Giovanna Sabrina Cacciola

The respondent sought to recover costs incurred in anticipation of a motion to set aside Minutes of Settlement that the applicant threatened but never brought.

The court found that costs incurred for preparing draft motion materials for a never-brought motion were not recoverable.

However, costs incurred in efforts to clarify the applicant's intention to proceed with the motion were recoverable, as the applicant's unreasonable actions caused significant delay and rendered settlement discussions unproductive.

The court awarded $3,500 in costs to the respondent.

The Applicant sought to enforce an informal handwritten settlement document signed by the parties regarding property and support issues.

The Respondent argued it was merely a framework.

The court applied contract law principles, finding that the document lacked an essential term regarding the method and timing of the $650,000 payment.

Despite the parties' subjective belief of a final agreement, an objective assessment of their conduct revealed an "agreement to agree" on this crucial term.

Consequently, the document was deemed unenforceable, and the Applicant's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, requiring the matter to proceed to a full trial.

The court also found that the formal requirements of s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act were met, as the agreement was in writing, signed, and witnessed by sworn testimony.

This costs endorsement followed motions where the applicant sought to change a spousal support order and the respondent sought to strike the applicant's motion and other relief.

The court largely dismissed both the respondent's strike-out motion and the applicant's interim relief motion.

Neither party met their settlement offers.

The respondent sought costs, arguing partial success, but the court found her strike-out motion largely ill-advised and unnecessary, failing to resolve issues or significantly advance the matter.

Consequently, no costs were awarded to either party.

The Applicant sought to change a spousal support order and reduce costs enforceable as support, citing bankruptcy and the time-limited nature of the support.

The Respondent sought to strike the Applicant's motion, obtain security for costs, and lift a stay on her cross-appeal.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to strike the Applicant's pleadings, her request for security for costs, and her request to lift the stay of her cross-appeal.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the Applicant's claim to reduce costs enforceable as support and dismissed the Applicant's request for an interim stay of the support and costs orders.

The court declined to make an interim determination on the termination of ongoing spousal support, leaving it for the main motion to change.

A temporary motion for custody and guardianship of a four-year-old orphan from Afghanistan who survived a Taliban attack that killed his parents and siblings.

The applicants, the child's maternal uncle and aunt, sought temporary custody until the maternal grandmother could arrive in Canada.

The respondent, the child's father's nephew who had obtained legal guardianship in Afghanistan and brought the child to Canada for medical treatment, opposed the motion and sought custody.

The court found that the respondent had validly obtained guardianship in Afghanistan with the consent of the maternal grandmother, that the child had been in the respondent's stable and loving care for nearly two years, and that the applicants' allegations of abuse were unsubstantiated and made in bad faith.

The court granted custody to the respondent and his wife, denied the applicants' request for the Office of the Children's Lawyer to be appointed, and prohibited the applicants from having contact with the child without the respondent's consent.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a temporary order to move the parties' 12-year-old child from a private school to a public school gifted program for Grade 7.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing the child should remain at the private school and that the issue required a trial.

The court found it had jurisdiction to make a temporary order regarding school choice if it was in the child's best interests.

However, the court dismissed the motion, finding the mother had not met the onus of demonstrating that a change in schools was in the child's best interests at this time, particularly given the child's preference to remain at his current school and the lack of comprehensive expert evidence evaluating both options.

The court ordered an independent assessment under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to determine the issue for trial.