules.

The court granted divided success, ordering both parties to produce certain relevant documents while dismissing requests that were overly broad, irrelevant, or already sufficiently answered.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that advancements of funds from his father totalling $157,414 were gifts rather than loans.

The advancements were invested in the matrimonial home held in the appellant's name.

The characterization of these funds as gifts or loans directly affected the calculation of the appellant's net family property in the family law proceeding.

The trial judge found the advancements were gifts and therefore included in the appellant's net family property.

The appellant argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and erred in fact and law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no reversals of the burden of proof and no palpable and overriding errors in the evaluation of evidence.

Following a seven‑day trial concerning a Hague Convention application for the return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant father had sought the return of the child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, while the respondent mother successfully relied on the Article 13(b) exception to resist return.

The successful party sought full recovery costs of over $83,000, arguing complete success and reliance on discretionary factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The court rejected the argument that costs could only be awarded under Article 26 of the Hague Convention and held that the ordinary operation of Rule 24 applied.

While some reductions were warranted, the court found the bill of costs generally reasonable and awarded the successful party $64,000 in all‑inclusive costs.

The applicant father sought the return of a child to Perú under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after the respondent mother retained the child in Ontario beyond a court‑authorized travel period.

The mother conceded the retention was wrongful but relied on the Article 13(b) exception, arguing that returning the child would expose her to a grave risk of psychological harm or an intolerable situation due to persistent domestic violence, threats, harassment, and violent confrontations involving the father and his family in Perú.

After a full trial, the court found credible evidence of ongoing intimidation, physical altercations, and the child’s exposure to violence and instability.

The court concluded the mother met the high threshold under Article 13(b), and that undertakings or temporary protective measures would not sufficiently mitigate the risks, particularly given the likelihood of further harassment and possible arrest of the mother upon return.

The application for the child’s return was dismissed, allowing the mother’s custody claim in Ontario to proceed.