Cate S. Martell

Appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, use of a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, discharge of a firearm with intent, breach of probation, possession of a prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appellant was identified as the shooter in surveillance video footage by three witnesses based on recognition from prior acquaintance.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on this recognition evidence despite finding that facial features were not visible on the poor-quality video.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to properly scrutinize the reliability of the recognition evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and related firearms offences following his arrest on March 19, 2014.

He appealed on the grounds that his arrest was unlawful because it lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that evidence seized incident to arrest should be excluded under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful based on a reliable confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by independent police observation.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding misapprehension of evidence concerning the seizure of a cellular phone.

The appellant was convicted of importing marijuana into Canada following a judge-alone trial.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant's exculpatory statement to police was deliberately concocted.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by making a finding of concoction based solely on evidence that proved the statement false, without independent evidence of fabrication as required by R. v. O'Connor.

Although the court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction on other grounds, the error in law regarding the treatment of the exculpatory statement warranted a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and possession offences arising from events in spring 2011.

He appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the prohibition against applying evidence across counts in a multi-count case, failed to correct improper cross-examination and closing arguments by the Crown, and failed to properly instruct on propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by providing ambiguous instructions on cross-count reasoning, failing to correct the Crown's improper invitations to the jury to use evidence from one count to determine guilt on other counts, and providing contradictory responses to jury questions.

The court concluded that the jury's verdicts were tainted by legally impermissible reasoning and ordered a new trial.

The young person fired shots into a crowd, injuring three people.

The Crown applied to have him sentenced as an adult.

The sentencing judge dismissed the adult sentence application and imposed the maximum youth sentence of three years, declining to give credit for 15 months of pre-sentence custody to ensure the sentence was of sufficient length to hold the young person accountable.

The young person appealed, arguing that credit for pre-sentence custody is mandatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that youth sentencing judges retain discretion to determine whether and how much credit should be given for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing trial unfairness.

At trial, Crown counsel breached an agreement not to cross-examine the appellant about his post-arrest conduct, specifically his departure from the jurisdiction and subsequent conviction for failing to attend court.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's ill-advised question opened the door to this evidence, prejudicing the appellant's credibility in a case that turned entirely on credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Michael Oduh, charged with serious drug trafficking offences, applied for a stay of proceedings pending state-funded counsel (a Rowbotham application) after being denied Legal Aid Ontario coverage.

The court found that Oduh lacked the financial means to retain private counsel for a complex, lengthy trial and that counsel was essential for him to receive a fair trial, given the seriousness of the charges, the potential for a lengthy jail term, and his lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system.

The application was allowed, and proceedings were stayed until state-funded counsel was provided.

During a trial for multiple counts of kidnapping, robbery, and firearm offences related to cargo thefts, the Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across counts to prove identity.

The offences were alleged to have been committed by a rotating group of individuals.

The court applied the test from Perrier, finding that the offences were strikingly similar and that there was 'some evidence' linking each accused to the specific offences with which they were charged, primarily through cell phone tower data showing symmetry of movement.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and ruled the similar fact evidence admissible across counts.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court of Justice decision granting certiorari, which quashed the appellant's discharge previously ordered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the conclusion and analysis of the reviewing judge.

The appellants appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying an absolute discharge and ordering a transfer to a less secure facility.

The hospital appellant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by ordering the transfer despite its objections.

The individual appellant argued the Board unreasonably rejected his treating physician's evidence that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the hospital received adequate notice but chose not to participate, and that the Board's findings regarding the individual's diagnosis and ongoing threat to public safety were reasonable.

This ruling addresses the admissibility and use of association evidence as circumstantial evidence of identity in a multi-accused criminal trial involving charges of theft, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Crown sought to use evidence of association between the accused and others, combined with cell phone proximity data, to establish identity in joint enterprise crimes.

The accused argued against this, citing concerns about 'guilt by association.' The court permitted the use of certain categories of association evidence (phone contact, contact information, surveillance observations, witness testimony) for the limited purpose of considering cell phone patterns in the context of joint enterprise crimes, provided careful jury instructions were given to prevent 'guilt by association.' However, the court disallowed the use of 'mirrored phone movements' across different counts and the circumstances of collective arrests as association evidence, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for the forcible seizure of a child and other offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a secure forensic unit.

The appellant sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a transfer to a different facility to access a larger gay community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to the public was reasonable and supported by expert evidence indicating he remained untreated and unstable.

The court also upheld the Board's refusal to transfer the appellant, noting the request was premature and lacked therapeutic justification.

The accused in a 29-count indictment for theft, kidnapping, robbery, and possession of property obtained by crime brought directed verdict applications at the close of the Crown's case.

The applications were dismissed, with the court finding that the Crown's circumstantial evidence, particularly cell phone data showing symmetrical movement and association between the accused, was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt for each count.

The court clarified the legal test for directed verdicts in circumstantial cases, rejecting the defence's argument that evidence must be inconsistent with any other explanation.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter motions seeking to exclude evidence from two separate police interactions.

For a July 2009 traffic stop, the court found the stop was unlawful due to a lack of credible police evidence regarding the reason for the stop, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The evidence from that stop was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to serious state conduct involving a failure to take notes.

For an August 2009 interaction where police approached a parked vehicle in a high-crime area, the court found no detention occurred, as the accused was free to leave and voluntarily provided his identification.

Consequently, there were no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches, and the accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how intoxication relates to planning and deliberation, and unfairly commented on the defence toxicologist's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions contained all essential legal elements and properly directed the jury to consider intoxication separately for intent and for planning and deliberation.

The court also found the trial judge's comments on the expert evidence were supported by the record and not objected to by trial counsel.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order quashing their discharge at a preliminary inquiry regarding a tractor trailer robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony from former co-accused implicating the appellants in other robberies.

The appellants argued the motion judge improperly treated evidence from other counts as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified a jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge in failing to consider the evidence as a whole, and that the similarities between the robberies supported an inference that the same group committed them.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the Board's finding that the appellant posed a significant risk to the public.

While the appellant argued that a treatment impasse had been reached requiring an alternative assessment, this request was not made before the Board.

The appeal was dismissed, but the Court encouraged the Board to consider exercising its jurisdiction to address the treatment impasse at the upcoming annual review.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000, fraud for the benefit of a criminal organization, and money laundering arising from a 'grandparent fraud' telephone scam.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a $500,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the court granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 1.5:1, reducing his custodial sentence and resulting in his immediate release.

However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the fine, finding the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant had control over the proceeds of the fraud and properly assessed the fine amount based on the value of the property controlled rather than the actual benefit received.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years' imprisonment for firearms offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and the denial of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 enhanced credit for 433 days of pre-trial custody because minor institutional misconduct did not justify an inference that the appellant would be denied statutory release.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence, finding it appropriate for a repeat offender whose conduct fell at the 'true crime' end of the spectrum, regardless of the trial judge's reliance on an unconstitutional mandatory minimum.