Christine Elinor Mary Bartlett-Hughes

The applicant sought leave to reopen his sentence appeal on sexual assault and voyeurism convictions, arguing that a subsequent overturning of related domestic assault convictions constituted a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration.

The applicant sought credit for pre-sentence custody previously applied to the now-quashed domestic assault conviction and argued the sentencing judge had improperly considered the domestic assault conviction as an aggravating factor.

The court dismissed the application, holding it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal already decided on its merits and that, even if jurisdiction existed, the interests of justice would not support reopening.

The appellants attended a house party armed with loaded handguns.

During an altercation, shots were fired, resulting in one death and two injuries.

Both were convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, failed to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence for the aider or abettor, and improperly instructed the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was acquitted of sexual offences involving two underage girls after the trial judge found he had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain their ages under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his application of the mistake of age defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly identified and applied the legal principles, and that it was open to him to conclude that a reasonable person would not have made further inquiries given the compelling indicia of age presented by the complainants.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, was convicted of domestic violence offences and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months.

The trial judge awarded pre-disposition custody credit at a ratio of 1.25:1.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent, varying the pre-disposition custody credit to a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the effective sentence from 60 months to 52 months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility after shooting the victim outside a bar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on self-defence, failed to leave the defence of provocation, and misstated witness evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly tailored the self-defence instruction to the key factual issue of whether the victim drew a gun first, correctly concluded there was no air of reality to provocation, and made no material errors regarding witness testimony.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors, including the use of an illegal handgun in a public place.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and physical assault against the mother of his daughter.

At trial, the complainant testified she could not recall the incident, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's demeanour while recanting and by relying on voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant's demeanour to determine if her failure to recall stemmed from a wish to reconcile, and that the parties had tacitly agreed the voir dire evidence was admissible at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, voyeurism, and breach of probation, as well as his six-year sentence.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant choked the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her while she was unconscious, and videotaped the activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence or error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of increasing the pre-sentence custody credit to a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 25.5 months of credit.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal after a sexual assault conviction, relying on fresh expert evidence that he was in a parasomnic state and should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court applied the fresh evidence framework under s. 683(1) of the Criminal Code and held that, although the proposed defence was raised only after trial and first appeal, the evidence was legally admissible, sufficiently cogent, and not barred by any tactical failure at trial.

Competing expert opinions created a live evidentiary issue that a reasonable trier of fact could resolve in favour of the appellant on a balance of probabilities.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The new trial was limited to determining whether the appellant was NCR-MD or guilty.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud under $5,000, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his post-conviction application to reopen the trial to introduce videotape evidence.

The appellant claimed the videotape showed the real perpetrator was someone else.

On consent of the Crown, the Court of Appeal reviewed the videotape and concluded there was a reasonable possibility of misidentification.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, was denied bail on the secondary ground.

After a year in pre-trial custody, she brought a second bail application based on a change in circumstances, which the Superior Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that only the Court of Appeal could review the decision under s 680 of the Criminal Code.

On review, the Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal have concurrent jurisdiction to hear a second bail application based on a change in circumstances.

The Court found a material change in circumstances due to the significant trial delay and the applicant's changed personal circumstances, and ordered her release on strict conditions.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for robbery and mischief, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that reaffirmed a hybrid detention order.

He argued he should be granted an absolute discharge, claiming he had initially malingered his symptoms and did not suffer from a mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant suffered from a major mental illness and remained a significant threat to public safety was well-supported by the evidence.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a co-accused who refused to testify at trial, failing to properly instruct the jury on the evidence, and improperly answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his discretion under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, failed to relate the evidence to the issues in his jury charge, and provided a procedurally and substantively flawed response to a jury question.

The applicant, who suffered from an undisclosed serious mental illness, accumulated over $20,000 in fines from four convictions for driving without insurance.

He applied for an extension of time and leave to appeal after his motions in the provincial offences appeal court were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding an arguable issue regarding the due administration of justice and the public interest in determining whether accommodations should be made for individuals with significant personal disabilities who lack the ability to pay draconian fines.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge's presiding over both his bail hearing and trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the jury charge contained errors regarding post-offence conduct, intent, and lacked balance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and concluding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in principle given the brutal, drug-related nature of the planned robbery and killing.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault.

Prior to trial, the defence learned of police occurrence reports relating to one of the complainants from an unrelated incident and sought disclosure.

The trial judge ruled that the occurrence reports were 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and subject to the third-party production regime in s. 278.2.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in statutory interpretation.

The Court found that a complainant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police occurrence report, and that records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence are explicitly excluded from s. 278.1.

The occurrence reports were subject to the Crown's first-party disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's convictions for physical and sexual abuse and ordered a new trial.

The majority held that the appeal raised a question of law, namely whether the trial judge was required to self-instruct on the dangers of convicting based on frail complainant evidence from the distant past.

Agreeing with the dissenting Court of Appeal justice, the majority found no legal error by the trial judge.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions restored, with one justice dissenting on the basis that the dissent below raised only questions of fact or mixed fact and law, and thus the Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a single charge of sexual assault.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by permitting cross-examination on the complainant's prior sexual activity without a section 276 vetting, excluding an out-of-court statement, and misusing evidence regarding the absence of an immediate complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some procedural errors may have occurred regarding section 276, they caused no prejudice to the Crown.

The Court concluded that the Crown's case was very weak and any misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge did not affect the ultimate determination that the evidence failed to meet the reasonable doubt standard.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his three-year-old niece.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding his false statement to the police and by admitting evidence of prior acts of abuse against the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no risk that the jury misused the false statement to infer intent, and holding that the prior abuse evidence was highly probative of animus and intent.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.