COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Goudge, van Rensburg and Pardu JJ.A.
IN THE MATTER OF: RODNEY WAYNE KING
AN APPEAL UNDER PART XX.1 OF THE CODE
Rodney Wayne King, appellant appearing in person
Michael Davies, amicus curiae
Dena Bonnet, for the respondent
Heard and released orally: January 21, 2014
On appeal from the finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder made on February 5, 2011 by Justice Michael Quigley of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.
ENDORSEMENT
1The appellant raises several arguments all of which in our view are unsuccessful.
2First, he says that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of not criminally responsible. We disagree. In our view, there was ample evidence to support that verdict.
3Secondly, he raises a concern about the treatment of his name during the criminal “process”. Again, we disagree. Nothing about the treatment of his name in the criminal process caused him any prejudice.
4Amicus raises two arguments. First, he says there should have been no explanation of the consequences of an NCR finding in the trial judge’s charge. We disagree. In our view, in this case, it was within the trial judge’s discretion to do as he did. The concern in R. v. Latimer about consequential reasoning if the jury is told about punishment, is somewhat muted with an NCR finding, which is a consequence rather than a punishment. Here, as well, the trial judge offered the explanation because there had been evidence about the accused’s mental condition prior to trial, his fitness to stand trial and the role of the Ontario Review Board in determining that outcome. The explanation the trial judge gave in his charge was a natural corollary to that evidence, and avoided any misunderstanding that the result might be that the accused would be freed immediately without condition. The charge told the jury clearly not to consider the consequence of an NCR finding in reaching their decision and finally, there was no objection from counsel. In all these circumstances, we find no error in the explanation offered by the trial judge.
5Second, amicus says the trial judge erred in offering a mistaken example to explain the first branch of s. 16 to the jury. We agree that the example was mistaken, being rather an example of the second branch of s. 16. However, since it was the second branch that was in issue in this case, we view the mistake as a harmless one. In the end, the appeal is dismissed.
“S.T. Goudge J.A.”
“K. van Rensburg J.A.”
“G. Pardu J.A.”
