Jeffrey Luke Fisher

The Crown applied for an order under section 752.1 of the Criminal Code to remand the respondent for a psychiatric assessment to determine if he might be found a dangerous or long-term offender.

The respondent had recently been convicted of attempted sexual assault, weapons dangerous, and voyeurism, marking his third conviction for sexual offences against young women.

Given his history of escalating sexual violence, mental health diagnoses including schizophrenia, and lack of insight, the court found reasonable grounds to believe he might be designated a dangerous or long-term offender.

The application was granted and an assessment by a CAMH psychiatrist was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a street altercation where he stabbed the complainant 13 times with a folding knife.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on a weapons possession charge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing a Scopelliti application to call a witness regarding the complainant's prior violent conduct while intoxicated and in restricting cross-examination on a prior peace bond; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing a Corbett application to exclude evidence of the appellant's prior firearm conviction; and (3) the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the acquittal on the weapons charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The accused was charged with firearm and drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at his family home, finding a loaded handgun, cocaine, heroin, and cash in a bedroom.

At trial, a defence witness unexpectedly testified that the firearm belonged to him.

Police arrested and interviewed the witness mid-testimony, prompting the defence to bring an abuse of process application alleging witness tampering.

The court dismissed the application, finding the police acted within their lawful ancillary powers to investigate the witness's confession.

On the merits, the court rejected the witness's confession as not credible and found the accused guilty of all charges based on constructive possession.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and two counts of failing to remain.

The appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge erred in finding reasonable grounds for arrest by misapprehending the evidence regarding the odour of alcohol, and whether the trial judge erred in articulating the test for identification based on circumstantial evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the misapprehension of evidence regarding the "strong odour" of alcohol did not undermine the overall analysis for reasonable grounds, given other strong indicia of impairment and connection to the vehicle.

On the identification issue, the court affirmed that no specific incantation is required for circumstantial evidence, and the trial judge's finding of "the logical inference" was sufficient to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of possessing heroin and cocaine after a police officer entered his unlocked public washroom stall without a warrant and discovered him with drugs.

The trial judge found a section 8 Charter breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his application of the Grant framework, specifically regarding the seriousness of the police conduct and the impact on his privacy interests.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable determination in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and search the appellant.

The trial judge found such grounds existed based on police observations of the appellant's vehicle making three stops at different locations within 15 minutes, with interactions at each location involving known drug users.

The sentence appeal challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence provision under the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The applicants, Brandon Dean Brooks and Bryan Frederick Styles, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing their drug-related charges to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was approximately 36 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, deducting periods attributable to a discrete event (judge's illness) and defence delay (one applicant's failure to appear).

After deductions, the net delay was 28 months, which did not exceed the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court also found no proven prejudice under the R. v. Morin principles.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed for both applicants.

The accused sought exclusion of firearms and drug-related evidence seized during execution of telewarrants at a rural farmhouse, arguing the warrants lacked sufficient grounds, the nighttime authorization was unjustified, the use of tear gas rendered the search unreasonable, and the telewarrant process was improperly used.

Applying the Garofoli review standard and the Debot framework for confidential informant reliability, the court held that the informant's detailed first-hand information was sufficiently corroborated and that any errors or exaggerations in the ITO did not amount to bad faith or invalidate the warrants.

The court further held that a nighttime dynamic entry was justified given the reported presence of multiple firearms and drugs, and that the planned use of tear gas was not excessive force on the facts.

No breach of s. 8 was established, and the seized items were ruled admissible at trial.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.

During a criminal jury trial, information emerged that the spouse of a juror had attended the proceedings and made comments supportive of a police witness, including remarks to the investigating officer.

The court had previously conducted an inquiry after learning the juror had received text messages from the spouse about events occurring in the courtroom.

Following new evidence from a detective about additional comments by the spouse, the court considered whether further inquiry of the jury was necessary.

Applying appellate guidance on allegations of improper juror contact, the court held that the potential taint of prejudice required a supplementary inquiry.

The judge directed that limited additional questions be put to the implicated juror to determine whether the spouse’s opinions had been communicated and whether they affected impartiality.