Amber Pashuk

The Supreme Court clarified bail principles under s. 515 of the Criminal Code, including strict adherence to the ladder principle and the limited role of cash bail.

It held the bail review judge erred by insisting on a combined cash-plus-surety release and by relying on speculation rather than evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, reversed the constitutional declaration against s. 515(2)(e), and replaced the release order with a cash-only release on the same terms.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

The self-represented applicant, facing charges under the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought an originating application seeking declarations that various provisions of those statutes violate the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that interlocutory Charter challenges during ongoing criminal proceedings should generally be declined absent special circumstances, which were not present here.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that s. 524(8) of the Criminal Code violates the presumption of innocence and that Part 18 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional for failing to grant preliminary inquiry judges the jurisdiction to decide Charter issues.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug-related charges.

Police had entered a residence without a warrant after a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute and death threats.

The trial judge found the entry unlawful and excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the police acted lawfully under the exigent circumstances doctrine to protect life and safety.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for cocaine trafficking, arguing that the motion judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that various production orders, warrants, and wiretap authorizations were invalid.

They also argued that the search of a Blackberry was unreasonable and that intercepted communications were protected by spousal communication privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the validity of the warrants and authorizations under the Garofoli standard, and concluding that spousal communication privilege does not extend to common-law spouses.

The appellant was convicted of participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group after attending a training camp and providing computer assistance to the group's leaders.

On appeal, he challenged the admission of intercepted private communications obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter, undated departure letters found in his bedroom, and cross-examination on religious and ideological materials.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the actus reus of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding the jury instructions substantially complied with the law.

The applicant corporation sought the return of $144,050 in cash seized by police during a drug and money laundering investigation targeting its former director.

The applicant argued it was the lawful owner of the funds, which it claimed were a business float, and that the funds were not required for the pending criminal proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that it was the lawful owner of the funds, and that the funds were required as evidence for the upcoming preliminary inquiry and trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting three utterances he made to officers at the scene and in failing to properly instruct the jury on how his limited English proficiency might affect the interpretation of those utterances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the utterances were voluntary and made before the appellant was detained, and that the trial judge's jury instructions adequately addressed the language barrier issue.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing and possessing opium.

A package containing opium concealed in a briefcase was delivered to his address, and he was arrested after accepting a controlled delivery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in relying on an out-of-court statement and that the finding of guilt was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in relying on the out-of-court statement, the error was not determinative.

The court further found that the circumstantial evidence, including the manner of acceptance and concealment of the package, reasonably supported a finding of knowledge.

The respondent was charged with producing marihuana and successfully argued at trial that the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) violated s. 7 of the Charter because physicians were boycotting the scheme, rendering the medical exemption illusory.

The trial judge struck down the MMAR and stayed the charges.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his factual findings and misapprehended the evidentiary record.

The Court held that the respondent failed to provide medical evidence that he or the patient witnesses qualified for an exemption, and there was no evidence of a systemic boycott by physicians.

The trial judge's orders were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to offences related to a large-scale marijuana grow operation and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias through comments about ethnicity and erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal condemned the trial judge's stereotypical comments about ethnicity but upheld the custodial sentence, noting conditional sentences are rarely appropriate for large-scale commercial grow operations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal to correct a mathematical error the trial judge made when calculating the sentence reduction for the guilty plea, reducing the sentence to 10 months' imprisonment.

The appellant, a youth at the time of his initial involvement, was convicted of participating in a terrorist group after attending training camps and committing acts such as shoplifting and removing a surveillance camera.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in admitting his post-arrest statement despite Charter breaches, improperly admitted hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, and failed to stay proceedings for abuse of process and entrapment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record, the Charter breaches did not warrant exclusion of the statement under s. 24(2), the hearsay evidence was properly admitted, and the police conduct did not amount to entrapment or an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a factual error occurred but found it immaterial.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant was a party to possession by consenting to the use of a secret compartment for a joint enterprise to traffic drugs was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to multiple counts of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The offender supplied large kilogram quantities of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer and was found with additional kilograms during the execution of search warrants.

The court rejected the defence claim that the offending was driven by a serious opioid addiction, finding instead that the offender was an experienced and sophisticated wholesaler motivated by profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale drug trafficking at a high level of the supply chain, the court imposed a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment along with firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The appellant sought to appeal a forfeiture order regarding Hell's Angels paraphernalia seized from his residence.

During his sentencing, the appellant disavowed any interest in the property, claiming it belonged to the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Corporation.

He chose not to participate in the subsequent forfeiture proceedings.

After the Corporation's appeal of the forfeiture order was dismissed as abandoned, the appellant attempted to appeal the order himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be an abuse of process to allow the appellant to challenge an order made in proceedings he deliberately chose to ignore.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a cocaine-related offence, as well as the trial judge's failure to make mandatory DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The respondent conceded the error regarding the orders.

The Court of Appeal noted that the conditional sentence was manifestly unfit given the amount of cocaine involved.

However, based on compelling fresh evidence regarding the deteriorating health of the respondent and the terminal illness of his son, the court declined to alter the custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed only to impose the DNA and s. 109 orders.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

The police officer asked the accused for identification, ran a CPIC check, and discovered an outstanding bail curfew condition.

The accused was arrested and searched, revealing cocaine.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that while the request for identification violated s. 8, there were no breaches of ss. 9 or 10(b).

The Court concluded the evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer could have lawfully obtained the identification by ticketing the accused for a seatbelt violation.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.