Paul J.I. Alexander

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his common-law wife from a single stab wound.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds: failure to answer a jury question regarding mental state for murder; admission of bad character evidence; admission of a 911 call; and misdirection on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence and gave appropriate jury instructions.

The first ground was abandoned after fresh evidence established the jury question was answered timely.

The remaining grounds were rejected as the trial judge properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and provided adequate cautionary instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of recognizance arising from a relationship with a 14-year-old.

The defence position was that the alleged events never occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge appropriately addressed inconsistencies in the evidence and that the record contained ample corroboration of the complainant's core testimony.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the victim surcharge was set aside.

The Crown applied for certiorari to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge two respondents, Justin McGregor and Herve Kalonji, on various drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, affirming the narrow scope of jurisdictional review for preliminary inquiry decisions.

The court reiterated that such decisions are reviewable only for jurisdictional errors (e.g., failing to consider all evidence, impermissible weighing), not for errors of law or sufficiency of evidence.

The judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly exercised her jurisdiction in concluding there was insufficient evidence for committal, despite some potential errors in her reasoning regarding the evidence.

The appellants were convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue on appeal concerned the validity of a search warrant obtained using information from a confidential informant.

The warrant was executed at night and resulted in the seizure of approximately 300 grams of cocaine and $46,000 in cash.

The appellants challenged the warrant on multiple grounds, including the use of the Garofoli step six procedure, the adequacy of the judicial summary of redacted information, whether the confidential informant's tip met the Debot criteria for reliability, and whether the night search was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the warrant was valid and the search lawful.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (x4) and possession of property obtained by crime, receiving a global sentence of five years and eight months.

He appealed on grounds relating to the validity of the search warrant executed at his residence, which yielded 800 grams of cocaine, 505 oxycodone pills, drug paraphernalia, and $32,880 in cash.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter s. 8 application, finding the warrant was properly issued based on a credible confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, rejecting all four grounds of appeal.

Application for appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for an appeal of conviction and sentence.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement following a two-day trial and sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment.

Legal Aid Ontario refused to fund the appeal based on lack of merit.

The applicant established lack of financial means but failed to meet the necessity threshold for appointment of counsel.

The court found that while some grounds of appeal were arguable, the applicant could effectively advance them without counsel, the record was manageable, and the court could properly decide the appeal without defence counsel assistance.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting that occurred after they were robbed at a flea market.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the jury selection process, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the periods of parole ineligibility and the sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as the trial judge had erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's sentencing position without notice and failing to give adequate weight to the appellants' youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant applied to re-open his sentence appeal and introduce fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences of his 26-month sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that a sentence of two years or more would deprive him of the right to appeal a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, admitted the fresh evidence, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day, noting the appellant's long-term residence in Canada, family ties, and lack of connections to his homeland.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to touch for a sexual purpose against his five-year-old great-niece, as well as possession of child pornography.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior consistent statements and the use of the child pornography evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the prior statements but held the trial judge erred by failing to expressly instruct the jury that the child pornography evidence could not be used to determine guilt on the sexual abuse charges.

The convictions for the sexual offences were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for possession of child pornography was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to time served after applying the correct pre-sentence custody credit.

The four applicants, who were convicted of various offences including participating in a criminal organization, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for their appeals.

The Crown conceded the applicants lacked sufficient means but argued their proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The court found that only one applicant, Ms. Neeranjan, had an arguable ground of appeal regarding her conviction for participating in a criminal organization.

Her application was allowed, while the applications of the other three were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited weapon, arguing that cross-examination on a draft affidavit was improper, the trial judge misapplied the W.D. test, and the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was fair, the trial judge properly assessed credibility and reasonable doubt, and there was a sufficient evidentiary basis to infer the appellant knew the firearm was loaded.

The appellants appealed their convictions for forcible confinement arising from a home invasion, arguing that their identity as the perpetrators was not the only reasonable inference from DNA and fingerprint evidence found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the pristine condition of the mask containing DNA, the location of the fingerprint on the duct tape roll, and the victims' descriptions of the perpetrators.

The court concluded that innocent explanations for the forensic evidence were speculative rather than reasonable.

The appellant pleaded guilty to attempted murder and threatening death after deliberately driving over his estranged wife and dragging her under his vehicle.

He was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he knew he dragged the victim, categorizing the offence as 'stark horror', and admitting prejudicial victim impact statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence reflected the appellant's moral culpability and the numerous aggravating features of the domestic violence offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 24 months' imprisonment for break, enter, and theft.

The sentencing judge had rejected a joint submission of 9 months, relying on the appellant's record and the mistaken belief that a stolen computer containing sentimental data was irretrievably lost.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in law by rejecting the joint submission without adequately considering the Crown's evidentiary concerns and relying on unproven aggravating facts.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to time served (10 months and 10 days), and a probation condition prohibiting drug and alcohol consumption was removed.