Gail Sinclair

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 435.01(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which restricts direct public financing to political parties that obtain at least 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in constituencies where they run candidates.

The application judge found the thresholds violated ss. 3 and 15 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the thresholds violate s. 3 by exacerbating disparities in the capacity of smaller parties to communicate, the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a measure to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and prevent the misuse of public funds.

The Court also found no violation of ss. 15, 2(b), or 2(d), and held that political parties lack standing to sue in their own names outside of proceedings under the Act.

The Attorney General brought a motion to stay a Superior Court judgment that declared the threshold requirements for political parties to receive quarterly allowances under the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional and read in a one-vote threshold.

The Attorney General argued the prospective payment order was automatically stayed as an order for the payment of money, or alternatively, that a stay should be granted under the tripartite test.

The Court of Appeal held the prospective order was not an order for the payment of money.

However, applying the test for a stay pending appeal, the Court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the potential politicization of the Chief Electoral Officer, irreparable harm to the public interest, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff claimed damages for his internment during the Second World War due to his Italian origin.

The court found good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, noting that prior to 1953, there was no common law cause of action in tort against the Crown, and the Crown Liability Act is not retrospective.

Leave to appeal was granted as the issues raised had implications beyond the plaintiff's interest.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act requirement that a political party must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to obtain registered party status and its associated benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 50-candidate threshold violates the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter.

The Court found that the threshold diminishes the capacity of marginal or regional parties to communicate their ideas, thereby undermining the right of citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, and the relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.

The Canadian Coalition of Liberal Rabbis for Same-Sex Marriage brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning the right of same-sex couples to marry.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the motion, arguing the Coalition lacked capacity as an unincorporated entity and that intervention at a late stage would cause prejudice.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the Coalition offered a unique perspective that would make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal without causing injustice to the parties.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in appeals concerning the entitlement of same-sex couples to marry.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the Commission had the experience and expertise to provide a unique perspective and useful contribution to the resolution of the constitutional and societal issues raised, without causing injustice to the immediate parties.

Media appellants challenged the federal election provision prohibiting the broadcasting, publication, or dissemination of new opinion survey results during the final three days of an election campaign.

The majority held that the ban infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1 because the measure was overbroad, underinclusive, and failed minimal impairment.

The Court accepted that guarding against the possible influence of inaccurate late polls was a pressing and substantial objective, but found the evidentiary basis for broad deference insufficient and emphasized the central constitutional value of political expression.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was declared of no force or effect.

The moving party brought a motion to abridge time and expedite the hearing of its appeal.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that while the Court could accommodate the parties and Attorneys General, it could not abridge the time granted under Rule 18(2) for unknown potential interveners to apply for intervener status.

The Court emphasized its unwillingness to deny potential litigants their right to seek intervener status in an important matter.