Karen Papadopoulos

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for certiorari to quash decisions by two Justices of the Peace who refused to issue process on private informations for fraud under $5,000.

The appellant had previously commenced a civil action against the same individuals, which was dismissed and settled.

The Justices of the Peace declined to issue process on various grounds, including lack of prima facie case, expiration of limitation periods, and absence of reasonable prospect of conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error by either Justice of the Peace and noting that the Crown would have been duty-bound to withdraw any charges issued.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing and killing an 18-year-old victim following a brief altercation.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 13 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: failure to leave the defence of provocation with the jury, failure to provide a rolled-up charge incorporating self-defence, provocation, and intoxication, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

The appellant also challenged the sentence on three grounds: erroneous finding that the appellant armed himself after being attacked, failure to treat provocation and self-defence as mitigating, and improper focus on lack of remorse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant, a leader of the Galloway Boyz gang, appealed his convictions for attempted murder and firearms offences arising from a drive-by shooting in April 2004.

The Crown conceded that warrantless wiretap evidence obtained under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code breached the appellant's section 8 Charter rights.

The sole issue was whether the intercepted communications should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The motion judge admitted the evidence, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal conducted a fresh section 24(2) analysis under the Grant framework and upheld the admission of the evidence, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the shooting death of a drug dealer during a robbery.

The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility after 16 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on five grounds: (1) the admissibility of expert opinion evidence regarding cellphone usage patterns by drug traffickers; (2) the trial judge's refusal to admit prior out-of-court statements; (3) jury instructions cautioning the jury to consider the appellant's testimony with particular care; (4) jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence; and (5) the trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury on the significance of non-identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found merit in several grounds of appeal, particularly regarding the cellphone evidence, jury instructions on the appellant's alibi testimony, and instructions on eyewitness non-identification evidence.

The court determined that the cumulative effect of these errors was not harmless and warranted a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the stabbing death of Nighisti Semret in downtown Toronto on October 23, 2012.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that after-the-fact conduct had no probative value in distinguishing between levels of culpability; (2) that the trial judge failed to provide an O'Connor instruction regarding the appellant's false statements to police and medical personnel; and (3) that evidence of the appellant's trip to Germany should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder arising from a home invasion robbery of a drug dealer during which the victim was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from the appellant's accomplice who pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal concerning jury instructions: the failure to give a Vetrovec warning, the failure to give a W.(D.) instruction, the instruction on common purpose liability, and improper re-examination.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 22 years.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that defence counsel's tactical decisions at trial were reasonable and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in jury instructions.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The Crown appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge properly assessed threshold reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly in light of the complainant's developmental and psychological circumstances.

The court found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge properly deferred to the trial judge's findings and was entitled to review the entirety of the evidence, including expert evidence and inconsistent statements, when assessing threshold reliability.

The appeal was dismissed.