Najma Jamaldin

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine into Canada.

She challenged the trial judge's decision to admit statements she made to Canada Border Security officers at the airport.

The appellant argued that she was detained before making these statements and that her Charter rights were engaged, requiring exclusion of the statements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained during routine questioning and luggage searches, and that detention only occurred after x-ray images revealed suspicious tins and the appellant asked what was in them.

The court found no error in admitting the pre-detention statements and dismissed the appeal.

Appeal from conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum correcting an error in the prohibition order.

The trial judge had failed to specify the duration of the prohibition order.

The Court varied the order to impose a 15-year term to the prohibition order as a whole, in accordance with the appellant's request and the Crown's concession.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his six-year-old son and sentenced to five years imprisonment with ancillary prohibition orders.

He appealed against conviction and sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal aspects of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidence of collusion between the complainant and his mother and no error in the admission of similar fact evidence regarding the appellant's prior conviction for sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl.

The Court granted a limited sentence appeal, varying the prohibition order by deleting a provision regarding communication with persons under 16 and reducing a lifetime proximity ban to 15 years, following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.R.J.

Appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following a conviction.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of whether section 8 Charter rights were breached during a search.

The trial judge found that a level 3 search was reasonable except for the "squat and cough" procedure, which was deemed unreasonable.

The trial judge reduced the sentence as a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing systemic deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in her findings and determining that the sentence reduction was an appropriate remedy for the breach.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of robbery with a firearm and five counts of theft over $5,000 following a trial by judge alone.

Following conviction, the defence advanced a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) plea.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified with conflicting opinions on whether the appellant knew his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offences, with their opinions based on the appellant's self-reports during interviews.

The trial judge assigned no weight to the experts' opinions because they were based on hearsay statements and the appellant had not testified.

The trial judge dismissed the NCR application.

Subsequently, defence counsel informed the trial judge that counsel had agreed before the hearing that the appellant's self-reports could be relied upon for their truth without the appellant testifying.

The trial judge declined to reopen, holding she lacked jurisdiction to do so after rendering a verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding she had no jurisdiction to reopen and erred in failing to engage in proper analysis of the conflicting expert evidence.

The applicant, facing extradition to Romania for a murder conviction, brought a disclosure application to obtain records from the Canadian and Romanian governments to support an abuse of process motion based on allegations of torture.

The court dismissed the application, applying the Larosa test and finding no 'air of reality' to the torture allegations due to significant inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence and his failure to disclose his conviction to Canadian immigration authorities.

The court also found the requested documents were largely irrelevant or amounted to a fishing expedition.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding consent and bodily harm, and brought a fresh evidence application alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the appellant's credibility regarding his trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 13-month reformatory sentence for attempted rape.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for multiple sexual assaults on multiple children.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to mitigate the sentence based on his own history of childhood sexual abuse and that a Gardiner hearing was required due to ambiguity about the number of assaults.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's criminal record for similar offences.

The court also held that counsel's ambivalence about the exact number of assaults did not trigger the need for a Gardiner hearing.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment after police found nearly 100,000 Ecstasy tabs in his vehicle.

On appeal, he argued that his arrest, based on a confidential informant's tip, lacked reasonable and probable grounds, rendering the subsequent search unlawful under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot factors, finding the tip compelling, the informant credible, and the information corroborated.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to robbery and was subsequently deported.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his lawyer allegedly failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was already subject to a stayed deportation order and knew that further criminal convictions could lead to deportation.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant understood deportation was a potential consequence of his plea.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the complainant's lack of credibility and that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge meaningfully addressed the frailties in the complainant's evidence, including her criminal record and drug use, and properly found confirmation in other evidence such as her immediate reporting and physical injuries.

The verdict was held to be reasonable.

The defendants moved to strike two paragraphs of a statement of claim in an action seeking Charter damages arising from an alleged unreasonable strip search following arrest.

The plaintiff alleged the impugned paragraphs were material to a s. 15 equality claim because they connected her individual treatment to broader allegedly disproportionate strip-search practices affecting Aboriginal persons.

The court held that the paragraphs pleaded relevant material facts, did not constitute an improper disguised class action, and were not scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.

The motion was dismissed, with costs submissions deferred if not agreed.

The accused applied for disclosure of investigative materials held by the Toronto Police Service Professional Standards Unit relating to investigations of two individuals connected to a large-scale drug investigation known as Project Gladiator.

The Crown argued the records constituted third‑party records requiring an O’Connor application, while the defence asserted they formed part of the fruits of the investigation subject to Stinchcombe disclosure.

The court found the investigations of the two individuals were intertwined with the criminal investigation of the accused and were conducted as part of the same joint police investigation.

Because the materials could assist the defence, including supporting alternate suspect theories, they constituted first‑party disclosure.

The court ordered disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence including his assertion of Métis status, rehabilitation efforts, and time spent on bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not warrant a reduction.

The court noted that Aboriginal Legal Services could not confirm his status, his troubled background was already considered, and the sentence imposed for violent and sexually exploitative crimes was already at the low end of the range.

The appellant sought a new trial following a jury conviction, arguing that the jury's rejection of her evidence may have been influenced by hearsay evidence that she was subject to a drug look-out on arrival from Trinidad.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the appeal should be allowed and ordered a new trial.

The conviction was quashed.

The appellant was convicted of credit card fraud-related offences after police found skimming equipment, encoded gift cards, and a USB key during a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the searches of his person, vehicle, and USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights and the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the pat-down search was lawful, and while the vehicle and USB key searches breached s. 8, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also affirmed that a conviction for possessing credit card data under s. 342(3) does not require proof that the data could successfully defraud an issuer.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was stopped for speeding and arrested for breaching his recognizance curfew.

During a search of the vehicle incident to that arrest, the officer smelled raw marihuana, leading to a second arrest for possession and a further search of the trunk, which revealed 18.1 pounds of marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest, the search of the front of the car was justified for officer safety, and the officer's testimony regarding the smell of marihuana was credible, making the subsequent search of the trunk lawful.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault.

Prior to trial, the defence learned of police occurrence reports relating to one of the complainants from an unrelated incident and sought disclosure.

The trial judge ruled that the occurrence reports were 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and subject to the third-party production regime in s. 278.2.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in statutory interpretation.

The Court found that a complainant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police occurrence report, and that records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence are explicitly excluded from s. 278.1.

The occurrence reports were subject to the Crown's first-party disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed the Registration Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario's refusal to annul her third unsuccessful attempt at the Canadian Practical Nurse Registration Examination.

The appellant argued she experienced health concerns during the exam.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable as the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence of the nature, extent, and consequences of her illness to justify annulling the exam attempt.