Court File and Parties
Court File No.: 18-SA5060
Date: 2025-08-01
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
His Majesty the King, Respondent
– and –
Chatelain Jean, Appellant
Counsel:
Siobhain Wetscher, for the Respondent Crown
Mark C. Halfyard, for the Appellant Chatelain Jean
Heard: June 11, 2025
Publication Ban
Subject to any further Order by a court of competent jurisdiction an Order pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code has been made in this proceeding directing that the identity of the complainant and any information that could disclose such identity, shall not be published in any document or broadcast in any way.
Summary Conviction Appeal
On Appeal from the decision of the Honourable Justice Janet O'Brien (now Justice Janet Robb) of the Ontario Court of Justice on August 30, 2022, at Ottawa, Ontario
Maranger J.
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal from convictions on two counts of sexual assault and one count of criminal harassment registered by Justice J. O'Brien on August 30, 2022.
[2] The convictions followed a trial that lasted several days.
[3] The Appellant, Mr. Chatelain Jean, was a massage therapist, and L.S., the complainant, was his client. The sexual assaults were found to have taken place in the context of that relationship. The crux of the matter was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jean sexually assaulted L.S. by intentionally and inappropriately touching her breasts and vaginal area during a massage therapy session that took place on April 24, 2018.
[4] Mr. Jean and L.S. both testified at the trial. They gave very different versions of the events of that day. Ultimately, the decision rested on a finding that L.S.'s testimony and version of events satisfied the judge beyond a reasonable doubt that she was sexually assaulted by Mr. Jean during that session. To arrive at this conclusion, the trial judge would have had to reject Mr. Jean's testimony seen in the context of all the evidence and hold that it did not raise a reasonable doubt that a sexual assault took place.
[5] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.
Overview
[6] The factual background and the thrust of the evidence presented at the trial can be summarized as follows:
Mr. Jean was a massage therapist who treated L.S. for injuries to her back, leg, groin, and foot. The injuries were sustained in a car accident. From January until March 2018, he treated her several times at the Amberwood Chiropractic Clinic where he worked.
In April 2018, Mr. Jean opened his own clinic in the basement of his residence and began treating L.S. at that location. He treated her multiple times at his residence without any issues and in a professional manner. The areas treated included the upper chest area above the armpit, the left leg, groin, and inner thigh area.
L.S. testified that on April 24, 2018, for the first time, Mr. Jean asked her to sign consent forms for treatment of specific body parts, including the groin and chest area: she did not check off the box on the consent form for "breasts".
L.S. further testified that on that date, the treatment started normally, but then Mr. Jean began massaging her armpit area, and then moved his hand to her chest, and then her sternum between her breasts. At that point, he ran his hands over her breasts and nipples. She said it lasted about five or six seconds. That the area touched included the entirety of her breast, underneath the breast, in the breast cavity, and over both of her nipples. She said she then told him that her chest did not need work that day.
L.S. then indicated that the massage continued towards her left inner thigh and groin area as it had on previous treatment sessions. However, this time he moved over the pelvis area. The first two times it was over her underwear at the hip bone above her pubic bone, but the third time his hand went down further inside her labia and over her clitoris. His hands were moving the entire time; it lasted about a second to a second and a half. Her reaction was that she curled up into a ball. She told him to stop and that she needed to leave. He proceeded to apologize, saying that he got carried away, and asked if they were good to which she replied, "We're not fucking good".
Mr. Jean testified that the massage included L.S.'s chest and groin as he had done in the past and to which she specifically consented. He agreed that she was treated on April 24, 2018, and that he asked her to sign consent forms. He explained that the need for consent forms had to do with his being in the process of obtaining a degree in osteopathy and to demonstrate his having a certain number of clinical hours.
He testified that the treatment of L.S.'s chest was part of his normal treatment. He said he worked on her pectoral muscles and not her armpit. He also worked on her sternum and her side over her rib cage. He said he did not put his hands on her breasts as they were under the sheet which was arranged to cover her private areas. He said he draped the sheet in a V-shape, which is a technique to expose a patient's sternum, while keeping the breasts and nipples covered during a massage.
He also testified that he treated her groin area as had been done during prior appointments and was part of her treatment plan. That he used his finger to knead her abductor muscles and to move to the hip flexor. That while treating her groin muscles, he said he accidentally touched the outside of her labia. The touch was very brief. L.S. made a sudden movement. He asked if she was okay and she said, "Yes, I'm good, it's, like, no big deal". The massage continued after L.S. said she was okay.
Mr. Jean testified that L.S. left before the treatment was completed because she said she had to go to a physiotherapy appointment.
With respect to the criminal harassment allegations, L.S. testified that when she left Mr. Jean's residence she was upset and crying. She drove to her physiotherapy appointment and broke down and told her physiotherapist that Mr. Jean had touched her inappropriately. She also said that she began to receive text messages from him just before her physiotherapy appointment. The first message asked whether she left an earring at his house. She did not respond. The messages continued. He then asked if she was okay. Later in the afternoon, he said he would drop by her house to check on her. He continued to text and call her throughout the evening, but she did not reply.
L.S. further testified that at one point later in the evening she saw Mr. Jean outside in her condo parking lot. She did not interact with him. She then went to the police station and reported what happened. She gave a written statement and texted Mr. Jean back after 9 PM advising him not to contact her. Mr. Jean continued to send messages.
Mr. Jean testified that he called and texted L.S. after the appointment. He said that initially it was in relation to an earring he found in the massage room. When she did not respond to his texts and calls, he said he continued to contact her out of concern for her well-being. This was also the reason he attended her house following the appointment. When he received the text saying that he was not to contact her, he became worried that she was upset about the accidental touch, and he wanted to explain to her that it was accidental.
The trial judge convicted Mr. Jean on two counts of sexual assault and one count of criminal harassment.
Grounds of Appeal
[7] The grounds argued and issues raised on this appeal can be narrowed down to the following:
I. The trial judge failed to reconcile material inconsistencies in L.S.'s testimony.
II. The trial judge applied a stricter level of scrutiny to Mr. Jean's evidence than that of L.S.
III. The trial judge gave insufficient reasons for finding that the necessary elements for finding Mr. Jean guilty of sexual assault had been made out.
Standard of Review
[8] The approach to be used by a court sitting in appeal of a trial judge's decision was described by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Burns, [1994] S.C.R. 656, at p. 663, in the following terms:
In proceeding under s. 686(1)(a)(i), the court of appeal is entitled to review the evidence, re-examining it and re-weighing it, but only for the purpose of determining if it is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusion; that is, determining whether the trier of fact could reasonably have reached the conclusion it did on the evidence before it: R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168; R. v. W. (R.), 1992 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122. Provided this threshold test is met, the court of appeal is not to substitute its view for that of the trial judge, nor permit doubts it may have to persuade it to order a new trial.
[9] A trial judge should be afforded considerable deference as to whether the allegations before the court have been made out beyond a reasonable doubt. In R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] S.C.R. 381, at para. 24, Justice Arbour indicated:
Triers of fact, whether juries or judges, have considerable leeway in their appreciation of the evidence and in the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom, in their assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and in their ultimate assessment of whether the Crown's case is made out, overall, beyond a reasonable doubt. Any judicial system must tolerate reasonable differences of opinion on factual issues. Consequently, all factual findings are open to the trier fact, except unreasonable ones embodied in a legally binding conviction.
Issue I: Failure to Deal with Material Inconsistencies in L.S.'s Evidence
[10] The Appellant raised two specific areas of concern.
[11] The first revolved around L.S.'s testimony at trial where she indicated she told Mr. Jean to "stop" after he touched her vaginal area. That this was only mentioned for the first time at the trial. The Appellant's counsel submitted that it was never mentioned in two statements provided to the police on the date that the event took place, and that the inconsistency was brought up in cross-examination at trial and that the trial judge failed to acknowledge it or assess the impact it had on L.S.'s credibility. It was further submitted that the inconsistency was important as it went to the issue of whether the touching could have been accidental.
[12] The second area related to L.S. being unable to see a male massage therapist after the incident. She was cross-examined about having told the Crown and police at a meeting in preparation for the trial that she was unable to see male massage therapists following the incident. However, in cross-examination, she acknowledged being treated by male therapists frequently after the incident. Counsel for the Appellant argued that the trial judge in her reasons dealt with this area insufficiently and improperly in that she used circular reasoning instead of considering the matter in the credibility and reliability analysis of L.S.'s testimony.
[13] The crux of the Appellant's argument on this ground was that these were material inconsistencies that went to the core issue of the credibility and reliability of L.S.'s evidence. The judge's failure in her reasons for judgment to adequately deal with these inconsistencies constituted an error in law warranting a new trial.
[14] In R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 76, 123 O.R. (3d) 536, at paras. 14, 16-18, the Court of Appeal for Ontario set out the following relevant governing principles:
When providing reasons a trial judge is not obliged to review and resolve every inconsistency in a witness' evidence nor respond to every argument advanced by counsel. However, the trial judge should address and explain how they have resolved major inconsistencies in the evidence of material witnesses.
In considering the issue of the sufficiency of reasons, a court sitting in appeal must ask whether the reasons taken as a whole and considered with the evidentiary record, the submissions of counsel, and the live issues at trial, reveal the basis for the verdict reached.
Where a case largely turns on determinations of credibility, the sufficiency of reasons must be considered in light of the deference generally afforded to trial judges on credibility findings. It is rare for deficiencies in a trial judge's credibility analysis, as expressed in the reasons for judgment, to warrant appellant intervention.
However, the failure of a trial judge to sufficiently articulate how credibility and reliability concerns are resolved may constitute reversible error. After all, an accused is entitled to know why the trial judge had no reasonable doubt about his or her guilt.
[15] Having reviewed the relevant parts of the trial testimony transcript, the reasons for judgment provided by the trial judge, and the detailed factums provided by counsel, I would not give effect to this ground of appeal for the following specific reasons:
The trial record provides a clear path as to the evidence presented and the judge's ultimate finding of guilt. The reasons for judgment took up 98 pages of transcript. They were thorough, coherent, and explain why she arrived at the conclusion she did.
In her reasons, the trial judge frequently and specifically addressed the issues trial counsel raised relating to the proffered inconsistencies between L.S.'s testimony and other statements. The reasons often referred to specific exchanges in L.S.'s cross-examination when explaining how these issues were resolved.
The specific inconsistency raised about omitting to tell the police in her initial statement that she told Mr. Jean to "stop" was dealt with by the trial judge at pp. 41-42 of her decision. In addressing trial counsel's argument on this issue, she indicated: "On the evidence before me, [L.S.] did not agree that she had not told the officer she told Mr. Jean to stop in her statement." The judge then went on to replicate a portion of trial counsel's cross-examination on that very point. The trial judge's interpretation of the flow of L.S.'s testimony is entitled to deference. If there was an inconsistency, it was dealt with and resolved.
In any event, had L.S. agreed that she did not specifically report saying "stop" in either of her statements to the police, I agree with the Crown's submission that this would not have been a fatal inconsistency in her evidence, so much as it would have or could have represented incremental disclosure, which is common to sexual assault cases and a relevant consideration in the credibility and reliability analysis: see R. v. M.H., 2018 ONSC 7366, at paras. 73-75; R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 75.
With respect to the second inconsistency regarding L.S.'s ability to see male massage therapists following the incident, that portion of her testimony was analysed at pp. 43-44 of the trial judge's decision. Fundamentally, the trial judge accepted L.S.'s testimony in this area as truthful. When reviewed in the context of the entire cross-examination, I find her analysis respecting the alleged inconsistency to be logical in the circumstances and error-free.
Issue II: The Trial Judge Applied a Stricter Level of Scrutiny to Mr. Jean's Evidence Than That of L.S.
[16] The thrust of the Appellant's argument is that the trial judge rejected Mr. Jean's defence and evidence based on inconsistencies that were peripheral matters but concluded that the inconsistencies in L.S.'s testimony on matters that were arguably material did not serve to undermine her credibility. As such, the trial judge applied an uneven level of scrutiny in assessing Mr. Jean's testimony juxtaposed to that of L.S. in the overall credibility analysis.
[17] In R. v. Phan, 2013 ONCA 787, 31 O.A.C. 352, the Court of Appeal for Ontario set out the following governing principles relating to this ground:
Subjecting the evidence of the defence to a higher or stricter level of scrutiny than the evidence of the Crown is an error of law.
In the event the error is found, the deference owed to a trial judge's credibility assessment is generally displaced.
The uneven level of scrutiny argument is a difficult argument to succeed on in an appellate court. This difficulty stems from two related reasons: credibility findings are the province of the trial judge and attract a very high degree of deference on appeal; and appellate courts invariably view this argument with scepticism, seeing it as a veiled invitation to reassess the trial judge's credibility determinations.
[18] I would not give effect to this ground of appeal for the following reasons:
I disagree with the Appellant's interpretation of the trial judge's reasons for judgment. The bulk of the decision, in my estimation, demonstrated a carefully considered analysis of the testimony of both L.S. and Mr. Jean.
Respecting the proffered material inconsistencies relating to the testimony of L.S., I would reiterate the conclusions reached when dealing with this issue on the first ground argued in this appeal.
With respect to the testimony of Mr. Jean, in my view, the inconsistencies specifically referenced by the trial judge in rejecting his testimony went directly to the fundamental issue of whether the touching in question could have been accidental.
The best example of this is the analysis of the testimony of Mr. Jean, juxtaposed to L.S., as to what happened at the end of the massage session and in the hours that followed the session. The trial judge's analysis is fair and balanced; the evidence was critical to the determination of whether what took place could have been an accident or a sexual assault. After stipulating at p. 71 of the judgment that she "found Mr. Jean's evidence regarding the messages, phone calls and trips to [L.S.'s] home to be evasive, contradictory, and implausible", the trial judge then, from pp. 71-80 of the judgment, provided clear examples from the testimony of Mr. Jean to buttress this finding.
To paraphrase the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Phan: to succeed on this ground Mr. Jean must be able to identify something clear in the trial judge's reasons or in the record indicating that a different standard of scrutiny was applied—something sufficiently significant that the heavy door of deference is opened to the domain of the trial judge, where credibility is assessed.
There is nothing in the judgment or in the record of the evidence before the trial judge to justify interfering with the deference owed in her assessment of the credibility and reliability of the testimony of Mr. Jean and L.S.
Issue III: The Trial Judge Gave Insufficient Reasons for Finding That the Necessary Elements of a Sexual Assault Had Been Made Out
[19] In R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, and R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the governing principals relating to the sufficiency of reasons and appellate review. These can be summarized as follows:
The requirement of reasons is tied to their purpose and the purpose varies with the context. At the trial level, the reasons justify and explain the result.
Reasons for conviction in criminal cases must be sufficient to fulfil the function of explaining why the accused was convicted or acquitted, providing public accountability, and permitting effective appellate review.
Appellate courts are to take a functional, substantive approach to sufficiency of reasons, reading them as a whole, in the context of the evidence, and the arguments at trial with an appreciation of the purposes or functions for which they are delivered.
The basis for the trial judge's decision must be capable of being made out. In other words, a logical connection between the decision and the basis for the decision must be apparent. This does not require a detailed description of the judge's process in arriving at the decision.
In determining whether there is a logical connection between the decision and the basis for it, an appellate court looks to the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the history of the trial to determine the "live" issues as they emerge during the trial.
The degree of detail in a judge's reasons for decision will vary with the circumstances. Less detail may be required in cases where the basis for the decision is clear from the record, even without it being specifically articulated. The need for more detail may be required where the trial judge is called upon to address troublesome principles of law or to resolve confused and contradictory evidence on key issues.
Where the path taken by the trial judge through confused or conflicting evidence is not at all apparent, or there are difficult issues of law that need to be confronted but which the trial judge has circumnavigated without explanation, the trial judge's reasons could be found insufficient and warrant appellate intervention.
[20] The thrust of the Appellant's argument on this ground was that the trial judge gave insufficient reasons as to how she found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jean intended to touch as opposed to accidentally touched the disputed areas of L.S.'s body, and how the touching was objectively sexual in nature.
[21] More specifically, the Appellant submitted that the trial judge, while providing an extensive analysis regarding the credibility and reliability of L.S.'s and Mr. Jean's testimony, failed to account to him or the public why she found that the essential elements of a sexual assault had been proven, specifically whether the touching, given its brevity, was intentional and objectively sexual in nature. Further, the Appellant submitted that the trial judge's reasons frustrated appellate review.
[22] I disagree with the Appellant's interpretation of the trial judge's decision, and I would not give effect to this ground of appeal for the following reasons:
The trial judge in this case provided a carefully crafted, comprehensive, and thorough decision. At its core, this case required a comprehensive analysis of the credibility and reliability of L.S. and Mr. Jean's testimony respecting what each party said took place during a massage therapy session on April 24, 2018. The reasons for judgment accomplish that task and the conclusion reached was inextricably connected to that analysis.
In the 98-page decision, the trial judge thoroughly covered why she accepted L.S.'s evidence over Mr. Jean's evidence. With respect to the sexual assault allegations, the decision essentially came down to whether the trial judge was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jean touched L.S.'s breasts and vagina in the manner that L.S. described. To do so, the trial judge had to reject Mr. Jean's evidence and find that it did not raise a reasonable doubt in the context of all the evidence heard at trial.
Once that bridge was crossed, the trial judge found as a fact that he touched her breasts and her vagina without her consent, albeit briefly, in a clearly sexual manner, negating the possibility of an accidental non-sexual touching.
A reading of the decision in its entirety leaves little room in my view for confusion as to why the trial judge found that all the required elements of sexual assault were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And specifically, why the possibility that what occurred was an accidental touching was rejected.
The following excerpts from the decision illustrate this point:
At p. 60, the trial judge stated: "[L.S.'s] description of the progression of Mr. Jean touching both breasts and her lower body has the ring of truth and makes sense. The cross-over from treatment to sexual touching occurred incrementally. As she expressed in her testimony, he was testing the waters…. I accept [L.S.'s] evidence about what happened on April 24, 2018."
At pp. 84-85: "On the whole … I do not believe Mr. Jean's evidence. His testimony was fraught with inconsistencies. He was often evasive and his evidence cannot be reconciled with the evidence that I do accept. Nor does Mr. Jean's evidence raise a reasonable doubt in the context of all the evidence. There is no aspect of his evidence that causes me to be uncertain that Mr. Jean touched [L.S.'s] breasts and vagina region in the manner she described or doubt that [L.S.] consented to that touching or that it was in any way accidental."
At p. 88: "In this case, the Crown must establish that Mr. Jean knowingly touched [L.S.], that the touching was of a sexual nature, and that [L.S.] did not consent to that touching.… I find that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jean touched [L.S.'s] breasts, including her nipples with both of his hands, and that he cupped her breasts, and that he touched her vaginal region under her underwear, specifically inside her labia and touched her clitoris."
The reasons given were sufficient and did not frustrate appellate review. Mr. Jean and any objective member of the public could readily make out why the trial judge ultimately convicted him of the offences charged.
Conclusion and Disposition
[23] The appeal also raised the collateral issue of whether, had the appeal on the convictions for sexual assault succeeded, should the conviction on the count of criminal harassment stand or whether there should also be a new trial. The issue is moot given the conclusions reached in this case. However, had I accepted that a new trial was warranted on the sexual assault convictions, then in the circumstances of this case I would have ordered a new trial on the criminal harassment conviction as well. I agree with counsel for Mr. Jean that the trial judge intricately linked her findings on the sexual assaults to the criminal harassment, that the finding of a sexual assault was an important factor in Mr. Jean's subsequent contact with the complainant amounting to harassment. In other words, the two issues were inextricably intertwined.
[24] I wish to commend both counsel for the excellent written material and for their clear and concise oral arguments presented at the hearing of this appeal.
[25] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Justice Robert Maranger
Released: August 1, 2025