Christopher G. Walsh

The applicant sought relief from a forfeiture order relating to residential property forfeited as offence-related property and proceeds of crime following a relative’s conviction for conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The applicant claimed an interest in the property based on a $150,000 loan used toward its purchase and argued he held either an equitable mortgage or constructive trust interest.

The court found no intention by the parties to secure the loan against the property and therefore no equitable mortgage or resulting interest arose.

The court further held that a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment was unavailable because the applicant was merely an unsecured creditor and Parliament’s statutory forfeiture scheme constituted a juristic reason for the Crown’s enrichment.

Although the applicant appeared innocent of complicity or collusion in the offences, the absence of any legal or equitable interest in the property required dismissal of the application.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The police arrested the appellant based on a tip from a confidential informant, which was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arresting officers had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest, applying the Debot criteria.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking approximately 26 pounds of marijuana found in the trunk of a car he was driving.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in relying on his knowledge of a small amount of marijuana in the console and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence supported the inference that he knew about the marijuana in the trunk.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the amount of drugs seized.

During a jury trial for importing cocaine, the Crown sought to admit opinion evidence from a police officer regarding the pricing and value of cocaine imported through Pearson Airport.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence, arguing the witness lacked proper qualifications and that the evidence could improperly influence the jury.

Applying the criteria for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Sekhon, the court assessed relevance, necessity, absence of exclusionary rules, and proper qualification.

The court found that the evidence was relevant to the issue of the accused’s knowledge and that the jury would not otherwise understand the value of the quantity of cocaine involved.

Based on the officer’s extensive investigative experience and exposure to pricing information through investigations and intelligence sources, the court concluded he possessed the requisite specialized knowledge and permitted the opinion evidence.

The applicants, a mother and daughter, were arrested at Pearson Airport after a sniffer dog alerted to them and customs officers found they were wearing shorts containing cocaine under their dresses.

They brought a motion to exclude the evidence and stay the proceedings, alleging violations of their Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found a violation of s. 10(b) due to a 41-minute delay in facilitating access to duty counsel, but dismissed the other Charter claims, finding the dog sniff, arrests, and strip searches were lawful in the border context.

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the police lacked justifiable grounds to search his house and that an officer exceeded his authority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was amply supported by evidence including a 911 call and plain view observations that justified a telewarrant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the forfeiture order was deemed reasonable and the sentence length was not challenged.

The accused was sentenced following a jury conviction for trafficking nearly three kilograms of cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $54,000.

Wiretap evidence demonstrated the accused’s ongoing and significant role in a multi‑kilogram cocaine distribution network, including negotiating price, quantity, and delivery.

Although the accused had no relevant criminal record and presented numerous mitigating personal circumstances, the court emphasized the seriousness of multi‑kilogram cocaine trafficking and the need for general deterrence.

Relying on Ontario appellate authorities establishing higher sentencing ranges for large‑scale cocaine trafficking, the court concluded that a penitentiary term within the 8–10 year range was appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the uncorroborated evidence of a single witness who had a self-interest in implicating him.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was aware of the need for caution and properly weighed the witness's inconsistencies, timing of statements, and relationship with the appellant.

The court concluded the verdict was not unreasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for selling crack cocaine to an undercover police officer, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on identification evidence and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him regarding his alibi and prior criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on identification, when read as a whole, properly distinguished between certainty and reliability.

The court also held that the Crown's cross-examination on the appellant's alibi and prior record was proper and cured by appropriate limiting instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.