Brian H. Snell

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a housekeeper was strangled to death during a break and enter.

At trial, each accused blamed the other for the killing.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding party liability, the use of lies to police, and the evidence of a co-accused's ex-wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the jury instructions on common purpose liability or post-offence conduct, and concluding that the Crown's cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

The primary grounds of appeal related to the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's refusal to admit third-party suspect evidence, jury instructions on out-of-court statements and identification evidence, and alleged Crown misconduct during cross-examination and closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown's conduct fell below the expected standard of propriety, the trial judge's strong corrective instructions were sufficient to cure the damage and preserve the right to a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to possession of stolen property, attempted break and enter, and break and enter, receiving a 42-month sentence and a lifetime weapons prohibition under s. 109(3) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the weapons prohibition, arguing there was no violence used, threatened, or attempted.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's actions, which he admitted scared the victims, constituted an implied threat of violence.

The appeal was dismissed, but the prohibition was varied to 10 years at the Crown's request.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in drawing an inference of knowledge from circumstantial evidence and reversed the onus of proof.

The appellant also sought to tender fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence pointed to only one rational conclusion and the trial judge did not reverse the onus of proof.

The court declined to admit the fresh evidence due to the lack of a motion and its irrelevance.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge should have granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody rather than 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and appropriately considered the appellant's repeated serious misconduct while in custody.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and accessory after the fact to murder.

At trial, the Crown called the common-law spouses of two of the appellants as witnesses and introduced out-of-court statements made by one of the spouses shortly after the shooting.

The appellants appealed, arguing the spousal incompetency rule should be extended to common-law spouses under s. 15(1) of the Charter, and that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that while failing to extend the spousal incompetency rule to common-law spouses violates s. 15(1) of the Charter, the limitation is justified under s. 1.

The court also upheld the admission of the out-of-court statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, fatally stabbed a fellow inmate and was convicted of first-degree murder.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence and testified to three prior incidents that were never put to the Crown's witnesses during cross-examination.

The trial judge ruled that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn and remedied the breach with a jury instruction rather than recalling the witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to find a breach of the rule and that the jury instruction was a reasonable and proper remedy in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for 20 months of pretrial custody.

The trial judge had only given 1 month of enhanced credit for 44 lock-down days.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted 1.5 to 1 credit for the entire 20 months of pretrial custody, reducing the sentence accordingly.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assaults, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and assault simpliciter involving his three daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence, particularly regarding credibility, demeanour, the application of the W.(D.) principles, and the reliability of child witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided comprehensive reasons, properly applied the burden of proof, and made credibility and reliability findings that attracted deference.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery of a drug dealer, during which two victims were unlawfully confined and shot to death.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the defence of alibi, a third-party suspect, the correction of defence counsel's closing address, the failure to give timely notice of an alibi witness, and the elements of accessorial liability for constructive first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to leave constructive first-degree murder to the jury for the non-shooter as an aider and abettor, and concluded that the verdicts were not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that the only reasonable inference from the cumulative effect of the evidence was the appellant's guilt.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for counselling and encouraging her boyfriend to kill the victim.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that two videotaped statements to police were inadmissible under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and appealed her adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant was not detained during the first interview and had validly waived her right to counsel in the second.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly concluded that a youth sentence would not provide sufficient long-term supervision to protect the public given the appellant's psychological profile and risk of reoffending.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of kidnapping and robbery arising from two incidents.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrators.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but held that the trial judge failed to adequately caution the jury about specific frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including generic descriptions, lack of distinguishing features, and discrepancies in height.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited weapon and his sentence of 3.5 years' imprisonment.

He argued that his takedown and search by police breached his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police lawfully exercised their common law power of investigative detention in a volatile situation involving a firearm.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in denying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody merely because the appellant pursued a weak Charter motion.

The Court granted enhanced credit at a ratio of 1.5:1 due to harsh remand conditions and ineligibility for remission, reducing the remaining sentence.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence was deemed irrelevant as the 3.5-year sentence was otherwise fit.

The appellants pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and forcible confinement after subjecting a vulnerable victim to 17 days of torture.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for one appellant and the Crown's proposal for the other, imposing significantly higher sentences without providing reasons or allowing counsel to make submissions.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error in principle, as a joint submission should not be rejected unless it is contrary to the public interest and brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to align with the original submissions.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 9 years (8 years for aggravated assault) less 3 years credit for pre-trial custody.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by inappropriately balancing his mistreatment in pre-trial custody against the severe injuries inflicted on the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge's comments were unfortunate, he did not err in principle in exercising his discretion to assess the appropriate credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentence was fit and within the range for the offences committed.

The appellant was convicted of threatening and criminally harassing his former common law wife.

Following the finding of guilt, defence counsel requested a psychiatric assessment, which led to a finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) due to alcohol-related dementia and delusions.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the NCRMD finding was unreasonable and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer raised his mental state without instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the NCRMD verdict was reasonable and that the appellant failed to prove his counsel acted without instructions or that the counsel's performance resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and conspiring to import heroin after a controlled delivery of a package to a third party's apartment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of the third party, who claimed the appellants orchestrated the importation.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was fatally flawed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the charge failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing credibility, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, improperly exhorted minority jurors to reconsider their views, and failed to separately review the evidence against each appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding frailties in the complainant's eyewitness identification evidence and in permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on his prior criminal record if he testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately addressed the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting she properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and appropriately sanitized the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.