Dena Nancy Bonnet

The appellant sought leave to appeal convictions arising from late-night shouting on a residential street and an interaction with police.

The court held that the causing a disturbance analysis is contextual and that it was open to the trial judge to find the offence made out on the evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that the appellant was psychologically detained when he pushed one of the officers, relying on evidence that he was free to proceed to his house.

Leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the six-year global sentence imposed for historical sexual offences against multiple child victims.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's prior sentences and lack of insight.

The court upheld the global sentence as fit for a sexual predator abusing young victims, but adjusted the allocation for specific offences to respect statutory maximums and credited 42 days for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for voyeurism and extortion arising from an internet-arranged sexual relationship and a secret recording of the complainant.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons inadequately addressed credibility, holding that a trial judge need not resolve every alleged inconsistency in a witness's statements or conduct.

The court also rejected the submission that the trial judge failed to make the necessary finding concerning the meaning of 'surreptitiously' under s. 162 of the Criminal Code.

Assuming without deciding that the term includes an intent element, the court held the trial judge found the requisite intent.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a jury finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged prejudice arising from the treatment of his name during the criminal process.

Amicus additionally argued that the trial judge should not have explained the consequences of an NCR finding to the jury and that the judge misstated an example under s. 16.

The Court of Appeal held there was ample evidence to support the verdict, no prejudice arose from the treatment of the appellant's name, the charge on consequences was permissible in the circumstances, and the mistaken example was harmless because the other branch of s. 16 was the issue at trial.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing the appellant's detention in hospital, while permitting community living under hospital supervision.

The sole issue was whether a conditional discharge could adequately replace the detention order for an NCR accused who required ongoing antipsychotic medication and rapid rehospitalization if non-compliant.

Relying on the treating psychiatrist's evidence, the court held that the Board reasonably found detention to be the least onerous and least restrictive disposition under s. 672.54 because a conditional discharge would not permit sufficiently prompt apprehension and return to hospital.

Appeal dismissed.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual abuse, arguing the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, set up a false dichotomy, and gave unreasonable weight to demeanour evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) principles and properly considered demeanour as only one of many factors in assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside an acquittal.

The trial judge had found state conduct unreasonable because the police did not take commission evidence before the victim passed away shortly after the charge was laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no evidence the police delayed their investigation or acted unreasonably, and the exception in R. v. Khelawon did not apply.

The appellant appealed his 15-month sentence for possession of child pornography, arguing it should have been in the 9 to 12-month range.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge considered all mitigating factors, including the appellant seeking treatment, and made no error in imposing a sentence that was not at the top end of the range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge allowing the witness to use a document to refresh her memory and giving the evidence the weight he deemed appropriate.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing judge intended to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of five years, but due to a mathematical error by Crown counsel regarding pre-trial custody credit, the actual sentence imposed was ten months short of the legal minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adding ten months to the sentence to comply with the mandatory minimum, and quashed the probation order as the total sentence exceeded two years.

The youth appellant, who was unrepresented and mentally ill, pleaded guilty to break and enter with intent.

The Youth Court judge accepted the plea without a proper inquiry and subsequently found the appellant not criminally responsible (NCR) based on expert evidence that failed to address the legal test for criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal found fatal procedural errors, including the failure to ensure a valid plea, lack of evidence for the NCR verdict, and denial of trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, the NCR verdict set aside, and based on the appellant's fresh acknowledgement of guilt, a conviction was entered with a sentence of one day's imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her credibility assessments and misapprehended evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave substantial reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and that any minor misapprehension of peripheral evidence did not affect the overall credibility assessment.

The court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, noting it would not assist the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and heroin, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The contraband was found during a warrantless search of her knapsack after police responded to a 911 call about a hostage situation.

The Court of Appeal found that the search violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights, as it was not justified by exigent circumstances or the Waterfield doctrine.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith in a chaotic situation and the law regarding police powers in such circumstances was uncertain.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her Vetrovec warning to the jury regarding a 'mixed witness' who gave evidence favourable to both the Crown and the defence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge should not have directed the jury to look for confirmatory evidence of the exculpatory portions of the witness's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made it clear the jury could accept the testimony without confirmatory evidence.

The Court noted that the instruction was fair to the appellant, as it did not repeat strong inculpatory evidence and provided a path to accept the exculpatory evidence without confirmation.

Furthermore, defence counsel did not object to the charge at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for multiple offences, including assault, sexual assault, and uttering threats, against three former partners.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, quashing the convictions relating to one complainant because the trial judge improperly relied on prior consistent statements that were not in evidence to bolster her credibility.

The convictions relating to the other two complainants were upheld.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentences on the remaining counts, varying them to run consecutively rather than concurrently, resulting in a total sentence of 32 months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in his Corbett ruling by admitting the appellant's full criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by admitting the record to show a disposition to violence and to balance the character of the complainant, whose character had not been attacked.

Finding a serious risk that the jury impermissibly used the record as evidence of violent disposition, the Court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to expressly address the application of the Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge should have addressed them, citing R. v. Kakekagamick.

However, because the custodial portion of the sentence had already been served and the appellant was doing well with a proposed parole plan, the court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing there was a misunderstanding over the view expressed by the pre-trial judge as to the appropriate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting it could not resolve the conflict in the affidavits and reminding the bar to place the essence of pre-trial plea discussions on the record.

The term of imprisonment and probation were found to be appropriate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact and reply evidence, and that the sentencing judge should have imposed a long-term offender order instead of a dangerous offender designation, given the potential use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge correctly concluded there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community, given his life-long condition and the uncertainty of his long-term commitment to taking sex drive reducing medication.