R. Gadhia

During a criminal trial for a stabbing, the Crown applied under section 9.2 of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness testified at trial that one of the accused attempted to break up the fight, which contradicted his earlier police statement and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court granted the application, finding the Crown could not have been expected to lead this evidence in-chief.

However, the court restricted the Crown from questioning the witness about post-offence phone calls with the accused, ruling that such questions would improperly suggest consciousness of guilt and be highly prejudicial.

The defendant brought an application seeking the recusal of the trial judge assigned to his second trial, alleging that she demonstrated bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias during his first trial, which had ended in a mistrial.

The defendant argued that the trial judge's rulings, tone, and interventions during cross-examinations favoured the Crown and undermined defence counsel.

The court reviewed the transcripts and audio recordings and found that the trial judge's conduct was appropriate and necessary to manage a highly contentious trial.

The court concluded there was no cogent evidence of bias and dismissed the application.

During a first-degree murder trial, proceedings were halted for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon assessing the jury's availability to resume the trial in the fall, the court conducted individual inquiries with several jurors.

The court discharged two jurors due to undue hardship related to childcare, schooling, and employment concerns exacerbated by the pandemic.

As only nine jurors remained, and the parties did not consent to continue without a jury, a mistrial was declared.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude evidence of a submachine gun, ammunition, and utterances obtained during a warrantless search of his home.

The police attended the applicant's home to investigate a gun allegation made by his intoxicated girlfriend.

The officers searched the home without a warrant and without advising the applicant of his right to refuse the search or his right to counsel upon detention.

The court found that the applicant was psychologically detained and did not give informed consent to the search, resulting in breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the officers' conduct was serious and the impact on the applicant's rights was significant, warranting the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The four co-accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to be seated at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box during their trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security and the default practice of using the prisoner's box.

The court balanced the security concerns, which required six escort officers if the accused sat at counsel table, against trial fairness considerations, including the need for effective communication between the accused and their counsel during a lengthy trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused met their onus and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication and ensure the accused were viewed as individuals by the jury.

During a jury trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

They argued there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that a reasonable person would have objectively foreseen the risk of bodily harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence including video footage, the sound and power of the air hose, and the bypassing of a safety mechanism provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to find objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

During a trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the defence sought to cross-examine the Crown's forensic pathology expert on a statement from a 1942 journal article regarding public perception of the dangers of compressed air.

The Crown objected.

Following a voir dire, the court ruled that the question could not be put to the expert.

The court found that public perception was outside the expert's area of expertise, the 1942 article was of limited reliability for assessing public knowledge in 2015, and the question had no probative value while carrying significant prejudicial effect.

The accused were charged with unlawful act manslaughter following a workplace incident where a co-worker was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose.

One of the accused brought a motion to admit expert evidence from an occupational health and safety expert regarding the hazards of compressed air and the need for workplace training.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence regarding domestic law was inadmissible, and the factual evidence lacked probative value and was unnecessary, as the objective standard for manslaughter does not require such specialized knowledge.

In a manslaughter trial involving three Punjabi Sikh accused, the defence brought a pretrial motion to determine the wording of a challenge for cause question to be put to the jury panel.

The court ruled that a general preamble was sufficient, rejecting a more detailed version proposed by the defence.

The court also held that the question should specifically identify the accused as Punjabi Sikhs, recognizing that prejudice may be triggered by outward manifestations of religious beliefs such as wearing a turban.

Finally, the court exercised its discretion to not provide the question to prospective jurors in advance, preferring spontaneous answers.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking an order for the jury and the court to take a view of the food processing facility where the deceased was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose during an incident of horseplay.

The Crown sought the view primarily to allow the jury to hear the sound of the air hose.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the facility had undergone significant changes since the incident, the exact conditions could not be recreated, and the jury would have access to high-quality video and audio evidence.

The court concluded that the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the limited probative value of the view.