Andreea Ioan Baiasu

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included the trial judge's ruling on solicitor-client privilege over seized notes, the dismissal of an alternate suspect application, and the failure to leave manslaughter as an available verdict to the jury.

The sentence appeal sought a reduction in the 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the imposed sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings or the sentencing decision.

The appellant was convicted of child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption of belief in age and the appellant's failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the interlocutor's age.

On appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Morrison, which struck down the presumption of belief in age as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reliance on the unconstitutional presumption and the failure to take reasonable steps to establish the essential element of belief was a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and conditional stays were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, challenging the constitutionality and retrospective application of legislative amendments that abolished peremptory challenges and substituted the presiding judge for lay triers in challenges for cause.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendments did not violate the appellant's rights under ss. 7, 11(d), or 11(f) of the Charter.

However, the Court found that while the change to the challenge for cause procedure was purely procedural and applied retrospectively, the abolition of peremptory challenges affected substantive rights and applied prospectively.

Because the appellant's right to a jury trial vested before the amendments came into force, the abolition of peremptory challenges should not have applied to his trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of numerous sexual offences against various family members.

On appeal, the appellant challenged convictions relating to two victims, arguing the trial judge failed to address their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground of appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed credibility and reliability considerations in his reasons.

However, the court accepted the Crown's concession that the trial judge erred in considering pre-undertaking conduct when convicting on one count of breaching an undertaking, and set aside that conviction and stayed the charge.

The court also accepted the Crown's concession regarding pre-sentence custody credit, awarding an additional 503 days at a 1.5:1 rate.

A 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first degree murder under sections 229(c) and 231(4)(a) of the Criminal Code after a police officer was killed during a traffic stop.

The officer attempted to remove the appellant from a stolen vehicle, became trapped as the vehicle accelerated, and was ejected and killed when the vehicle became airborne.

The appellant claimed he did not intentionally accelerate the vehicle and that pedal misapplication occurred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's age and level of maturity when assessing whether he knew his dangerous driving was likely to cause death.

The court also found errors regarding the Crown's closing address and the exclusion of a prior consistent statement.

The accused brought an application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code, which eliminated peremptory challenges and replaced lay triers with the trial judge for challenges for cause.

The accused argued these changes violated his rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the amendments did not infringe the accused's right to an independent and impartial jury, nor did they violate principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that the amendments were procedural in nature and applied retrospectively to the accused's trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction from a judge alone trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial judge provided extensive and thorough reasons addressing the issues raised on appeal.

The case turned on an assessment of credibility.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of collusion allegations against Crown witnesses and objected to the use of notes created subsequent to the events.

The appellant also raised the issue of being denied a legal aid certificate and proceeding without counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and no demonstrated unfairness in the trial proceedings.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years imposed for robbery and dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge should have imposed concurrent rather than consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach, which balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation prospects.

The court dismissed the appeal but set aside the $400 victim fine surcharge.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing incident at a restaurant party.

He appealed on four grounds: (1) errors in jury instructions regarding the mental element in murder under s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code and the application of s. 21(2); (2) failure to give a "rolled up" instruction regarding intoxication and provocation; (3) failure to admit exculpatory portions of a co-accused's police statement; and (4) misapprehension of witness evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions, taken as a whole, properly equipped the jury to render a true verdict, and that any errors were harmless.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice on the grounds that a mathematical error was made in calculating pre-sentence custody credit.

The sentencing judge intended to apply a 1.5:1 credit ratio but the calculation resulted in 13 months of credit instead of the correct 13.3 months.

The Crown conceded the mathematical error but argued against correction based on judicial discretion and the minimal nature of the discrepancy.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence by 15 days to correct the mathematical error.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of three subsections of the child luring provision in a police sting operation context: the age presumption under s. 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4), and the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a).

The majority held that s. 172.1(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, but that s. 172.1(4) does not infringe s. 7 because it only limits a defence rather than providing an independent pathway to conviction.

Because the trial judge convicted on a legally unsound basis — failure to take reasonable steps — without finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual belief, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum was left to the new trial judge.

Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have also declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional.

Abella J. dissented in part, finding s. 172.1(4) also unconstitutional and that an acquittal should be entered.

An appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant appealed both the conviction entered on October 10, 2017, and the sentence imposed on November 24, 2017.

However, the conviction appeal was not pursued during oral argument by either duty counsel or the appellant, and accordingly the conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge pre-judged the case based on a prior domestic murder conviction; (2) that the trial judge erred in believing the complainant despite her potential financial motive to lie; and (3) that the trial judge failed to adequately account for the absence of the appellant's DNA on the hammer and complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no basis for the pre-judgment claim, that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, and that the absence of DNA evidence was not determinative given the complainant's accepted testimony.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault perpetrated over a lengthy period against his seven-year-old nephew and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as there was no basis in the record for the appellant's contentions that the trial judge erred in believing the complainant or that the complainant's testimony was coerced.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity and did not give appropriate weight to mitigating factors including the appellant's youth, absence of prior criminal record, prior victimization, and intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge had properly considered all relevant factors.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his sentence for sexual interference and sexual assault, both involving the same complainant and occurring within the same date range.

The trial judge imposed consecutive two-year sentences on both counts.

The Court of Appeal found that the two counts were alternative ways of pleading the same incidents rather than distinct offences, and therefore one count should have been stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court allowed the appeal, stayed count 6, and set aside any victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of two years and six months imposed on September 13, 2017 for breach and enter of a commercial premises, robbery of a convenience store, theft, and failure to comply.

The appellant sought a reduction of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no joint submission existed and determined the sentence was entirely fit given the circumstances of the robbery and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The Crown conceded that the victim surcharge must be set aside.

The appeal was allowed only to set aside the victim surcharge; the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a five-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault involving forced sexual intercourse with a pregnant woman.

The appellant had prior convictions for sexual assault but received suspended sentences with probation in 2006.

The trial judge identified the appellant's intellectual limitations and mental health status as mitigating factors but did not adequately explain why these factors did not warrant a sentence in the lower range.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not properly calibrated to account for the significant mitigating factor of diminished intellectual capacity and reduced the sentence to four years.

Five appellants were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case alleged a planned robbery with violence, while the defence maintained the incident arose from a drug transaction that escalated when the victim produced a firearm.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair, that jury selection instructions were inadequate, and that prior consistent statement instructions were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's questioning of defence witnesses and extemporaneous comments during jury instructions created a cumulative appearance of bias toward the prosecution, seriously compromising the fairness of the trial.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a self-represented accused charged with failure to comply with a recognizance, sought directions from a single judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant requested that the trial judge hear outstanding motions before the appeal from the dismissal of the motion to quash the bench warrant was heard, and that the motions be expedited.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the requested relief fell outside the court's jurisdiction as it had no nexus to the appeal before it and was not authorized by the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for contempt of court and his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly compelled the appellant's attendance and that his refusal to testify constituted contempt.

The appellant was afforded ample opportunity to consult counsel and declined further time to consider his position.

The Court found the conviction unassailable and dismissed the appeal.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.