Brian H. Snell

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences arising from allegations by several complainants in circumstances involving crack cocaine use and alleged coercive sexual conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the similar fact evidence was admitted, there was at least an air of reality to possible inadvertent collusion through media reports, rumours, and street communications, and the jury should have been left to assess that possibility when weighing the evidence.

The court also held that, after severing counts involving one complainant to preserve the accused’s ability to testify only on those counts, the trial judge erred in then admitting that complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence, effectively undermining the accused’s right to silence and control of the defence under ss. 7 and 11(c) of the Charter.

The combined errors required a new trial.

The appellant appealed his concurrent life sentences for two counts of counselling to commit murder.

While incarcerated for offences against his ex-wife, the appellant attempted to hire an undercover police officer to kill his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence based on the appellant's future dangerousness, despite the Crown not bringing a dangerous offender application.

The Court of Appeal found the life sentence disproportionate and outside the range for similar offences, citing R. v. Goyette.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the life sentence, designated the appellant a long-term offender, and imposed a 16-year determinate sentence less pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Court also varied a non-communication order to allow contact with the appellant's adult daughter upon her written consent.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing the deceased in the appellant's apartment.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's failure to retreat from his own home when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as there is no duty to retreat from one's own home when attacked, nor is it a factor for the jury to consider under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the 18-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following a conviction for a brutal domestic homicide.

The trial judge treated the appellant's mental state as a marginal mitigating factor, which was outweighed by significant aggravating factors including the brutality of the crime, a history of violence, and disregard for court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and breaking and entering, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a co-perpetrator's out-of-court statement, failed to properly caution himself about unsavoury witnesses, and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a witness's recantation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement was properly admitted, the trial judge did not need to explicitly articulate a Vetrovec warning to himself, and the fresh evidence of the recantation was incredible and lacked sufficient impeachment value to affect the verdict.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug offences committed while on probation for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error with the global sentence given the appellant's record and the nature of the drugs.

However, the court agreed that the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for pre-sentence custody.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence on count 6 was reduced to 22 months' imprisonment.

Multiple appellants challenged jury convictions for two first degree murders and attempted murder arising from a retaliatory gang-related shooting.

The court rejected allegations of unfair trial management, unfair jury instructions, improper admission of prior K.G.B. statements and preliminary inquiry evidence, erroneous refusal of severance, improper admission of intercepted artistic expression, and misdirection on cell phone location evidence.

Applying a threshold reliability analysis informed by Khelawon, the court upheld admission of a key unavailable witness's prior statements.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence application concerning synchronization of 911 and carrier clocks, holding the proposed evidence would not reasonably have affected the verdict given the broader evidentiary record.

The appellant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offence, appealed his adult sentence of life imprisonment with seven years of parole ineligibility for second-degree murder.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by not considering declining pre-sentence custody credit to make a youth sentence sufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the adult sentence was supported by the appellant's age and the violent, unprovoked nature of the crime.

The Court also declined to alter the sentence based on fresh evidence of recent progress in custody, noting this could be addressed in future applications under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and manslaughter in relation to the deaths of two sisters.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge made several evidentiary errors, including admitting frail eyewitness non-identification evidence, excluding evidence of the co-accused's motive and prior bad acts, admitting hearsay statements of the deceased, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory regarding the co-accused's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge failed to mention or apply the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility and the burden of proof, and failed to address defence evidence bearing on culpability.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing a stranger during an altercation.

At trial, the judge only instructed the jury on self-defence under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on sections 34(1) and 37, failing to give a Baxter instruction regarding the exact measure of defensive action, and failing to adequately answer a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the other self-defence provisions and concluding that the omission of the Baxter instruction did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the trial judge's treatment of identification evidence.

The trial judge had rejected the complainant's in-dock identification but convicted based on circumstantial similarities.

The Court of Appeal found significant discrepancies between the complainant's description and the appellant, particularly regarding height and clothing, as well as contextual issues of time and place.

The Court concluded the trial judge's evaluation of the evidence was flawed, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for several offences related to two retail store robberies.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, admitting a photograph found on his cell phone during a search incident to arrest, and instructing the jury that simple robbery was an included offence to armed robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate, the cursory cell phone search lawful to determine ownership, and no miscarriage of justice regarding the included offence instruction.

The appellant participated in a home-invasion robbery during which his gun discharged, killing an occupant.

He was convicted of second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 229(c), arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter by not requiring an intent to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that subjective foresight of death combined with an unlawful object is a constitutionally sufficient mens rea for murder.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant, the mastermind of a terrorist bomb plot targeting locations in Toronto, pleaded guilty to terrorism offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 10 years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and that a fixed term of 18 to 20 years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a life sentence was warranted given the catastrophic potential of the plot and the appellant's guarded prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period following a fatal shooting in a park.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a correcting instruction regarding unproven suggestions made during cross-examination and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the cross-examination instruction and applying the curative proviso to the post-offence conduct instruction error, given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling bad character evidence from a Crown witness and improper closing submissions by a self-represented co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's mid-trial instructions and jury charge were appropriate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence and the trial judge's refusal to make a DNA order or a delayed parole eligibility order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence and parole decision but allowed the Crown's appeal in part to impose a DNA order, noting that violence is not a pre-condition for such an order.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by provisionally ruling that if the defence led 'other suspect' evidence regarding strychnine in the deceased's home, the Crown could lead evidence of the accused's wife's death by strychnine poisoning the previous year.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly held that without evidence of the accused's special access to strychnine, the other suspect evidence would leave the jury with a distorted picture.

The ruling was a fair balancing of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a videotaped statement of a witness who claimed memory loss at trial, and that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by prejudging the witness's veracity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement had sufficient indicia of reliability, including being given under oath and corroborated by other evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the trial judge's comments related to the witness's reluctance to testify, not his truthfulness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his one-year custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his role in a gang attack and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant gave two voluntary statements to police explicitly acknowledging his role in the assault.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding it fit given the sudden and vicious nature of the attack by multiple people.