Emily Anne Bala

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession, accessing, and making child pornography available.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's knowledge and control over illicit material found on computers seized from his father's residence.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including dates from a Digital Forensic Report that was not formally admitted into evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable based on admissible evidence, the trial judge's material reliance on the unadmitted report constituted a misapprehension of evidence, which was essential to the reasoning process and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on portions of the appellant's police statement that were not properly in evidence and by making a finding of fabrication without independent supporting evidence.

These errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial and impacted the assessment of his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, G.H., appealed convictions for sexual assault and related sexual touching charges, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge had found the complainant credible but with reliability concerns, which were addressed by confirmatory evidence from the complainant's brother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, including the use of confirmatory evidence and the holistic approach to ongoing sexual abuse allegations.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the five-year sentence within range despite a factual error by the trial judge.

However, a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order was varied to 20 years in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the impact of possible inadvertent tainting on the complainant’s evidence, by rejecting the appellant’s testimony based on an unreasonable inference, and in refusing to consider the appellant’s mental disability in assessing his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the potential for inadvertent tainting, that any errors in inference regarding the appellant's testimony were harmless, and that the trial judge appropriately dealt with the intellectual disability evidence for testimonial accommodation but not for credibility assessment as it was not admitted for that purpose.

Five organizations brought motions to intervene in an application challenging the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act.

The applicant consented and the respondent did not oppose.

The court applied the test for intervention under Rule 13.02 and found that all five proposed intervenors—the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Legal Services, Justice for Children and Youth, the Income Security Advocacy Centre, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association—met the criteria.

Each organization demonstrated special expertise, a real and substantial interest in the proceedings, and the ability to provide an important and distinct perspective.

The motions to intervene were granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim to add new parties and assert additional causes of action, including nuisance, negligence, and various Charter and international covenant claims.

The defendants opposed the amendments and brought motions to strike.

The court denied leave to add new Ministries/Ministers, dismissed claims based on international covenants as not actionable in domestic law, and rejected most Charter claims (specifically s. 7) on the basis of issue estoppel, as these issues had been previously determined by the Environmental Review Tribunal and upheld by the Divisional Court.

However, the court permitted amendments for nuisance and negligence claims against the K2 defendants, acknowledging that the alleged harms were now realized post-construction.

The action against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario and the Director was dismissed.

The appellant, an audiologist with a doctorate degree, appealed a discipline panel's finding of professional misconduct for using the title 'Doctor' in her clinical practice, contrary to s. 33 of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

She argued that the prohibition violated her freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and raised several jurisdictional challenges against the College.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent finding no s. 2(b) violation for similar professional title restrictions.

Alternatively, the Court found that any infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to prevent public confusion.

The Court also dismissed all jurisdictional arguments, finding the tribunal's decisions on procedure, penalty, and costs to be reasonable.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent costs fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The respondent, a Canadian businessman, brought a libel action in Ontario against an Israeli newspaper regarding an article published online and in print.

The appellants moved to stay the action, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction, Israel was a more appropriate forum, and the action was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding Ontario had jurisdiction based on the tort being committed in Ontario, and that Israel was not clearly a more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The Canadian Doctors of Audiology Association brought a motion for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning a finding of professional misconduct against an audiologist for using the title 'Doctor'.

The proposed intervenor sought to support the appellant's constitutional challenge to s. 33 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the application was brought very late, the proposed argument substantially echoed the appellant's argument, and the intervention would not make a useful and distinct contribution sufficient to justify disrupting the scheduled appeal.

The defendants in a libel action brought a motion for security for costs under section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act after the trial judge passed away before rendering a decision.

The court held that the test under section 12 is conjunctive, requiring the defendants to prove that the plaintiff lacks sufficient assets, that the defendants have a good defence on the merits, and that the statements were made in good faith.

Although the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets, the defendants failed to establish that their defences of justification, fair comment, or responsible journalism were more likely than not to succeed, or that the statements were made in good faith.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The defendants moved to set aside service ex juris and stay a defamation action brought by an Ontario resident against an Israeli newspaper and journalists regarding an article published online.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the alleged defamatory article was read by individuals in Ontario, establishing a presumptive connecting factor through the commission of the tort in the province.

The defendants failed to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction and did not demonstrate that Israel was a clearly more appropriate forum under the forum non conveniens analysis.

The plaintiff’s undertaking to limit damages to reputational harm suffered within Canada, the availability of jury trials in Ontario, and fairness considerations supported Ontario as the proper forum.

The court also rejected the argument that the action constituted an abuse of process due to minimal publication in Ontario.