Court of Appeal

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple drug and firearms offences and was sentenced to a net term of just over 8 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that new evidence of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and triple-bunking, justified a reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had implicitly accounted for the likelihood of harsh conditions when imposing a sentence at the bottom of the proper range.

The court also rejected arguments that the sentencing judge misapprehended the appellant's drug addiction or his role as a street-level dealer.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside a separation agreement on the basis of duress under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's vulnerabilities were compensated by independent legal advice.

On the respondent's cross-appeal regarding costs, the Court found the application judge erred in principle by using a 'cost equalization' methodology rather than applying the proper purposes of a costs award.

The cross-appeal was allowed, and the respondent was awarded $80,000 in costs for the proceeding below, plus $12,500 for the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a release order by communicating with the complainant in his pending human trafficking trial.

The communication occurred when third parties approached the complainant with a phone connected to a video call with the appellant, who smirked at her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the smirk was an intentional communication and that the appellant knew the complainant could see him.

The court also held that the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant sought a panel review of a motion judge's order that granted him an extension of time to perfect his appeal.

The appellant failed to perfect the appeal by the extended deadline and sought a further extension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the panel review motion, finding no error by the motion judge, and dismissed a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Registrar was directed to dismiss the appeal for failure to perfect.

The appellant union engaged in secondary picketing at the respondent's premises during a lawful strike against Canada Post.

The respondent obtained an ex parte injunction under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The union appealed, arguing the injunction should have been governed by s. 102, which requires notice for injunctions connected to a labour dispute.

Although the underlying dispute had settled and the appeal was moot, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear the case.

The Court held that s. 102 applies whenever an injunction is sought to restrain picketing that has an identifiable and distinct connection with an underlying labour dispute, regardless of whether the moving party is a direct disputant.

Because the required notice under s. 102 was not provided, the injunction was issued without jurisdiction and was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of multiple charges of assaulting and threatening his children, and breaching bail orders.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge failed to consider that the youngest complainant's evidence might have been inadvertently tainted by her older sibling.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, noting that the trial judge was entitled to conclude there was no evidence of influence regarding the specific assaults that formed the basis of the convictions.

The court also declined to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings, which rejected the appellant's claim that he was framed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, contractors who supplied services and materials to an insolvent developer, appealed a motion judge's decision determining the quantum of their priority payables claim under s. 78(2) of the Construction Act.

The motion judge held that the deficiency in the holdbacks should be calculated as ten percent of the unpaid invoices, rather than ten percent of all invoices rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where there are no subcontractor lien claims at the time of the priority dispute, and a payer has fully paid invoices from a contractor, there is no deficiency in the holdbacks related to those fully paid services or materials.

Calculating the holdback based on all invoices would result in double recovery for the contractor and unfairly prejudice the building mortgagee and other creditors.

The appellant appealed his convictions and nine-year sentence for impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and related offences.

The collision occurred after the appellant drove at excessive speeds and struck oncoming traffic.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in identifying him as the driver based on seatbelt marks, and in dismissing his Charter challenges regarding his arrest and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred the appellant was the driver and correctly held that police had reasonable grounds to arrest both occupants when they blamed each other.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found the nine-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the high moral blameworthiness of the conduct.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault arising from a coercive sexual encounter, arguing that the jury was inadequately instructed on the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending that a 20-month conditional sentence for sexual assault involving penetration was demonstrably unfit.

The court held that the jury charge, read functionally and as a whole, sufficiently guarded against impermissible propensity reasoning and punishment for bad character.

However, the sentencing judge failed to justify a major departure from the usual three-to-five-year range for serious sexual assault, and a penitentiary sentence of three years was substituted.

Because the offender had completed the conditional sentence and reincarceration would not serve the interests of justice, execution of the substituted sentence was stayed.

The appellants appealed the case conference judge's dismissal of their action against the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The action was dismissed as a nullity because there was no pleading of bad faith, the PGT had immunity, the action should have been brought against Ontario, and the requisite 60-day statutory notice was not given.

The appellants argued the judge erred by determining the subject matter on the merits, prejudicing their second action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge had jurisdiction to dismiss the action as a nullity without prejudice to a new action against Ontario, and made no decision on the merits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to properly address discrepancies between the complainant's evidence and that of her sister, and misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's demeanour upon disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's brief reasons were responsive to the issues and disclosed no misapprehension of evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to find that discrepancies were explained by the passage of time and to rely on the consistent evidence of the complainant's emotional upset during disclosure to support her credibility and reliability.

Following the dismissal of the moving parties' motion on June 24, 2026, the Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the moving parties to pay the trustee in bankruptcy costs in the all-inclusive amount of $7,551.23.

The appellant, an investment adviser, was convicted of fraud, theft, and obstructing a police officer after misappropriating funds from his clients.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed himself, made cogent factual findings supported by the evidence, and correctly concluded that the appellant knowingly deceived his clients and made evasive statements to the investigating police officer.

The appellant was convicted of firearm offences after an Instagram video showed him displaying what appeared to be a loaded handgun.

The physical weapon was never recovered.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's finding that the object was a real firearm was unreasonable, as the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the possibility it was an imitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the firearm was real based on the video evidence, including the appellant's act of removing the magazine to display ammunition in response to a question about whether the gun was real.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that while the trial judge made minor errors in summarizing the collateral immigration consequences, these errors did not impact the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellants, a police officer and an employee of the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, were convicted of defrauding an elderly man's estate using a fabricated will.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing errors in the trial judge's refusal to stay proceedings for a Charter breach, admission of after-the-fact conduct evidence regarding the concealment of their affair, and an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the sentences imposed.

The appellant general contractor appealed a decision finding that the former Construction Lien Act, rather than the amended Construction Act, applied to its dispute with the respondent owners.

The application judge held that the procurement process commenced before July 1, 2018, triggering the transitional provision in s. 87.3(1)(b), even though the initial proposal contemplated a different property and the respondents did not own the final property at the time of the proposal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the proposal and the final contract related to the same improvement, and that a functional approach to ownership meant the respondents only needed to own the premises at the time of construction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous operation causing death and failure to stop after an accident causing death.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver of the truck that struck and killed a pedestrian.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of video surveillance evidence under Nikolovski, failed to apply W.(D.) to exculpatory evidence, and misapprehended evidence regarding the vehicle's features.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the extensive video evidence tracing the appellant's vehicle and properly considered all potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of the record as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and relied on facts not in evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors, holding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and grounded his findings in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after border officers found nearly three kilograms of the drug hidden in the false bottom of his carry-on suitcase.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a fabrication instruction regarding his statements to border officers and by characterizing Crown witnesses as 'professionals' who took notes compared to 'civilian' witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the jury instructions were flawed in both respects, the errors did not prejudice the appellant's right to a fair trial given the overwhelming independent evidence of fabrication and trial counsel's strategic decision not to object.

This was a sentence appeal concerning an agreed error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The parties agreed that the appellant was entitled to 101 additional days of pre-sentence custody, amounting to 152 days after applying 1.5 to 1 credit.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal sentence, allowed the appeal, and reduced the sentence accordingly.

Given that only 18 days remained to be served after the correction, the court stayed the balance of the custodial sentence in the absence of any public interest in requiring re-surrender.