Harry Joe Hong

The applicant sought a determination regarding $172,500 held in trust from the proceeds of sale of a residential property.

The respondent asserted that monies previously provided to the applicant for tuition and living expenses gave rise to a purchase money resulting trust entitling him to those proceeds.

The court reviewed the principles governing resulting trusts and the presumption of advancement, including the requirement that the claimant provide purchase money at the time of acquisition and demonstrate an intention to retain a beneficial interest.

The evidence did not establish that the respondent contributed to the purchase price or that the funds provided earlier were loans or intended to create a beneficial interest in the property.

The court concluded that no resulting trust arose and ordered that the trust funds be released to the applicant.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The offender argued for the 10‑year statutory minimum while the Crown sought 13 years.

The court considered the nature and brutality of the stabbing, the circumstances surrounding the meeting with the victim, and the offender’s efforts to conceal the crime.

Although the offender had no criminal record and some mitigating personal circumstances, the attack was particularly violent and involved luring the victim to an isolated location.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors and considering jury recommendations, the court imposed a 12‑year period of parole ineligibility.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the lawful limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand and the breath sample obtained.

The court considered whether the demand was made "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code and whether any breach would warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that while there was a potential delay in making the demand, the "forthwith" requirement was satisfied and, in any event, the evidence would not be excluded as the breach was minimal, the real-life impact on the accused's Charter rights was negligible, and excluding highly probative evidence on a serious offence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.