Brian H. Snell

The young person appealed a sentence of 18 months (12 secure custody, 6 community) for robbery with an imitation firearm.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred by failing to consider open custody under the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown's argument that its appellate powers were limited to adjusting the custody levels, holding it could impose a new sentence.

Noting the young person's significant rehabilitation, the Court varied the sentence to time served (15 weeks) followed by community supervision and probation.

The appeal of the DNA order was dismissed.

The youth appellants were convicted of armed robbery and related offences.

At trial, the judge admitted hearsay statements from a victim and a co-accused under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reliability analysis for the hearsay statements.

However, the sentence appeals were allowed.

The trial judge erred by considering general deterrence, which is not a principle of youth sentencing.

Given the passage of time and fresh evidence of the appellants' successful rehabilitation, the court reduced their sentences to periods of open custody and community supervision.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant applied for an adjournment of her conviction and sentence appeal to obtain transcripts and adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request, noting the appellant had failed to take steps to obtain transcripts and the proposed fresh evidence was irrelevant.

The appellant then declined to participate in the appeal.

The Court reviewed the materials, found no basis to interfere with the convictions or sentence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his 'Oliver' instruction by failing to clarify that the caution applied only to the co-accused and not the appellant.

Furthermore, given the frailties in the evidence of two witnesses who could be viewed as accomplices, the trial judge should have cautioned the jury to proceed with care before acting on their evidence to convict the appellant.

The combined errors warranted a new trial, particularly as the Crown's case was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown had proceeded at trial on the basis that the appellant's ex-wife was entitled to an interest in the former matrimonial home, which was erroneous in law.

Because no calculation of equalization of property was performed, the Crown failed to establish that the complainant was entitled to any equalization payment, thereby failing to prove the essential element of deprivation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction for care and control while impaired and substituted an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge overstepped her appellate jurisdiction by effectively retrying the case, as there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of impairment.

However, because the trial judge failed to address the respondent's exculpatory evidence and improperly relied on an inculpatory statement, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for using a firearm while committing an indictable offence and his sentence.

He had shot a friend in the eye with a pellet gun while intoxicated.

The trial judge found recklessness satisfied the mens rea for both aggravated assault and the firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in equating the mens rea for the two offences, the factual finding that the appellant intended to point and fire the gun satisfied the general intent requirement for the firearm offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, as well as her sentence of a four-month conditional sentence and two years' probation.

She argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of eyewitness identification and by comparing handwriting without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably relied on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's possession of false identification.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision to impose a sentence resulting in a criminal record.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for break and enter, theft, and mischief following guilty pleas.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge ought to have made further inquiries into the basis for the plea regarding a July 8 break-in, as the police had no evidence other than the appellant's equivocal statement and inability to remember the event.

The conviction for the July 8 charge was vacated, and the sentence was correspondingly reduced by six months.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, with the court noting the appellant's lengthy record justified the remaining sentence.

The young person appealed their convictions for sexual assault and carrying a concealed weapon, as well as the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the identification evidence or in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the concealed weapon charge.

However, the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in applying s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Given the time already spent in custody, house arrest, and community service, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to time served and striking out the probation order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that had excluded derivative evidence of the victim's severed head, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and police investigation deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence's own questioning necessitated the admission of the head evidence to restore trial fairness.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions and evidentiary rulings, concluding the Crown presented an overwhelming circumstantial case.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a preliminary inquiry judge's discharge on a firearm charge.

The complainant testified that during an assault over a drug debt, one of the appellants struck him with what appeared to be a .45 calibre handgun and threatened to kill him.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellants on the firearm count, citing a lack of evidence that the gun was pointed or that a threat to shoot was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Superior Court that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by improperly weighing the evidence and choosing among competing inferences rather than determining if a jury could reasonably conclude the gun was real.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction.

The trial judge had rejected his defence under section 43 of the Criminal Code after finding he dangled a child's legs out of a 9th-floor window.

The Court of Appeal found no inconsistent credibility findings and held that such conduct is clearly unreasonable and cannot amount to a section 43 defence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of a former drug associate.

On appeal, he raised nine grounds of error, including the trial judge's instructions on the failure to call witnesses, the Crown's cross-examination on the failure to cross-examine Crown witnesses, the use of disclosure to tailor evidence, the right to silence, the admission of his criminal record, the voluntariness of statements, informer privilege, the trial judge's interventions, and the jury charge on alternative verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

While the trial judge erred in attributing an alternative defence of manslaughter to the appellant, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that the circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the error occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a vast conspiracy to traffic cocaine and launder money, committed while on bail pending appeal for another drug trafficking offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was at the high end of the range but not manifestly excessive.

The trial judge's findings of fact were consistent with the jury's verdict, and she did not err in refusing enhanced pre-sentence credit beyond 2:1.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entirely justified in imposing the sentence given the gravity of the breaches, the appellant's prior record, and the need for the protection of society.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment against his former girlfriend.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant on four counts based primarily on the complainant's testimony, while acquitting him on five others.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessment by failing to reconcile his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate with his acceptance of defence evidence showing she sought revenge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to give effect to the complainant's motive to falsely accuse the appellant and her deliberate lies during testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an 18-month conditional sentence imposed for introducing narcotics into a penitentiary.

The trial judge had accepted a joint submission from experienced counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the appellant's unblemished past and remorse, the serious aggravating factor of introducing drugs into a penitentiary meant the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed a two-year sentence, conceding that the sentence was fit but arguing it was improperly imposed.

The Court of Appeal distinguished the case from R. v. Luther, noting the sentence was fit and exactly what the appellant had requested at trial.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.