Jeffery Wilson

Following a seven‑day trial concerning a Hague Convention application for the return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant father had sought the return of the child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, while the respondent mother successfully relied on the Article 13(b) exception to resist return.

The successful party sought full recovery costs of over $83,000, arguing complete success and reliance on discretionary factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The court rejected the argument that costs could only be awarded under Article 26 of the Hague Convention and held that the ordinary operation of Rule 24 applied.

While some reductions were warranted, the court found the bill of costs generally reasonable and awarded the successful party $64,000 in all‑inclusive costs.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children, J.B. (age 14) and S.B. (age 12), whose parents have a lengthy history of conflict spanning approximately eight to nine years.

The children's emotional distress, particularly J.B.'s suicidal ideation and hospitalization, was directly linked to parental conflict over school choice and ongoing litigation.

The court determined that J.B. was at risk of emotional harm if returned to his father's care, as the father continued to involve the child in parental disputes despite court proceedings being ongoing.

The court ordered J.B. to remain in the temporary care of the society with supervised access to both parents, and S.B. to remain with his mother under society supervision.

A father brought an application under the Children’s Law Reform Act seeking shared custody of a newborn child born in California after the mother travelled there late in pregnancy.

The primary issue on the motion was whether Ontario had jurisdiction over custody despite the child never residing in Ontario.

The court found that both parents were habitually resident in Ontario before the mother travelled to California and that the mother’s intention to relocate permanently to California arose only after the child’s birth.

Invoking the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to address a gap in the statutory definition of habitual residence, the court held that Ontario had jurisdiction to determine custody.

The court also held that the respondent’s earlier Notice of Constitutional Question constituted attornment to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.

The applicant mother brought a motion to transfer her motion to change a final custody order from Elliot Lake to Brantford, arguing it should be heard together with a child protection proceeding involving her third child.

The respondents, who have had custody of the two children in Elliot Lake since 2003, opposed the transfer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the preponderance of evidence regarding the children's best interests, including their education, friends, and community ties, is located in Elliot Lake, and there was no merit to dragging the respondents into the applicant's child protection litigation in Brantford.

The applicant father sought the return of a child to Perú under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after the respondent mother retained the child in Ontario beyond a court‑authorized travel period.

The mother conceded the retention was wrongful but relied on the Article 13(b) exception, arguing that returning the child would expose her to a grave risk of psychological harm or an intolerable situation due to persistent domestic violence, threats, harassment, and violent confrontations involving the father and his family in Perú.

After a full trial, the court found credible evidence of ongoing intimidation, physical altercations, and the child’s exposure to violence and instability.

The court concluded the mother met the high threshold under Article 13(b), and that undertakings or temporary protective measures would not sufficiently mitigate the risks, particularly given the likelihood of further harassment and possible arrest of the mother upon return.

The application for the child’s return was dismissed, allowing the mother’s custody claim in Ontario to proceed.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a motion judge's decision to conditionally certify a class action on behalf of aboriginal people placed in non-aboriginal foster or adoptive homes.

The motion judge had found that the statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action but conditionally certified claims in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, effectively pre-approving an amended pleading.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by predetermining the viability of the cause of action without conducting a full analysis and denying the defendant the opportunity to argue the certification criteria.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend, and the certification motion was ordered to be heard by a different judge.

The appellant father appealed an order under the Hague Convention requiring the return of his 13-year-old daughter to Mexico.

The child had previously been granted Convention refugee status in Canada based on abuse by the respondent mother.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no conflict between the Hague Convention and the principle of non-refoulement in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court held that a refugee child's s. 7 Charter rights are engaged in a Hague application, requiring a risk assessment and procedural fairness, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.

A new hearing was ordered.

The mother appealed a trial decision that transferred sole custody of her two children to the father due to her relentless campaign of parental alienation.

The trial judge had severely restricted the mother's access, making it conditional on her engaging with a specified expert for counselling and assessment, and ordered a review of access after six months.

The mother also appealed a $160,000 costs award made against her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction to order a review, did not impermissibly delegate access determination, and properly exercised her discretion in awarding costs given the mother's bad faith conduct.

The mother brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of her 13-year-old child to Mexico.

The child had previously made a successful refugee claim in Canada based on allegations of abuse by the mother.

The motion judge ordered the child's return.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to conduct a meaningful risk assessment regarding the return of a recognized refugee.

The court set aside the return order and directed a new hearing.

The moving parties brought motions within an ongoing family law appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted an order directing the Office of the Children's Lawyer to represent the child on the appeal.

The court set strict timelines for the filing of fresh evidence and factums to ensure the appeal could proceed on its scheduled dates, emphasizing the best interests of the child.

The respondent mother was ordered to permit the OCL reasonable access to the child.

Three organizations (UNHCR, CCR, and CCLA) brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the return of a child to Mexico under the Hague Convention.

The child had been granted refugee status in Canada.

The respondent on appeal sought to adjourn the intervention motions until after her motion to quash the appeal was decided.

The court dismissed the adjournment request to avoid delaying the scheduled appeal hearing.

The court granted leave to intervene to all three organizations, finding they could make useful contributions on the intersection of refugee law, the Hague Convention, and Charter rights, without causing injustice to the parties.

Strict conditions and page limits were imposed on the interveners.

The appellant father sought an extension of time to perfect his appeal of an order under the Hague Convention returning his child to Mexico.

The appellant's counsel missed the deadline by one day due to a misunderstanding of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding whether a transcript of the motion hearing constituted 'evidence'.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing the appeal was an abuse of process driven by the child's aunt rather than the father.

The court granted the brief extension, finding the intention to appeal was maintained, the delay was explained, and issues of standing and abuse of process were best left for the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Director to place a hold on an approval process for an international adoption.

The Divisional Court granted the application, quashed the Director's decision, and ordered the Director to notify the relevant authorities, including the China Centre of Adoption Affairs and the Canadian Embassy, that the temporary hold was no longer in effect and that the approval of the proposed adoption was in full force and effect.

The appellant appealed an order regarding spousal support and the construction of a 1994 consent judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings of fact, application of law, or assessment of accounting evidence.

However, based on fresh evidence admitted on appeal, the court found the trial judge's calculation of the appellant's entitlement to pension benefits fell short by $280 per month.

The court varied the order to increase support payments by $280 per month retroactively, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order finding she wrongfully removed her child from Florida and directing the child's return.

She argued the application judge erred in admitting expert evidence on Florida law, applying the wrong standard of proof, and considering post-removal paternity testing to find the respondent had custody rights.

She also sought to introduce fresh expert evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was unchallenged at the hearing and the application judge correctly determined the respondent had custody rights at the time of removal.

The fresh evidence was not admitted as it failed the due diligence test and would not have affected the outcome.

The parties separated, and the husband subsequently received 245,000 stock options from his employer.

The trial judge included a prorated portion of these options in the husband's net family property, finding they were earned prior to separation.

The trial judge also rejected the husband's expert valuation of his pre-separation options using the Black-Scholes method, instead using an 'if and when' approach based on the actual profit realized when the options were later exercised.

The Court of Appeal upheld the inclusion of the post-separation options but found the trial judge erred in using hindsight to value the options.

The Court held that the Black-Scholes method is an appropriate valuation approach for employee stock options where the underlying stock is publicly traded, and adjusted the equalization payment accordingly.

The applicants, foster parents of a child since birth, sought judicial review of a Director's decision confirming the Halton Children's Aid Society's decision to place the child for adoption with another family.

The applicants argued the process was procedurally unfair due to excessive delay and the admission of late expert evidence, and that the removal of the child violated their section 7 Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the delay was necessary to determine the child's best interests, the applicants had no section 7 rights as foster parents, and the Director's decision was reasonable based on the evidence of the child's attachment to the adoptive family.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Considering the circumstances, including offers to settle made by the appellant, the court awarded costs to the appellant in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The mother appealed an order that required her to comply with a previous consent order and imposed additional terms without reasons.

The parties agreed the order should be set aside.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer, appointed during the appeal, recommended that the children reside primarily with the mother and alternate weekends with the father pending further investigation, as the children were strongly expressing this preference.

Despite the father's concerns about parental alienation and manipulation by the mother, the Court of Appeal adopted the Children's Lawyer's recommendation as a temporary measure to prevent further deterioration of the children's relationship with their father while more information is gathered.

The Court of Appeal reviewed written submissions regarding the costs of an appeal.

The court declined to award costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

Costs of the appeal were fixed in favour of the respondent at $12,500 inclusive of GST and disbursements.