Andreea Ioan Baiasu

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal shooting during a gang-related confrontation at a public festival.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on former s. 34(2) self-defence, the refusal to leave provocation under s. 232 to the jury, and the trial judge’s review of the evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly presented self-defence and correctly focused the jury on the critical moment of the shooting.

It further held that there was no air of reality to provocation because the defence position was deliberate self-preservation, not loss of self-control, and found no material misstatement or omission in the evidentiary review.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

Following the court's earlier ruling that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional and that the trial sentence was manifestly unfit, the remaining issue was whether the respondent should be re-incarcerated after having completed the sentence originally imposed.

The court held that a fit sentence at trial would have been two years less a day, with 12 months' credit reducing the remaining custodial term to 12 months.

However, given the lengthy appellate delay, the respondent's successful completion of the conditional sentence, and his demonstrated rehabilitation, the court permanently stayed execution of the 12-month sentence.

The appellant challenged a Review Board disposition continuing his detention in a maximum secure forensic facility after findings of not criminally responsible on multiple threatening offences.

He argued that the Board failed to address an alleged treatment impasse, failed to order the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, and failed to consider re-integration into society.

The Court of Appeal held that the record supported the Board’s conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety, that active treatment efforts were ongoing, and that transfer to medium security was not shown to be appropriate or less restrictive in practical terms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused appealed his convictions for violent offences against a former friend, while the Crown appealed the refusal to designate him a dangerous offender.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reviewable errors in applying the credibility framework, assessing the forensic evidence, or giving reasons.

On the sentence appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in law by importing intractability into s. 753(1), by treating spontaneity and absence of 'serial' offending as defeating pattern, and by misapprehending the availability of long-term offender style community control for a non-sexual violent offender.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and the disposition was varied to five years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year supervision order.

The accused appealed his convictions for violent offences against a former friend, while the Crown appealed the refusal to designate him a dangerous offender.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reviewable errors in applying the credibility framework, assessing the forensic evidence, or giving reasons.

On the sentence appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in law by importing intractability into s. 753(1), by treating spontaneity and absence of 'serial' offending as defeating pattern, and by misapprehending the availability of long-term offender style community control for a non-sexual violent offender.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and the disposition was varied to five years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year supervision order.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a psychiatric hospital with conditions permitting him to live in the community.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to grant an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidentiary support for the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat due to his schizophrenia, lack of insight, and resistance to treatment.

The community-based detention order was upheld as reasonable and the least onerous disposition.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 of the Charter because it is grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonable hypothetical offender at the regulatory end of the spectrum.

The court declared s. 95(2)(a)(i) of no force or effect, but affirmed the appellant's specific sentence of time served.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had declared the three-year mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a five-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the declaration that the mandatory minimum violates s. 12 of the Charter, relying on its companion decision in R. v. Nur.

However, the Court found that the trial judge made unsupported findings of fact that improperly mitigated the offence.

The Court concluded the original sentence was manifestly inadequate and requested further submissions to determine an appropriate sentence.

The appellant, a repeat firearms offender, appealed his global sentence of eight years' imprisonment for eight firearm-related offences, including possession of a restricted firearm and breaches of two firearms prohibition orders.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the prohibition breaches, that the global sentence offended the parity principle, and that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences and concluding the global sentence was fit and did not offend the parity principle.

The Court declined to address the constitutional challenge as the sentence was justified regardless of the mandatory minimum.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years' imprisonment for possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm and other firearms offences.

He challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code for a second or subsequent offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violated s. 12 of the Charter as it would be grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical scenarios, and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

However, the appellant's seven-year sentence was upheld as fit given his extensive criminal record and the gravity of his offences.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a minimum security facility.

She sought an absolute discharge or unsupervised community access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant posed a danger to the public and that the disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive option.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's absence without leave and refusal to take medication was admitted but ultimately supported the Board's decision.

On an application under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code, the court suspended the application of an absolute discharge granted to an NCRMD accused and substituted a conditional discharge pending appeal.

Post-disposition evidence showed renewed illicit drug use, medication non-compliance, missed psychiatric appointments, decompensation, and re-hospitalization under mental health legislation.

The court held that the applicant had shown compelling reasons to doubt the soundness of the absolute discharge and that the fresh evidence would be admissible on appeal.

Applying the s. 672.54 factors, the court found the accused again posed a significant threat to the safety of the public and that a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempt to obstruct justice, break and enter, uttering a threat, and mischief to property, as well as his sentence of nine years' imprisonment and designation as a long-term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on in-dock identification and in failing to disqualify a juror.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate given the context, including that the complainant knew the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that fresh evidence confirmed the appellant remained a high risk to reoffend, justifying the long-term supervision order.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a person can be a party to the offence of conspiracy under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a youth convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for assisting two sisters in planning to kill their mother, argued that party liability should not apply to conspiracy.

The Court held unanimously that party liability to conspiracy is an offence known to Canadian law, but adopted the narrower Trieu model, limiting such liability to aiding or abetting the formation of the agreement or assisting new members to join a pre-existing agreement, and rejecting the broader McNamara approach extending liability to furthering the conspiracy's unlawful object.

Although the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability, the curative proviso applied because the evidence of the appellant's membership in the conspiracy was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge breached his right to be present at his trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code by holding in-chambers discussions about a Parks challenge and having private conversations with potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal held that the in-chambers discussions were preliminary and did not breach the Code.

While the private discussions with potential jurors did breach s. 650(1), the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv), finding that the appellant suffered no prejudice as his counsel was present, no objections were raised, and all jurors spoken to privately were excused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm, using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, and careless storage of a firearm, as well as his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding the robbery and careless storage charges, finding the verdict reasonable and rejecting arguments regarding police evidence and adverse inferences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the aggravating factors of a home invasion with a loaded firearm and the mitigating factors.

However, based on a Crown concession, the conviction for using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence was set aside as it was precluded by the robbery conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction and four-year sentence for sexual assault and breach of probation.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately address a gap in the complainant's memory shortly before the assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficiently addressed the live issues of credibility and reliability, noting that the complainant clearly expressed her lack of consent during the sexual acts regardless of any prior memory gap.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the four-year term was within the appropriate range given the appellant's prior record and the circumstances of the offence.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence and alternatively sought bail pending an adjournment to await the result of a constitutional challenge to a three-year mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The request for bail was denied because the appellant would receive a penitentiary sentence even if the mandatory minimum were struck down.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a statement made during a traffic stop should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 8 violation.

The Court of Appeal applied the Grant framework and upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence.

The court found that the police conduct was not egregious, the state of the law was uncertain at the time, and the reliable evidence was essential to the case.

The appeal was dismissed.