Vincenzo Rondinelli

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a suitable breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge’s extensive questioning of witnesses compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the judge erred in assessing the elements of the offence, particularly regarding voluntariness and reasonable excuse.

The court acknowledged that the trial judge improperly assumed part of the Crown’s role during examinations-in-chief but found that the interventions did not undermine the overall fairness of the trial.

The court further held that the trial judge reasonably concluded that the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and rejected the explanation that cold weather and nervousness made compliance impossible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a health spa owner, was convicted of unlawful confinement and assault after locking the door and pushing a client who tried to leave without paying.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected her defence of citizen's arrest under s. 494 of the Criminal Code, finding she did not subjectively believe the client had committed a crime.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing a translation error affected her testimony and raising the issue of citizen's arrest for non-payment of services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, challenging the sentencing judge's approach to enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court granted leave but dismissed the sentence appeal.

It held that the sentencing judge did not err by considering that the appellant would not have been eligible for bail because of his criminal record, and properly took into account delay attributable to both the Crown and the defence.

The exercise of discretion in awarding significant enhanced credit warranted no appellate intervention.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a judge-alone criminal trial on the basis of misapprehension of evidence.

The respondent conceded material misapprehensions on two counts but disputed any error on the remaining count.

The court held that a further misapprehension affected the credibility assessment on the first count and, taken cumulatively with the conceded errors on the other counts, rendered the verdicts unreliable.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on all three counts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a three-year sentence for sexual assault and parent procuring sexual activity.

The court rejected arguments that the sentencing judge underemphasized the absence of a criminal record, failed to give adequate weight to personal frailties, misapprehended the procurement offence, or failed to account properly for family hardship.

Emphasizing the appellant's position of trust and authority as a parent and the extended period of offending, the court found no sentencing error and held that the sentence was fit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

Following convictions for drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and related offences, the Crown applied under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of assets and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court applied the reverse onus provisions for criminal organization offences and accepted forensic accounting evidence showing substantial unexplained wealth.

Certain assets were found to be proceeds of crime or partly derived from such proceeds, including cash seized from a residence, equity from a property sale, a vehicle, and unexplained deposits.

The court exempted a condominium claimed by a third party where evidence established it had been purchased using inherited funds.

Significant fines in lieu of forfeiture were imposed where assets were no longer available.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence and improperly drew an adverse inference from his right to silence upon arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were well-reasoned and that the trial judge permissibly considered the inconsistency between the appellant's statement to police and his trial testimony.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, and breach of probation arising from his failure to disclose his HIV-positive status to sexual partners.

Applying the Supreme Court's framework in Mabior, the Court of Appeal upheld the aggravated sexual assault convictions, finding that unprotected intercourse with an HIV-positive person establishes a realistic possibility of transmission.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding one count of sexual assault where a condom was used, ordering a new trial on that charge.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a nurse/receptionist, forged oxycodone prescriptions and faxed them to pharmacies, where accomplices picked up the pills.

She was convicted of uttering forged documents and trafficking, and sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge failed to give a W.(D.) instruction, the trafficking verdict was unreasonable because innocent pharmacists dispensed the drugs, and the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed and the innocent agency doctrine applied.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 42-month sentence was fit given the serious breach of trust and did not violate the parity principle.

The appellant was tried by a judge and jury for arson.

In response to a jury question, the trial judge instructed the jury for the first time on the included offence of attempted arson, stating the mens rea included recklessness.

The jury convicted the appellant of attempted arson.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that whether recklessness applies to attempt offences is unsettled law.

Because the trial judge raised this issue late, depriving the defence of the opportunity to research or address it in closing, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving two incidents with a minor complainant, as well as the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on similar fact reasoning across counts, failed to consider possible innocent collusion between witnesses, and imposed an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court rejected the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not improperly use similar fact evidence and that no evidentiary foundation existed for innocent collusion.

However, the court found an error in principle in sentencing where the trial judge treated the appellant’s exercise of the right to trial and lack of admission of guilt as aggravating factors.

Re‑sentencing afresh, the court reduced the custodial term to a 90‑day intermittent sentence while maintaining the probation and ancillary orders.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm, using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, and careless storage of a firearm, as well as his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding the robbery and careless storage charges, finding the verdict reasonable and rejecting arguments regarding police evidence and adverse inferences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the aggravating factors of a home invasion with a loaded firearm and the mitigating factors.

However, based on a Crown concession, the conviction for using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence was set aside as it was precluded by the robbery conviction.

The appellants were charged with trading in real estate as brokers without being registered.

The justice of the peace acquitted them, providing ambiguous reasons regarding whether they possessed the requisite mens rea or were acquitted based on perceived unfairness.

The summary conviction appeal judge reversed the acquittals and entered convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that both the justice of the peace and the appeal judge provided inadequate reasons that foreclosed meaningful appellate review on the mens rea component of the offences.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt, arguing the trial judge erred in inferring he knew his brother possessed a knife prior to a fight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inference was reasonably available based on the prior conflict between the parties, their late-night visit to the victims' home, and video evidence showing the appellant and his brother in close contact while the brother clutched an object under his clothing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

The trial judge had found that as the operator of the vehicle, the appellant had prima facie de facto possession of its contents unless there was evidence to the contrary.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error in law, as it impermissibly transferred the burden of proof to the accused and created a rebuttable presumption not found in common law or statute.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending an extradition hearing to the United States on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.

The court applied the bail framework incorporated through the Extradition Act and Criminal Code provisions, noting the reverse onus applicable to drug trafficking allegations and non‑resident status.

The court found the applicant failed to establish that detention was not justified on the primary ground due to a significant flight risk, including use of aliases, prior deportations, illegal re‑entries into Canada and the United States, and untrustworthy evidence regarding residence.

Although the court found no substantial risk to public safety given the absence of a criminal record, it concluded detention was also necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the seriousness of the allegations and strength of the evidence.

Bail pending extradition was therefore denied.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after inflicting a life-threatening stab wound to the victim's neck and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, plus 7 months of pre-sentence custody credit.

She appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in stating he could not go lower.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge meant a lower sentence was inappropriate, not legally prohibited, and that the sentence was fit given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's prior conviction for a similar offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted break and enter and possession of burglary tools.

He argued that the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) Charter analysis and that the finding of guilt was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to infer that the CPIC check, which led to the discovery of an arrest warrant and the subsequent lawful search incident to arrest, would have occurred regardless of an initial unlawful pat-down search.

The court also held the finding of guilt was reasonable given the eyewitness description, the appellant's proximity to the crime scene, and his possession of burglary tools.