51 total
Production orders may lawfully obtain historical text messages without violating s. 8.
Accused persons charged with murder brought applications to exclude historical text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider.
They argued that s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code did not authorize the production of private communications, or alternatively that the provision violated s. 8 of the Charter.
The court held that stored historical text messages constitute “data” within the meaning of the provision and that obtaining them by production order does not amount to interception of private communications under Part VI.
The statutory prerequisites for a production order satisfied constitutional standards for reasonable search and seizure.
The applications to exclude the evidence were dismissed.
Bail denied for accused facing serious gang-related drug, firearms, and conspiracy to murder charges.
The accused, facing numerous serious charges including conspiracy to commit murder, drug trafficking, and firearms offences arising from a gang investigation, applied for judicial interim release.
The court found the proposed release plan and sureties inadequate to address the secondary ground of public safety.
The court also found detention justified on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the strength of the Crown's case and the gravity of the offences.
The application for bail was dismissed.
Eight‑year sentence imposed for manslaughter arising from fatal shooting during struggle.
The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting during a struggle in a hotel room.
The sentencing judge considered competing theories regarding who brought the firearm and whether the killing occurred during a robbery, self‑defence, or provocation.
The court found it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender brought the gun to commit a robbery, concluding instead that the deceased likely brought the firearm and that the offender gained control of it during an ambush and struggle.
While the killing was unlawful, the offender lacked the state of mind for murder.
Balancing denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, the offender’s youth and background, and aggravating factors including a prior record and probation status, the court imposed an eight‑year penitentiary sentence with credit for pre‑trial custody.
Evidentiary motion granted; documents seized from accused's former apartment excluded due to high prejudicial effect.
The accused, on trial for second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude several documents seized by police from an abandoned apartment he formerly occupied.
The documents included a probation order, letters from a girlfriend, drawings depicting a gun, and a driver's licence suspension notice.
The Crown sought to introduce the documents to negate the accused's claim of self-defence and innocent purpose.
The court allowed the application and excluded the documents, finding they lacked relevance and probative value, and that their prejudicial effect far outweighed any potential probative value.
Similar fact robbery evidence excluded for insufficient similarity and weak linkage.
The Crown brought a motion seeking to admit evidence of an alleged robbery occurring four days before a fatal shooting as similar fact evidence in a second degree murder trial.
The Crown argued that the earlier incident shared distinctive similarities with the charged offence, including the use of a firearm, hotel-room encounters with sex trade workers, and the use of the same cellphone number to arrange meetings.
The respondent opposed admission, arguing that the similarities were generic and that the evidentiary link between the accused and the earlier robbery was weak and largely hearsay.
The court held that the similarities were not sufficiently distinctive and that the evidence linking the accused to the earlier incident was not cogent.
As the probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect, the proposed similar fact evidence was ruled inadmissible.
Extradition committal ordered; dual purpose of prosecution and interrogation does not constitute abuse of process.
The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of Japan, applied to commit the respondent for extradition to face a charge of using a forged passport.
The respondent cross-applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing the extradition was an abuse of process because Japan's true motive was to interrogate him about an unsolved 1995 triple murder.
The respondent also sought to exclude evidence obtained from an accomplice who was on death row in China.
The court dismissed the cross-applications, finding that Japan's dual investigative and prosecutorial purposes did not constitute an abuse of process, and that the accomplice evidence was neither manifestly unreliable nor gathered abusively.
Finding sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and the respondent's identity, the court ordered the respondent committed for extradition.
Stored text messages from provider not an interception requiring wiretap authorization.
The applicants sought to exclude text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider, arguing that the messages constituted private communications requiring a wiretap authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code.
The court accepted that text messages attract a reasonable expectation of privacy but held that the statutory regime governing interceptions applies only to contemporaneous surveillance of communications.
The retrieval of stored text messages from a service provider after the communication had occurred did not amount to an interception.
The court found that the use of a production order under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code was the proper legal mechanism and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.
Appeal from conviction dismissed; informant's evidence not necessary to ensure a fair trial.
The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that an informant's evidence was necessary for his defence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even at its best, the informant's testimony that the appellant was not present at an apartment on a specific day would not have materially assisted the appellant in meeting the Crown's case, nor was it necessary to ensure a fair trial.
Convictions and seven-year sentence for drug trafficking upheld; wiretap evidence properly admitted.
The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking offences and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.
Much of the evidence was derived from wiretaps.
The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application to exclude the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter, alleging the supporting affidavit was misleading.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police acted in good faith and that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).
The sentence appeal was also dismissed.
Appeal from refusal to quash committal for murder dismissed; scintilla of evidence supported requisite intent.
The appellant, a bouncer, struck a patron outside a tavern, causing the patron to fall and hit his head on the concrete, resulting in death.
The preliminary inquiry judge committed the appellant for trial on a charge of murder, finding evidence that he knew his actions were likely to cause death and was reckless.
The appellant's application for certiorari to quash the committal was refused.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the evidence of the requisite knowledge was weak, there was a scintilla of evidence to support the committal.
Crown sentence appeal dismissed despite error in principle due to family hardship and delay.
The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include punitive conditions.
The Court of Appeal agreed that an error in principle occurred, noting the trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Proulx.
However, the Court dismissed the appeal due to the respondent's family circumstances, his guilty plea, his testimony against co-accused, and the significant passage of time since the offence and sentencing.