Graeme A. Hamilton

The appellants were convicted of agreeing to bribe a foreign public official, the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, contrary to the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including unreasonable delay, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial following late Crown disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional and delay arguments but allowed the appeal on the basis of the mistrial application.

The Court found that the Crown's late disclosure of communications with a key witness and information regarding a central defence exhibit impaired the overall fairness of the trial process.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicants, charged with offences under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging their s. 11(b) Charter rights to be tried within a reasonable time were infringed.

The total delay from charges to the anticipated end of trial was 44 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework, confirming a 30-month presumptive ceiling for matters proceeding by preferred indictment in the Superior Court.

After deducting defence delay and time attributed to the extradition process as a discrete event (minus a period for Crown lack of diligence), the net delay was calculated at 27 months for one applicant and 26 months and 3 weeks for the other.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling and the case was particularly complex, the court dismissed the stay applications.

The moving party obtained a judgment for conversion against a lending corporation that unlawfully seized his equipment.

After the corporation declared bankruptcy, the moving party brought an action against the corporation's insurers under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the tort of conversion involves interference with possessory rights, which does not constitute 'injury or damage to property' within the meaning of s. 132(1).

The claim was characterized as pure economic loss, which is not recoverable under the provision.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the arresting officer's reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples and whether the samples were taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The Superior Court of Justice found no material misapprehension of the evidence, noting the officer's roadside observations were corroborated and the delays in taking breath samples were adequately explained by the need to secure the collision scene and provide the appellant a reasonable opportunity to consult with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.