Vincenzo Rondinelli

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting the joint submission on sentence.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his spouse on the third day of trial.

The Crown and defence had agreed that a sentence of seven years was appropriate.

The trial judge rejected the joint submission as contrary to the public interest and imposed a sentence of 10 years' incarceration instead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the joint submission was so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter over a period of approximately nine years, from when she was five to fourteen years old.

The sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching convictions were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing they were tainted by palpable and overriding errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder as the middleman between the deceased's nephew who orchestrated the murder and the hired killer who carried it out.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury composition on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge improperly used static triers to decide challenges for cause without a formal application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code, and (2) that the trial judge erred in discharging an elderly juror with physical disabilities without reasonable cause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, holding that the appellant obtained what he wanted in substance regarding jury selection procedures and that the trial judge had reasonable cause to discharge the juror based on his inability to follow proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm under section 255(2) of the Criminal Code.

The primary ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's admission of a prior inconsistent statement made by a defence witness for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in conducting an analysis regarding whether the statement could be used for its truth (a matter neither party had addressed), this did not constitute reversible error.

The trial judge had only used the statement for the proper purpose of assessing the witness's credibility and had not relied upon it for its truth in reaching the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge's questioning of him at the end of his evidence rendered the trial unfair and that the trial judge erred in assessing a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's questions were primarily for amplification and did not impair the fairness of the trial.

The Court also deferred to the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the witness, concluding they were fully supported by the record.

The appellants, a truck driver and a trucking company, were convicted of possessing invasive fish without a licence after entering Canada with shipments of live invasive fish.

The summary conviction appeal judge ordered a new trial for the corporate appellant on the issue of identity and varied the driver's sentence.

Both appellants sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The corporate appellant argued the appeal judge should have entered an acquittal based on an unreasonable verdict, while the driver argued the courts below erred in assessing his due diligence defence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal for both, finding no errors of law or issues of general importance.

The appellants appealed their convictions for cocaine trafficking, arguing that the motion judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that various production orders, warrants, and wiretap authorizations were invalid.

They also argued that the search of a Blackberry was unreasonable and that intercepted communications were protected by spousal communication privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the validity of the warrants and authorizations under the Garofoli standard, and concluding that spousal communication privilege does not extend to common-law spouses.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding his conviction.

The conviction related to a car driven to the border that was found to be subject to duties under section 159 of the Customs Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's decision and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death after striking a 13-year-old pedestrian while driving 152 km/h in a 50 km/h zone.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider evidence regarding his speed and erred in assessing legal causation, specifically whether the victim running onto the road was an intervening act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the speed evidence lacked probative force and the appellant's dangerous driving was a significant contributing cause of the death.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence related to his involvement in two marijuana grow operations.

He argued there was insufficient evidence of his participation and that he was treated unfairly at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence that he was a significant participant, including his presence at the locations, delivery of plants, and possession of grow-op paraphernalia.

The court also found the trial was fair and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation of the young complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapprehended forensic evidence showing the complainant's saliva on the respondent's underwear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge misunderstood the DNA evidence and its ability to confirm the complainant's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement as an aider and abettor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions relating to the main sexual assault in the bedroom, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported the inference that the appellant intended to assist his friends.

However, the Court quashed the convictions relating to an earlier 'tickling incident' because the trial judge failed to provide any analysis of how the appellant aided and abetted that specific assault.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered on the quashed counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code following trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and improperly applied an objective standard of fault when concluding the refusal was intentional.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reference to a “reasonable person” related to the officer’s decision to stop further testing, not the mens rea of the offence.

Although the trial judge did not expressly refer to the reasonable doubt standard, the reviewing court concluded that the proper standard was implicitly applied and that the conviction was based on credibility findings rejecting the appellant’s explanation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of drug offences committed before the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA) came into force but sentenced after, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the AEPA's abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

Relying on the companion case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's incarceration time, constituting a variation in punishment that violated s. 11(i) and was not saved by s. 1.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared entitled to the APR regime.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and breach of trust.

He had used police resources to obtain information about the complainant and her boyfriend to facilitate his harassment of her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework to the appellant's inculpatory statement to the police.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and extortion against an employee.

He appealed the convictions, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper, the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial after a courtroom interruption, and the trial judge erred in preventing the jury from questioning a DNA expert.

He also appealed his 27-month sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on the victim impact statement as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice in the cross-examination, no error in the trial judge's discretionary rulings, and no error in principle regarding the sentence.

The Crown sought certiorari with mandamus in aid after a preliminary inquiry judge discharged the respondents on break and enter and related charges arising from a bank vault robbery.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by impermissibly weighing exculpatory against inculpatory inferences in a circumstantial case and by failing to consider the cumulative inculpatory inferences available to the Crown.

Applying the committal test under s. 548(1) of the Criminal Code and the governing authorities on preliminary inquiries, the court found committal inevitable on the break and enter counts for both respondents and on the possession of break-in instruments count for one respondent only.

Certiorari with mandamus in aid was granted accordingly.

The appellant appealed four of his six drug-related convictions, including conspiracy to traffic, trafficking, and two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine.

He argued that intercepted communications did not show a finalized agreement to traffic, that the trial judge erred in admitting co-conspirator statements without sufficient analysis, that he could not be convicted of possessing unseized cocaine, and that the trial judge improperly inferred the use of drug paraphernalia without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence, including extensive intercepted communications and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm possession and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on circumstantial and DNA evidence linking the appellant to a gun thrown from a room.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-trial custody at a ratio of 1.5 to 1, applying the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, which reduced the sentence by two months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to warn the jury about the dangers of in-dock identification evidence.

The Crown conceded this error for two of the counts, but the appellant further argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and acquittals should be entered.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and ordered a new trial on the two counts, but rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or that the conviction on the remaining count should be overturned.

The appeal was allowed in part.