Michael Nathan Bernstein

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay 17 charges, including human trafficking, against the respondent.

The trial judge found that police had fabricated evidence by planting false identification in the respondent's wallet and that an officer lied about it in testimony, constituting an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his conclusion that the egregious police conduct warranted a stay of proceedings to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was invalid due to a mental disorder and equivocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made the necessary inquiries to ensure the plea was informed and voluntary.

Fresh evidence, including medical records without expert interpretation, did not demonstrate the plea was involuntary or unequivocal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, sexual assault, and criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred in appointing counsel to cross-examine the complainant, alleged unfairness in the appointment process, and claimed the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the procedural objections were raised for the first time on appeal and lacked merit, and finding no error in the trial judge's detailed assessment of credibility and reliability.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder following a home invasion robbery where the victim was bound and shot.

At trial, they advanced a cut-throat defence, each accusing the other of being the shooter.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the elements of constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code and party liability under s. 21(2).

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 21(2) can form the basis for first degree murder, the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on what factual findings were required to conclude the non-shooter actively participated in the killing.

The appeals were allowed in part, the first degree murder convictions were set aside, and convictions for second degree murder were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He conceded the trial judge correctly stated the law but argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to sustain the conclusion based on the circumstances leading up to a phone call and the clear language the appellant used with an undercover officer.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was already serving an eight-year penitentiary term, had a substantial prior record, and the offence was serious and related to a police officer doing his job.

The applicant, convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and possession of property obtained by crime, sought bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

His conviction had previously been upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The court applied the test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

While the applicant established he was not a flight risk and the court accepted the leave application was not frivolous, bail was denied on the public interest ground.

The court held that the balance favored immediate enforceability of the sentence given the seriousness of the crime, the confirmation of the conviction on appeal, and the remote chance of the Supreme Court granting leave.

The appellants were convicted of offences arising from a jewellery store robbery.

Police obtained a 'tower dump' warrant for cell phone records near the store without reasonable grounds, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

Using this unconstitutionally obtained information, police secured subscriber warrants and residential search warrants.

The trial judge excluded the tower dump records but admitted the subscriber and residential evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, reasoning that the subscriber records could have been lawfully obtained via a telephone records order under s. 492.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, arguing his Charter rights were violated during an investigative detention and search at a subway station.

The police approached the appellant for loitering, initiated an investigative detention, and subsequently arrested and searched him after he resisted a pat-down search.

The Court of Appeal found no violation of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, holding that the police had reasonable grounds for both the investigative detention and the subsequent arrest and search.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility.

He subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial judge dismissed.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from his co-accused, appealed the dismissal of his motion to withdraw the plea, and appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked credibility as the co-accused refused to answer critical questions.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in extending the period of parole ineligibility based on the appellant's high culpability and poor pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed his convictions for various firearms and stolen property offences, arguing that evidence seized during a search of his home should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found the search warrant invalid and a breach of s. 8, but admitted the evidence under the pre-Grant Collins framework.

Applying the new Grant framework, the Court of Appeal found that the significant carelessness of the police in drafting the Information to Obtain, combined with the intrusive nature of searching a dwelling house, outweighed the reliability and probative value of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the evidence excluded, and acquittals substituted.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a conviction for criminal contempt arising from a sentencing submission that inadvertently misled the trial judge regarding her client's pre-sentence custody status.

The trial judge found that the actus reus of contempt was established and placed the burden on the appellant to purge the contempt with an explanation and apology, which he ultimately rejected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to properly assess whether the Crown had proven the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, and finding that the record did not support a finding of intentional or reckless conduct.

The appellant was convicted of paying for sexual services from a person under 18 years of age.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding his defence of mistake of age.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave conflicting and confusing instructions on the burden of proof concerning whether the appellant took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for contempt of court, which arose from his refusal to testify at a first-degree murder trial.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the procedure followed and in rejecting his defence of duress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the procedure was fair, the duress defence lacked merit because the appellant failed to pursue a safe avenue of escape by going to the police, and the sentence was fit given the impact of his refusal on the murder trial.

The appellant, a home care provider, was convicted of defrauding an elderly couple of over $35,000 and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that her s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed by a 33-month delay, and that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from the deceased complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 11(b) analysis or his admission of the hearsay evidence based on necessity and reliability.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit was within his discretion and the sentence was fit given the significant breach of trust.

The appellant appealed her sentence for common assault, which occurred during a noncontact hockey game.

She argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and that gender played a role in the sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range based on the facts and that there was no basis to suggest gender influenced the sentence.

The appellant failed to surrender himself as required by his release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of a firearm, and aggravated assault, as well as his 11-year sentence.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting his non-videotaped statements to police and photo array identification evidence that did not meet the Sophonow requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the weight of the evidence and affirmed that police should record interviews from the outset.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the gratuitous shooting and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after organizing and leading a coordinated attack on the deceased, during which an associate fatally stabbed the victim.

The appellant admitted to participating in a planned assault but argued he lacked the mens rea for murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 21(2) is applicable to render a party guilty of second degree murder where the common unlawful purpose is assault and the accused actually knew that murder would be a probable consequence.

The appellant appealed from a sentence of 18 months' custody and two years' probation for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to provide the necessaries of life to infant victims.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by rejecting a joint submission of 90 days intermittent custody and an 18-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge followed the proper process and was entitled to impose a more substantial custodial sentence given the extremely serious circumstances of the offences, which involved horrible injuries to virtually newborn children and a failure to seek medical treatment.

The appellants were convicted of robbery with a firearm and conspiracy to commit robbery.

On appeal, one appellant argued his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated, while the other argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both of these grounds.

However, both appellants also argued the trial judge's charge to the jury was fatally flawed regarding both the conspiracy and robbery counts.

The Court agreed, finding the charge failed to adequately explain the law, the three-step process for conspiracy, and the evidence relevant to each appellant's position.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.