Court File and Parties

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2025-10-20

Court File No.: Central West (Peel) Region 998-24-31100934

Between:

His Majesty the King

— and —

Tyler Van Meeteren

Before: Justice R. Tomovski

Ruling on s. 11(b) Charter Application

Heard on: September 28, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: October 20, 2025

Counsel

Enoch Guimond — counsel for the Crown

Royland Moriah — counsel for the accused Tyler Van Meeteren

Judgment

Tomovski J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] The Applicant's trial has yet to occur. It is scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2025, nearly 23 months after the Applicant's arrest. However, this will be the third time a trial date has been set for this relatively straightforward "domestic" assault case involving one alleged victim. Third time's not the charm, according to the Applicant. As such, he brings an application pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time has been violated and seeks a stay of the proceedings as a remedy. This application arises from the failure of the trial to proceed on the first two scheduled dates. The Applicant and the Crown disagree on who is ultimately responsible for the delay in reaching the currently scheduled trial date.

[2] The Applicant argues that delayed core disclosure at the beginning of the prosecution caused significant delays in the completion of the case irrespective of the reasons for the adjournment of the first two trial dates. Conversely, the Crown argues that once core disclosure was made, the Applicant's actions led to an adjournment of the first two trial dates due to a scheduling error and the Applicant's unavailability on multiple earlier dates and is therefore responsible for the delay that followed.

[3] For my reasons that follow, I dismiss the application. I find that once defence delay is deducted from the total delay, the net delay is significantly below the presumptive ceiling established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 and by any reasonable assessment is the delay in the Applicant's case unreasonable. The Applicant's unavailability for multiple earlier trial dates offered by the court and available to the Crown coupled with the Applicant's error in scheduling the second trial date when the Applicant was already booked were the main causes of the bulk of the delay in the Applicant's case.

II. BACKGROUND

[4] The Applicant is charged with three counts of assault against the alleged victim. The incident dates are April 9, December 29, 2023, and January 12, 2024. The Applicant was arrested on January 13, 2024.

[5] The Information was sworn on January 22, 2024. The anticipated end of trial is December 10, 2025, the second day of a two-day trial. As a result, the overall delay is 688 days or 22 months and 18 days, which is over the Jordan presumptive ceiling for unreasonable delay of 18 months for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, when the Crown has elected to proceed summarily, which it has in this case.

[6] For the sake of analytical convenience, the history of the proceedings in this case can be somewhat neatly divided into two phases, as will become apparent in these reasons: the disclosure phase and the trial-setting phase.

The Disclosure Phase

[7] Starting with the disclosure phase, the applicable period is from the date the Information was sworn (January 22, 2024) and the date the Applicant finally received the alleged victim's statement to police (August 20, 2024), a period of 211 days.

[8] Both the Crown and the Applicant agree that this entire period is appropriately viewed as non-defence delay; specifically, Crown delay based on the Crown's (and police's) failure to provide core disclosure (the alleged victim's statement to police), disclosure necessary for the Applicant to be able to meaningfully assess the case against him and to allow him to move his case forward to the trial-scheduling phase.

[9] The disclosure phase consisted of several court appearances in the administrative remand court, which included numerous efforts on the part of the Applicant to obtain the core disclosure. Those dates are January 26, March 1, April 12, May 24, July 5 and August 9, 2024.

[10] Before moving on from this period, I wish to address what I find is far too common an approach by the Crown that contributes to a culture of complacency that must change to ensure the re-occurrence of this type of delay is prevented. The Supreme Court in Jordan at paras. 4, 29 and 40 referenced a culture of complacency and a tolerance for excessive delay and identified insufficient practices as one contributing factor to that culture. That recognition was nearly 10 years ago. Neither in its written materials on this application nor during its oral submissions did the Crown provide an explanation, or satisfactorily attempt to provide one, for why it took nearly seven months for the Applicant to be provided a copy of the alleged victim's statement to police, despite numerous requests by the Applicant for it. The statement was recorded on video and obtained prior to the Applicant's arrest. Many justice system participants – including the accused, the alleged victim, and the public – deserve and should expect the Crown to seek out an answer to avoid re-occurrence of this kind in future cases. This approach would align with the framework's prospective approach in taking proactive measures to remedy delay: Jordan at para. 108. While I may not be the first to raise these concerns, as a justice system participant, I share in the responsibility of helping to resolve an apparent Crown and police indifference to remedying the repeated failure to provide timely core disclosure: see R. v. Scott-Wolf, 2024 ONCJ 502 at paras. 57-59; R. v. Stefan, 2024 ONCJ 565 at para. 52; R. v. Smith, 2023 ONCJ 222 at para. 49; and R. v. Hotaki, 2023 ONCJ 261 at paras. 29-33.

The Trial-Setting Phase

[11] Turning now to the trial-setting phase, it is at this stage that the Crown and Applicant diverge in their views regarding responsibility for significant portions of the delay in scheduling the trial in this case. As such, I will outline this phase in greater detail than I did when discussing the disclosure phase.

[12] Once the Applicant received the alleged victim's statement, both the Crown and the Applicant agree that the latter was able to take the necessary steps to set a trial date.

[13] At the August 9, 2024, court appearance, the Crown advised the Applicant that the alleged victim's statement was just received and would need to be vetted and would be disclosed to the Applicant right after. As referenced above, the statement was eventually disclosed on August 20, 2024. Additionally at the August 9 court appearance, based on the Applicant's ongoing concerns regarding delay in obtaining outstanding core disclosure, the Crown and the court encouraged the Applicant to take the necessary steps to secure a trial date in advance of the return date. The Applicant sought and was granted an adjournment of six weeks to September 20, 2024, for that purpose.

[14] On September 20, 2024, agent for the Applicant's counsel appeared and indicated that he "was supposed to set trial dates" but was unable to due to personal reasons. The agent sought and was granted an adjournment to obtain trial dates. At the agent's request, the case was adjourned to October 11, 2024.

[15] It was not, however, until October 1, 2024, that the Applicant booked a trial scheduling meeting with the trial coordinator, which was for the following day, October 2.

[16] At the October 2 trial scheduling meeting, a 2-day trial was secured for September 25 and 26, 2025, which is 20 months from the date the Information was sworn. However, as the trial scheduling form shows, the court offered 21 earlier dates for a 2-day trial – October 17-18, 29-30, 2024, June 4-5, July 2-3, 7-8, 9-10, 15-17, 23-25, 28-30, July 30 and August 1, 11-13, 18-20, 20-21, 26-27, 28-29, September 2-3, 8-9, 15-16, 17-18, 22-23, 24-25, 2025 – all of which the Applicant was unavailable. Of those dates, the Crown was available for 17 of them, starting with June 4-5, 2025, which is approximately 16.5 months from the date the Information was sworn.

[17] The Applicant, at the time of the trial scheduling meeting, noted his intention to bring a s. 11(b) Charter application and secured a date of April 11, 2025, to have the application heard. The hearing did not proceed on that date.

[18] As part of the court's effort to reduce the backlog of cases in the region at that time, the Applicant's case was one of many cases brought forward from their respective trial dates to offer earlier trial dates which had become available because of the recent appointment of several new judges. This appearance occurred on January 8, 2025. An earlier 2-day trial of April 7 and 8, 2025 was secured, which is 14.5 months from the date the Information was sworn. Despite the overall delay being reduced by 2 months due to the backlog initiative, the Applicant, once again, noted his intention to bring a s. 11(b) Charter application and secured a hearing date of March 7, 2025.

[19] As occurred at the original trial scheduling meeting, at the January 8, 2025, backlog initiative court appearance, the court offered earlier dates for a 2-day trial, this time 5 earlier dates were offered – February 12-13, 20-21, 24-25, 26-27 and March 24-25, 2025 – all of which the Applicant was, once again, unavailable. Of those dates, the Crown was available for all but one of them, February 12-13, which is approximately 12.5 months from the date the Information was sworn. The Applicant, regardless, confirmed he would still be bringing a s. 11(b) Charter application. Of note, because April 7 and 8, 2025, were secured as the trial dates, none of the parties, understandably, canvassed to see what trial dates, if any, were available beyond then. In hindsight, as will become clear below, it would have been a useful exercise.

[20] On March 5, 2025, the Applicant brought the case forward to seek an adjournment of the April 7 and 8, 2025 trial dates due to a scheduling error on the part of the Applicant in setting the trial dates when he was already booked on an unrelated matter. No explanation, however, was offered by the Applicant in his written application or in his oral submissions to explain when the Applicant first discovered he was not available for the April 7 and 8 trial dates and why the application was not brought sooner than March 5. The adjournment was granted. A second trial scheduling meeting was held on March 7 to choose a new trial date. This period from when the trial date was set in error and the second trial scheduling meeting was held, January 8 and March 7, 2024, respectively, is 59 days.

[21] In seeking an adjournment of the trial and for the reason referenced above, which the Applicant accepted as his "fault", he, however, did not expressly waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights including any ensuing delay caused by the adjournment of the trial. However, in considering the request and, ultimately, granting the adjournment, the presiding Justice put to the Applicant that adjourning the trial "might effect your 11(b)", to which the Applicant responded, "it will, absolutely".

[22] After the adjournment was granted at the March 5 court appearance, the case was adjourned to March 21, 2025, to allow the Applicant to book the second trial scheduling meeting with the trial coordinator to secure new trial dates. That meeting, as referenced above, was held on March 7. The current trial dates of December 9 and 10, 2025 were secured. Only one earlier date approximately 1.5 months away was offered by the court, April 23-24, 2025, which was available to the Applicant but not to the Crown.

[23] At the March 7 trial scheduling meeting, a date for this application was secured for August 13, 2025. The application proceeded before me as scheduled. I reserved my reasons to October 20, 2025.

III. ANALYSIS

a. The Jordan Framework

[24] The Supreme Court in Jordan outlined the framework by which delay is to be assessed under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The framework as it applies to the Ontario Court of Justice is summarized as follows.

[25] There is a presumptive ceiling of 18 months: Jordan at paras. 5, 46, 49, and 105. Delay above that mark is presumptively unreasonable, whereas delay below it is presumptively reasonable: Jordan at paras. 47-48, 68, 82 and 105.

[26] Delay is considered and calculated in different ways at different stages of the framework. At the outset, the total delay must be calculated. This period is calculated from the date of the charge to the end of the trial: Jordan at para. 60. The former equates with the date the Information is sworn: see R. v. Allison, 2022 ONCA 329 at paras. 35-43; R. v. Kalanj.

[27] Defence delay is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at paras. 49, 60, and 66.

[28] Defence delay can result from an explicit or implicit waiver or delay caused solely or directly by the defence's conduct: Jordan at paras. 61, 63 and 66. An example of the latter is when the Crown and court are ready to proceed but the defence is not: Jordan at para. 64. However, legitimate defence conduct is not defence delay: Jordan at para. 65.

[29] When the delay is above the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to establish the presence of exceptional circumstances that justify the delay: Jordan at paras. 47, 68, 81 and 105. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the ensuing delay emanating from those circumstances cannot reasonably be remedied by the Crown: Jordan at para. 69. The Crown must show that it took reasonable steps to avoid the delay before the presumptive ceiling was surpassed: Jordan at para. 70. Those steps need not be successful in preventing the delay: Jordan at para. 70.

[30] Generally, exceptional circumstances fall into two groups: discrete events or particularly complex cases: Jordan at para. 71. The former includes medical emergencies or unexpected illnesses, whereas the latter includes cases with novel or complicated legal issues, voluminous disclosure or many witnesses requiring a lengthy trial: Jordan at paras. 77-78.

[31] Like defence delay, delay caused by exceptional circumstances is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at para. 75.

[32] When the delay is below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Applicant to show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable by establishing that it "took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings" and the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have": Jordan at paras. 48, 82 and 105.

[33] Meaningful and sustained steps include seeking and setting the earliest available trial dates and giving notice when delay is becoming a problem: Jordan at para. 85.

[34] Whether a case took markedly longer considers multiple factors including the case's complexity, local considerations, and whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings: Jordan at para. 87.

[35] Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling will be granted only in clear cases: Jordan at para. 83.

b. The Hanan Principle

[36] In R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12 at para. 9, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule of attributing the entirety of ensuing delay to the defence after the rejection of an initial date because of unavailability. Instead, a contextual analysis was emphasized in which all relevant circumstances are to be considered to determine if and how the ensuing delay should be apportioned.

[37] In R. v. Jones, 2025 ONCA 103 at para. 32, the Court of Appeal noted that Hanan did not "adopt an inverse bright-line rule apportioning the defence with none of the delay". The Court at para. 33 reiterated that all relevant circumstances must be assessed to decide how to apportion the delay among the parties: see also R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2024 ONCA 458 at paras. 5-7; R. v. Shaporov, 2025 ONCA 281 at para. 33.

[38] In R. v. K.D., 2025 ONCA 639, the Court of Appeal further clarified the principle in Hanan. The Court at para. 46 noted, "it is not that the apportionment of delay is warranted in every case, but rather that the circumstances of every case must be considered to determine whether apportionment is warranted".

[39] In R. v. Bowen-Wright, 2024 ONSC 293 at paras. 38-48, the summary conviction appeal court identified several factors that would inform any contextual analysis in the apportionment of ensuing delay after the rejection of an initial date. Those factors include the reason for the need to reschedule and whether it was caused by the defence; the extent to which the defence was available; and the reasons for the defence unavailability.

c. Jordan and Hanan Applied

[40] The total delay in the Applicant's case is from January 22, 2024 (the date the Information was sworn) to December 10, 2025 (the anticipated end of trial). The total delay is 688 days or 22 months and 18 days.

[41] As referenced earlier in these reasons, the Crown inevitably conceded it was responsible for all the delay up to the date it finally provided core disclosure to the Applicant. I accept the Crown's concession and agree that the Crown's failure to provide the Applicant with the alleged victim's video statement to police is entirely Crown delay. This period is from January 22, 2024 (the date the Information was sworn) to August 20, 2024 (when the statement was disclosed to the Applicant), a period of 211 days.

[42] I find there is no further Crown delay beyond August 20, 2024.

[43] There are, however, several periods of defence delay once the Applicant received the alleged victim's statement and was able to proceed, that are to be deducted from the total delay.

[44] The first period of defence delay is from September 20 to October 2, 2024, a period of 12 days. This is the period from when the Applicant had received the alleged victim's statement (August 20, 2024) and was ready to set a trial date but returned to court on September 20 having failed to take the necessary steps to set a trial date, requiring a further adjournment to October 11. It was not until October 1 that the Applicant set a trial scheduling meeting for October 2 and obtained a trial date.

[45] Subtracting 12 days from the total delay of 688 days leaves a net delay of 676 days.

[46] The second period of defence delay is from June 5 to September 26, 2025, a period of 113 days. This period is in reference to the scheduling of the first trial date. Of the dates offered, June 5 was the first date that the court and Crown were ready to proceed but the Applicant was not. The latter was not available until September 25 and 26, 2025, the dates chosen for trial. As referenced earlier, the court and Crown were available for 17 additional interim dates, while the Applicant was not.

[47] Subtracting 113 days from the net delay of 676 days leaves a remaining delay of 563 days.

[48] The third period of defence delay is from February 21 to June 5, 2025, a period of 103 days. This period is in reference to the backlog initiative court appearance of January 8, 2025. At that appearance, the first trial date of September 25 and 26, 2025, was vacated so that an earlier trial date could be chosen. Five earlier dates were offered. The Crown and court were ready to proceed starting on February 20-21, 2025. February 21 is, therefore, the start of this period of defence delay. Determining the end of this period of defence delay requires a more nuanced assessment. Although an earlier trial date of April 7 and 8, 2025 was chosen, as it became apparent later, the Applicant had set this date in error because he was not actually available, because of a prior commitment. At the original trial scheduling meeting of October 2, 2024, when the first trial date of September 25 and 26, 2025 was chosen, the earliest trial dates the Crown and court were available was June 4 and 5, 2025. June 5 is, therefore, the end of this period of defence delay.

[49] I do not find it appropriate to apportion any of the third period of delay to anyone other than the Applicant. As referenced in Hanan, I am required to undertake a contextual analysis of the cause of the delay resulting from the backlog initiative court appearance. After having considered the circumstances including the reasons the first trial date was vacated – a defence error in booking a date he was not actually available – I find that none of the delay flowing from the vacated first trial date should rest with anyone other than the Applicant. I find the Applicant's trial should have taken place no later than June 4 and 5, 2025 and could have taken place as early as February 20 and 21, 2025. Regarding the latter, I find the dates offered were sufficiently far enough away (1.5 months away) from when the parties appeared on January 8, 2025, to be a reasonable date to offer and expect the defence to be available. My view that it is reasonable to find the defence's unavailability as the basis for finding this period is defence delay is reinforced by the fact that three further dates were offered, also unavailable to the defence, including March 24-25, 2025, approximately 2.5 months away.

[50] Subtracting 103 days from the net delay of 563 days leaves a remaining delay of 460 days.

[51] If I am mistaken in my determination of the start of this third period of delay, that is, February 21, 2025, or in attributing the entire period between February 21 and June 5, 2025 as defence delay, I find that the defence inaction between the setting of the second trial date of April 7 and 8 at the January 8 backlog initiative court appearance, and the corresponding vacating of the September 25 and 26 trial date at that time, and the Applicant's delay in waiting until March 5 to bring an adjournment application to rectify the scheduling error is defence delay. As stated in Jordan at para. 113, the defence "cannot benefit from its own delay-causing action or inaction". On January 8, the Applicant attended the backlog initiative court and inadvertently set the second trial date on dates for which he was already booked. It was not, however, until March 5 and 7, 2024, respectively, that the matter was brought forward to vacate the trial date and a new trial date was obtained. The Applicant cannot benefit from either setting the second trial date in error or from his delay in correcting it. I find this entire period, from January 8 to March 7, 2024, a period of 59 days, as defence delay.

[52] However, I do not subtract this period from the net delay, but it does factor into any below-the-ceiling assessment and my finding that the Applicant did not take meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings once the Applicant received the complainant's video statement. Further, subtracting one but not both of this period of delay or the third period of delay from the net delay similarly results in a period of delay well below the presumptive ceiling.

[53] The fourth period of defence delay is from September 26 to December 10, 2025, a period of 75 days. As instructed by Hanan, in considering all the relevant circumstances and whether to apportion some, none or all of the ensuing delay to the Applicant for adjourning the trial date, I find that but for the Applicant's error in setting the earlier trial date of April 7 and 8, 2025, for which the Applicant was not actually available, the original trial dates of September 25 and 26, 2025, would never have been vacated, obviating the need for the currently scheduled trial dates of December 9 and 10, 2025. This is no fault of the Crown or court. It is delay entirely caused by the actions of the defence.

[54] I have considered but declined to apportion any of the delay in setting the current trial date of December 9 and 10, 2025 to the Crown. The second trial scheduling meeting was held on March 7, 2025. The only interim date offered, which was available to the Applicant but not the Crown, was April 23-24, 2025. However, recall that the first trial date of September 25 and 26, 2025, was available to the Crown at the time it was set – in addition to a significant amount of earlier trial dates – which were not available to the Applicant. Even if I were to apportion the entire period from when the Crown was originally available, September 26, to its revised availability of December 10, a period of 75 days, as my ensuing below-the-ceiling assessment will show, the applicable net delay could be adjusted and increased by 75 days and still be well below the presumptive ceiling (15 months). However, I reiterate that I decline to apportion any of the fourth period of delay to the Crown based on the Applicant having solely caused the need for an adjournment of the April 7 and 8 trial date due to an error in scheduling. In all the circumstances it would be unreasonable to apportion any delay to the Crown knowing that it was originally available for several earlier trial dates starting in February followed by March, June, July, August and September.

[55] Subtracting 75 days from the net delay of 460 days leaves a remaining delay of 385 days or approximately 12.5 months.

[56] The 12.5 months of net delay falls considerably short of the Jordan presumptive ceiling. In my view, by any reasonable assessment and application of the Jordan framework for below-the-ceiling cases does the net delay in the Applicant's case become unreasonable. Despite this, I will briefly undertake a below-the-ceiling assessment of the net delay.

Below-the-Ceiling Assessment

[57] Aside from the very low numeric value itself, there are several factors which lead me to find that the delay in the Applicant's case is reasonable. They are as follows.

[58] The Applicant failed to take meaningful and sustained steps.

[59] First, the Applicant did not set the earliest available trial dates. When the first trial date was set, the Applicant was unavailable for 17 earlier dates that were offered by the court and available to the Crown. Similarly, when the second trial date was set, the Applicant was unavailable for 4 earlier dates that were offered by the court and available to the Crown.

[60] Second, the Applicant waited approximately two months to bring an adjournment application to vacate the trial dates that were set in error and obtain new trial dates.

[61] The case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

[62] First, the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings. The first two times the Applicant's case was ready to be set down for trial (October 2, 2024, and January 8, 2025), the Crown and court offered several earlier dates, all which were under the presumptive ceiling. Additionally, after the first trial date of September 25 and 26, 2025 had been set on October 2, 2024, the Crown and court acted quickly in earmarking the Applicant's case for the backlog initiative court and secured a date of January 8, 2025, to offer earlier trial dates.

[63] Second, regarding local considerations, a trial within 12.5 months in this, and likely, any jurisdiction, is reasonable. In Peel region, recent similar cases to the Applicant's with a net delay in the range of 14-16 months have been found to be reasonable: see, for example, R. v. Richards, 2024 ONCJ 7 (15.5 months); R. v. Kullab, 2023 ONCJ 458 (15.5 months); Scott-Wolf, supra (14.8 months delay); R. v. Mikovic, 2024 ONCJ 106 (14.6 months). Conversely, I am unable to locate a single recently reported decision in this jurisdiction in which a case with a net delay of 12.5 months resulted in a stay being granted. Even if one did exist, the circumstances of the Applicant's case and the reasons for the delay do not satisfy me that the delay is unreasonable.

[64] Before concluding, I will address one of the cases relied on by the Applicant in this application: R. v. A.(C.), 2024 ONSC 1603. Both A.(C.) and the Applicant's case involved significant delay at the outset of the prosecution in obtaining core disclosure. However, the similarities end there. There were determinative facts in A.(C.), not present in the Applicant's case, which justified a stay of proceedings. These facts include: no defence delay (para. 115); the net delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling (para. 39); an alternative analysis placing the adjusted net delay at 17 months (paras. 44-45); new trial dates offered were never more than 33 days away (paras. 2, 8-11; 26-31, 35); and the Crown's attempt to secure an earlier trial date began too late – 14.5 months after the charge (paras. 8, 34, 111, 114).

IV. CONCLUSION

[65] The net delay of 12.5 months is well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling. The Applicant has failed to rebut the presumption and show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable.

[66] The application is dismissed.

Released: October 20, 2025

Signed: Justice Tomovski