Andreea Ioan Baiasu

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years imposed for robbery and dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge should have imposed concurrent rather than consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach, which balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation prospects.

The court dismissed the appeal but set aside the $400 victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice on the grounds that a mathematical error was made in calculating pre-sentence custody credit.

The sentencing judge intended to apply a 1.5:1 credit ratio but the calculation resulted in 13 months of credit instead of the correct 13.3 months.

The Crown conceded the mathematical error but argued against correction based on judicial discretion and the minimal nature of the discrepancy.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence by 15 days to correct the mathematical error.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of three subsections of the child luring provision in a police sting operation context: the age presumption under s. 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4), and the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a).

The majority held that s. 172.1(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, but that s. 172.1(4) does not infringe s. 7 because it only limits a defence rather than providing an independent pathway to conviction.

Because the trial judge convicted on a legally unsound basis — failure to take reasonable steps — without finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual belief, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum was left to the new trial judge.

Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have also declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional.

Abella J. dissented in part, finding s. 172.1(4) also unconstitutional and that an acquittal should be entered.

An appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant appealed both the conviction entered on October 10, 2017, and the sentence imposed on November 24, 2017.

However, the conviction appeal was not pursued during oral argument by either duty counsel or the appellant, and accordingly the conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault perpetrated over a lengthy period against his seven-year-old nephew and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as there was no basis in the record for the appellant's contentions that the trial judge erred in believing the complainant or that the complainant's testimony was coerced.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity and did not give appropriate weight to mitigating factors including the appellant's youth, absence of prior criminal record, prior victimization, and intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge had properly considered all relevant factors.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge pre-judged the case based on a prior domestic murder conviction; (2) that the trial judge erred in believing the complainant despite her potential financial motive to lie; and (3) that the trial judge failed to adequately account for the absence of the appellant's DNA on the hammer and complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no basis for the pre-judgment claim, that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, and that the absence of DNA evidence was not determinative given the complainant's accepted testimony.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed his sentence for sexual interference and sexual assault, both involving the same complainant and occurring within the same date range.

The trial judge imposed consecutive two-year sentences on both counts.

The Court of Appeal found that the two counts were alternative ways of pleading the same incidents rather than distinct offences, and therefore one count should have been stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court allowed the appeal, stayed count 6, and set aside any victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of two years and six months imposed on September 13, 2017 for breach and enter of a commercial premises, robbery of a convenience store, theft, and failure to comply.

The appellant sought a reduction of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no joint submission existed and determined the sentence was entirely fit given the circumstances of the robbery and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The Crown conceded that the victim surcharge must be set aside.

The appeal was allowed only to set aside the victim surcharge; the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

Five appellants were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case alleged a planned robbery with violence, while the defence maintained the incident arose from a drug transaction that escalated when the victim produced a firearm.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair, that jury selection instructions were inadequate, and that prior consistent statement instructions were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's questioning of defence witnesses and extemporaneous comments during jury instructions created a cumulative appearance of bias toward the prosecution, seriously compromising the fairness of the trial.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for contempt of court and his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly compelled the appellant's attendance and that his refusal to testify constituted contempt.

The appellant was afforded ample opportunity to consult counsel and declined further time to consider his position.

The Court found the conviction unassailable and dismissed the appeal.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge for breach of a court order.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's position without providing the appellant's counsel an opportunity to make further submissions regarding the trial judge's inclination to impose a greater sentence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in procedure.

On review of the fitness of the sentence de novo, the court determined that the Crown's requested sentence was fit and varied the sentence to 12 months less pre-trial custody of 219 days.

The appellant was convicted after a three-day trial of nine domestic violence offences against his wife, including two counts of assault, three counts of assault with a weapon, two counts of uttering death threats, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The charges were based on five alleged incidents occurring between September 2010 and August 2012.

The appellant was sentenced to 35 months in prison.

On appeal, the sole ground raised was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the alleged deficiencies in counsel's representation did not result in an unfair trial or an unreliable verdict.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of nine months in custody, three years probation, and $50,000 restitution imposed for an eleven-year fraud on a small union.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider mitigating factors including early guilty plea, cooperation, and intent to make restitution.

The sentencing judge rejected a request for a conditional sentence as part of a blended sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's rejection of the conditional sentence given the circumstances of the offence and the need for general deterrence, and determined that the custodial sentence was at the low end of the range reflecting mitigating factors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that dismissed his appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by confusing the distinction between a proved absence of motive to lie and the absence of evidence of a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the legal principle was well-settled and the merits of the appeal were not strong.

The trial judge's statement that she did not find a motivation to fabricate was a rejection of the defence submission rather than a positive finding that no motive existed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The conviction was for robbery with a firearm, where the Crown's case relied on a BB gun.

The appellant argued that a BB gun did not fall within the definition of firearm under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that on the evidence accepted by the trial judge, the BB gun fell within the definition of firearm in section 2 of the Criminal Code and that this definition applies throughout the Act, including to the robbery provision.

The Court also found the sentence imposed was not unfit and declined to interfere.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The accused was convicted of child luring by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual conversations with a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of three provisions: the presumption of belief in section 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement in section 172.1(4), and the mandatory minimum one-year sentence in section 172.1(2)(a).

The trial judge found section 172.1(3) violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The trial judge upheld section 172.1(4) as constitutional under section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate under section 12 of the Charter and imposed 75 days intermittent incarceration instead.

Both the conviction appeal and Crown's sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the 33-month sentence as fit, finding no error in principle regarding the trial judge's characterization of the sentencing range.

However, the court varied the sentence by modifying the firearms prohibition from a lifetime ban under s. 109(2) to a ten-year ban, considering the appellant's youth and absence of prior firearm misuse.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting the victim through the heart in a bus shelter in broad daylight.

The appellant claimed self-defence under former s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, asserting that the victim had unlawfully assaulted him.

The jury rejected this claim and found him guilty.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds regarding the jury instructions on self-defence and challenged the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle or misdirection by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a person can be a party to the offence of conspiracy under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a youth convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for assisting two sisters in planning to kill their mother, argued that party liability should not apply to conspiracy.

The Court held unanimously that party liability to conspiracy is an offence known to Canadian law, but adopted the narrower Trieu model, limiting such liability to aiding or abetting the formation of the agreement or assisting new members to join a pre-existing agreement, and rejecting the broader McNamara approach extending liability to furthering the conspiracy's unlawful object.

Although the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability, the curative proviso applied because the evidence of the appellant's membership in the conspiracy was overwhelming.