WARNING
The President of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be attached to the file:
An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:
486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences;
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.
(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.
486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Roberts, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Pardis Senoubari Abedini
Appellant
Pardis Senoubari Abedini, acting in person
Lynda Morgan, appearing as duty counsel
Nicole Rivers, for the respondent
Heard: August 10, 2020 by videoconference
On appeal from the sentence imposed on April 2, 2019, by Justice Edwin B. Minden of the Superior Court of Justice.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant was convicted of eight offences involving two complainants and related to the sex trade. These offences include human trafficking, receiving financial benefit, living on the avails of a person under 18 under aggravated circumstances, procuring a person to become a sex trade worker and exercising control for the purpose of gain. The trial judge conditionally stayed the counts related to exercising control for the purpose of gain.
2The appellant was sentenced to 8.5 years in custody less credit for pre‑sentence custody and strict bail conditions of 11 months, leaving a balance of 7 years and 7 months to be served. The trial judge made a number of ancillary orders, including that the appellant pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $185,000 within 10 years following her release from custody.
3The appellant has abandoned her conviction appeal. With the able assistance of duty counsel, she appeals her sentence on the grounds that: (1) the 8.5-year custodial sentence was too harsh and therefore unfit - 6 years’ custody is a fit sentence; and (2) there was no evidentiary foundation for the $185,000 fine; alternatively, the amount of $37,500 should have been imposed. She also seeks to file fresh evidence with the respondent’s consent.
4We are not persuaded that there is any basis for appellate intervention.
5The sentence was entirely fit and within the range for similar offences and offenders. Given the seriously aggravating circumstances that the trial judge carefully considered, the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence were paramount. These circumstances included the appellant’s detailed orchestration of a sex trade business into which she enticed vulnerable young women from whom she profited greatly while exercising strict and abusive physical and psychological control and giving them very little in return.
6The trial judge also took into account the few mitigating circumstances, including the appellant’s rehabilitative efforts. In this respect, the fresh evidence adds little to the evidence that was already before the trial judge. Given the predominance of the principles of denunciation and deterrence in this case, we do not agree that the sentence would have been any different had the trial judge known that the appellant’s studies would be hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic.
7Finally, while not determinative, but relevant to the question of fitness of sentence, we also note that the defence submission on sentencing was for 8 years in custody.
8Turning to the question of the fine in lieu of forfeiture, the trial judge’s determination of the amount of the fine was supported by the evidence at trial, including the appellant’s evidence. The trial judge reasonably expressed the difficulty in coming to an appropriate assessment based on the record before him and therefore quite correctly, in our view, took a conservative approach to his determination of the amount of the fine to be imposed. The trial judge’s expression of the difficulty of his task did not equate with impossibility. The evidence that the appellant profited greatly from her crimes, the appellant’s and complainants’ evidence of the rates that were charged, the hours worked, and the length of time the complainants worked for the appellant, amply supported the trial judge’s conclusion that the amount of $185,000 was an appropriate and fit fine.
9We do not accept the appellant’s alternative submission that the fine was too high because the Crown had restricted its request for a fine in lieu of forfeiture to the designated offence of receiving a financial or other material benefit under s. 286.2 of the Criminal Code that only came into effect on December 6, 2014. We do not read the Crown’s sentencing submissions to be limited to that offence. They also included the other designated offences in the Indictment that covered a longer period.
10Accordingly, the appeal from sentence is dismissed.
“L.B. Roberts J.A.”
“B.W. Miller J.A.”
“Gary Trotter J.A.”
