Dr. Michael Pollanen

The applicant, charged with three counts of first degree murder relating to her former husband and his parents, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the applicant posed a flight risk, a threat to the administration of justice, and that her release would undermine public confidence.

The court reviewed the strong circumstantial case against the applicant, her history of breaching court orders, and the proposed plan of supervision involving electronic monitoring.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to show cause for release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, and dismissed the bail application.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his daughter, brought a pre-trial application to exclude expert opinion evidence suggesting starvation as a possible cause of death.

The accused argued the Crown provided late notice of this theory and that the underlying estimates of the victim's pre-death weight lacked scientific validity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that late notice did not warrant exclusion given the time remaining before trial, and that the experts' estimates, based on specialized experience rather than strict scientific testing, met the threshold reliability required for admissibility.

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

During a murder retrial, the defence sought a jury instruction alleging the Crown breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross‑examine the accused on several key aspects of his testimony.

The court reviewed the rule governing fairness in cross‑examination and the circumstances in which a failure to challenge a witness’s evidence may require remedial instructions.

Considering the trial context, the prior disclosure of the Crown’s theory, and the cross‑examination that did occur, the court held that no significant Browne v. Dunn breach by the Crown had occurred.

The accused had full opportunity to address the Crown’s theory during testimony and was not ambushed.

The requested jury instruction was therefore refused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial due to unfair and inflammatory cross-examination and jury addresses by Crown counsel.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of alleged juror misconduct based on online comments made after the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the Crown's comments were ill-advised, they did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial when viewed in the context of the entire proceedings.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, concluding it did not prove Crown misconduct or compromise the integrity of the trial.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder in the fatal stabbing of an intimate partner during a domestic argument.

The sentencing judge rejected the offender’s claim that the victim accidentally stabbed himself during a struggle and found that the offender intentionally stabbed the victim in anger during an argument.

Aggravating factors included the domestic relationship, the use of a knife, and the offender’s failure to seek medical assistance for the victim after the stabbing.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, positive rehabilitative efforts while in custody, and difficult personal background.

The court concluded that the moral blameworthiness placed the offence in the upper range of manslaughter cases and imposed a penitentiary sentence of eight years, with credit for pre‑trial custody.

In a preliminary inquiry for second-degree murder, the court determined whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to trial for the beating death of a rooming house resident.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on witness testimony, DNA evidence from shoes found at the scene, and circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence and conduct.

The court applied the test for committal, examining whether evidence could support reasonable inferences regarding both the requisite intent and the identity of the perpetrator.

The court found sufficient evidence on both issues to commit the accused to trial.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from the prolonged abuse and death of a child, the court determined the appropriate periods of parole ineligibility under ss. 235 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge assessed the character of each offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendations.

The evidence established prolonged physical abuse, malnutrition, and deprivation of medical care, culminating in a fatal assault.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused committed the final assault causing death, while the other was complicit through failure to protect and participation in the ongoing abuse.

The primary perpetrator received life imprisonment with 18 years’ parole ineligibility, while the secondary participant received life imprisonment with 13 years’ parole ineligibility.

During a joint trial for the murder of a child, the co-accused's counsel produced previously undisclosed photographs depicting the victim chained to a bed.

The applicant sought a severance of his trial, arguing the late disclosure undermined his cross-examination strategy and created fundamental unfairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the late production was a natural response to the applicant's cutthroat defence tactics and did not violate Crown disclosure obligations or create an injustice requiring separate trials.

At a preliminary inquiry into a mass shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre, the Crown sought committal on two counts of first-degree murder.

The accused was charged with nine counts total, including two counts of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder.

The court found that the attempted murder charges should be reduced to aggravated assault, as there was no evidence of specific intent to kill the five survivors.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support committal on first-degree murder rather than second-degree murder for the two victims who died.

The court found that motive (revenge for a prior stabbing) combined with the deliberate and calculated nature of the shooting provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The applicant, convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal altercation at a bar, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The central issue on appeal was causation, with the applicant seeking to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting the deceased died from alcohol concussion syndrome triggered by a co-accused's subsequent punch, rather than the applicant's initial assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed fresh evidence raised an arguable ground of appeal, satisfying the requirement that the appeal not be frivolous.

Concluding that the applicant's detention was not necessary in the public interest, the court granted release pending appeal on strict conditions.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter for failing to provide the necessaries of life to his severely disabled brother, who died of starvation, pneumonia, and infected bedsores after eight years of extreme neglect and financial exploitation.

The court found the accused's moral culpability to be exceptionally high, characterizing the offence as a 'near murder' due to the prolonged, deliberate, and horrific nature of the abuse.

The accused was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, with a 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, as the court declined to grant enhanced credit.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision on a charge of first-degree murder in the death of Leanne Freeman on November 29, 2011.

The Crown sought to commit both accused for trial on first-degree murder charges.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for second-degree murder but argued insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused for trial on first-degree murder charges, relying on two alternative theories: (1) planning and deliberation, and (2) murder committed during unlawful confinement under Criminal Code section 231(5)(e).

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing the proceedings should have been stayed as an abuse of process due to the misconduct of a forensic pathologist and the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario.

The appellant had previously been convicted of murder based on the pathologist's flawed pediatric forensic pathology evidence, a conviction later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that while the state actors' misconduct was egregious and fell within the residual category of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

Balancing the interests, the court found that a trial on the merits was appropriate given the serious nature of the allegations of chronic physical child abuse and the fact that the systemic issues had since been addressed.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder and assault causing bodily harm in relation to the death of his common-law partner's two-year-old son.

The child suffered extensive, repeated blunt force trauma while in the offender's care, culminating in fatal abdominal injuries.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment for second-degree murder with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the brutal breach of trust against a vulnerable infant.

A concurrent sentence of five years was imposed for the assault causing bodily harm.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder in 1984, sought a declaration that section 7 of the Charter requires the Crown to preserve all Stinchcombe disclosure material for the lifetime of the offender.

She alleged her section 7 rights were violated because autopsy photographs from her trial were lost or destroyed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if a post-appeal duty to preserve evidence exists, the loss of the photographs was adequately explained given the passage of time and lack of retention policies in the 1980s.

Furthermore, the applicant suffered no prejudice as the photographs would not have assisted in demonstrating her innocence.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown brought a motion to admit graphic post‑mortem photographs of the deceased child to be used during the testimony of a forensic pathologist.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing the admissibility of graphic evidence, weighing probative value against prejudicial effect.

One photograph depicting the body in its original position was found to have significant probative value in illustrating the condition of the remains, corroborating witness testimony, and assisting the jury in assessing the forensic expert’s conclusions.

A second photograph was largely redundant and risked undue prejudice due to the exposure of the genital area, particularly given allegations of sexual assault.

The court admitted the first photograph but excluded the second, subject to reconsideration depending on the course of cross‑examination.

The appellant pleaded guilty in 1992 to criminal negligence causing the death of his infant son, based on flawed expert evidence from Dr. Charles Smith regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, fresh expert evidence revealed that the infant's death was likely caused by natural disease processes or birth trauma, and that the triad of symptoms relied upon by Dr. Smith was not diagnostic of non-accidental head injury.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea to prevent a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.