Brian H. Snell

The appellants, Gavra and Karl Largie, were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on private communications intercepted with the consent of an informant under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that s. 184.2 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it does not require the state to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that s. 184.2 satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of s. 8 and is not unconstitutional despite the absence of an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court also dismissed several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and designated a dangerous offender after rejecting a pre-trial plea offer from the Crown.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in excluding the entirety of his spontaneous exculpatory statements made upon arrest, in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and automatism, and in failing to stay the dangerous offender application as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while spontaneous exculpatory statements upon arrest may be admissible if the accused testifies, the trial judge's exclusion of the statements did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court also found no errors in the jury instructions and held that the dangerous offender application was not an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, specifically challenging his designation as a Dangerous Offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the designation and its associated stigma were entirely warranted in this case.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal was essentially fact-driven, raised no issue of law of general importance, and lacked sufficiently strong grounds to warrant leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a special instruction on the reliability of his confession and that Crown counsel's conduct caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were sufficient as the appellant had testified and explained why he falsely confessed.

The court also found that while some of the Crown's conduct was unfortunate, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice, noting that defence counsel raised no concerns at trial.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm offences following a shooting outside a Toronto nightclub.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the eyewitness identification evidence and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the identification by two independent witnesses, corroborated by gunshot residue on the appellant's hands, provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable trier of fact to convict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder in the death of his wife by strychnine poisoning.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to lead reply expert evidence regarding fatal doses of strychnine and homeopathic remedies, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of demeanour in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the reply evidence was admissible to respond to the appellant's unexpected testimony, and the demeanour instruction was adequate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting a loaded handgun and a statement into evidence following alleged breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal expressed reservations about the trial judge's finding of a s. 8 breach regarding the search warrant.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court held that even if a breach occurred, it was not serious, the police acted in good faith, and the reliable evidence was needed to prove a serious crime.

The Court also upheld the admission of the appellant's statement despite a s. 10(b) breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for domestic assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample evidence to support them.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant in the community.

The trial judge based this on the appellant's lack of motivation to change, directly contradicting unanimous expert psychiatric evidence that strict external controls would be effective regardless of motivation.

The dangerous offender designation was set aside and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the killing of his mother.

He raised three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial application based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after the appellant allegedly overheard the judge discussing expert evidence with a deputy; that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant failed to establish the defence of not criminally responsible; and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a sufficient factual inquiry regarding the bias allegation, that the weighing of conflicting medical opinions on the NCR defence was within the trial judge's exclusive province, and that the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the killing.

The appellant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea, seeking to withdraw the plea.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and found that a combination of factors, including retained counsel's failure to meet with the appellant for 8 months, substitute counsel's lack of preparation, the appellant's difficulties in custody, language barriers, and his consistent assertions of innocence, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for third-party police records relating to an alternate suspect, and in relying on prior consistent statements of the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that counsel's bald assertion that the alternate suspect was the shooter was insufficient to meet the likely relevance threshold for the O'Connor application.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-year sentence was fit for a planned shooting in a public place by an offender with a related criminal record.

The moving parties brought a motion to vary a decision of Ferrier J., who had found no serious issue to be tried regarding the License Appeal Tribunal's 30-day suspension of their commercial vehicle operator's registration.

The Divisional Court applied the Housen standard of review and found no palpable or overriding error in Ferrier J.'s conclusions that trial counsel made a tactical decision and that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable based on the safety record.

The motion to vary was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 20 years.

At trial, the defence argued that the main Crown witness was the actual shooter and attacked the integrity of the police investigation.

The trial judge permitted the lead detective to provide an investigative narrative to confirm the Crown witness's evidence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of this investigative narrative, the explanation for why a witness was not called, and the admission of prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence's attack on the investigation justified the Crown's response and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the limited use of the evidence.

The 20-year parole ineligibility period was also upheld given the appellant's violent criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of stolen property.

At trial, she testified that a passenger handed her the cocaine and she hid it in her wig out of panic.

The trial judge rejected her explanation, partly because she did not offer it to the police when searched.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge infringed the appellant's right to silence by using her failure to explain to the police as a basis for finding her incredible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his effective sentence of 13 years arising from his participation in a bank robbery where a teller was fatally shot.

He argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding the rule in Brown v. Dunn, the Vetrovec warning, and the Corbett ruling admitting his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions.

The court also upheld the 13-year sentence, noting the appellant's active participation and brandishing of a handgun during the violent robbery.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial where the cause of death and similar fact evidence were central issues.

The Crown alleged the appellant killed his partner during a contraband liquor deal, while the defence argued the death was accidental due to commotio cordis.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misdirected the jury by misstating expert evidence regarding carbon monoxide and confusing medical diagnosis with legal causation.

The trial judge also erred in admitting the entirety of a fictitious 'Mr. Big' murder plot as similar fact evidence, as it lacked sufficient distinctiveness and was highly prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice and upheld by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the imposition of consecutive sentences at or near the maximum for the serious offences committed.

Although fresh evidence presented an encouraging picture for the appellant's future, it did not warrant a reduction in the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for breach of trust against his employer and fraud involving identity theft of credit card holders.

The trial judge noted the significant disruption to victims and financial institutions, and although the actual loss was limited to $40,000 due to early detection, the potential for greater loss existed.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 20 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence and the availability of a manslaughter verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's comments on the evidence were acceptable and did not usurp the jury's function, and that there was no air of reality to manslaughter.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 20-year parole ineligibility period was justified by the extraordinary violence of the murder and the appellant's high moral culpability.