ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MUAYYAD ABU LABAN
Before Justice R. Tomovski
Ruling on s. 11(b) Charter Application
Heard on November 28, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on December 2, 2025
Jonathan Ng........................................................................................ counsel for the Crown
Gurbir Singh Gill.................................. counsel for the defendant Muayyad Abu Laban
I. INTRODUCTION
1It is alleged that the Applicant stole a bag containing cash and jewelry from the complainant. The alleged theft, I am advised, is captured on video surveillance. The procedural history of this matter has been protracted. There were several avoidable delays which occurred resulting in two cancelled trial dates and the currently scheduled one being nearly three years after the incident.
2The Applicant brings an application pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time. He seeks a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy for the alleged breach.
3This application arises from the failure of the trial to proceed on the first two scheduled trial dates. The Applicant and the Crown disagree on who is ultimately responsible for the delay in reaching the currently scheduled trial date. The Applicant argues that delayed disclosure at the beginning of the proceedings and new disclosure received just prior to the second trial date caused significant delays in the completion of the case. Conversely, the Crown argues that the Applicant unreasonably delayed conducting a crown and judicial pretrial and obtaining trial dates. Further, the Crown argues that the Applicant solely caused the first two trial dates to be cancelled.
4After having assessed and deducted the relevant periods of delay, the net delay is below the Jordan presumptive ceiling. Although the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, the Applicant did not take sustained steps to expedite the proceedings. My reasons below explain in detail why I dismiss the application.
II. BACKGROUND
5The Applicant is charged with one count of theft over $5000. The incident date is March 7, 2023, at which time the Applicant is alleged to have stolen a bag containing $50,000 in cash and approximately $30,000 in jewelry from the alleged victim. Video surveillance footage allegedly captures the theft. The Applicant was charged and released on an undertaking with a first court date of April 25.
6The Information was sworn on April 6, 2023. The anticipated end of trial is February 4, 2026, the third day of a three-day trial. As a result, the total delay is 1037 days or 34 months, which is well over the Jordan presumptive ceiling for unreasonable delay of 18 months for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, when the Crown has elected to proceed summarily, which it has in this case.
7For analytical clarity, the history of the proceedings can be divided into seven phases, as will become apparent in these reasons: (1) the disclosure phase, (2) the crown and judicial pretrial phase, (3) the original trial-scheduling phase, (4) the adjournment of the first trial date, (5) the first trial-rescheduling phase, (6) the adjournment of the second trial date, and (7) the second trial-rescheduling phase.
1. The Disclosure Phase
8Starting with the disclosure phase, the applicable period is from the date the Information was sworn (April 6, 2023) and the date the Applicant finally received core disclosure consisting of video surveillance of the alleged theft (October 3, 2023), a period of 190 days or 6 months. This phase can be delineated as follows.
9The first court date was April 25, 2023. Initial disclosure was not available. The Applicant requested disclosure at the first appearance and followed up the same day with a written request. Initial disclosure was provided on May 10. However, it omitted key items, including officer notes, search warrant-related materials, the 911 call, as well as video surveillance of the alleged theft. The Applicant wrote to the Crown requesting the outstanding items.
10Despite multiple written and oral requests between April and September 2023, core disclosure – including the video surveillance – was delayed. It was not provided until October 3, 2023. The 911 call was not disclosed until three days before the second trial date (September 17, 2025).
11As referenced above, core disclosure was not provided until October 3, 6 months after the Applicant was arrested and charged. As I noted in R. v. Van Meeteren, 2025 ONCJ 546, at para. 10, concerns in this jurisdiction regarding disclosure delays persist:
I wish to address what I find is far too common an approach by the Crown that contributes to a culture of complacency that must change to ensure the re-occurrence of this type of delay is prevented. The Supreme Court in Jordan at paras. 4, 29 and 40 referenced a culture of complacency and a tolerance for excessive delay and identified insufficient practices as one contributing factor to that culture. That recognition was nearly 10 years ago. Neither in its written materials on this application nor during its oral submissions did the Crown provide an explanation, or satisfactorily attempt to provide one, for why it took nearly seven months for the Applicant [6 months in Mr. Abu Laban’s case] to be provided a copy of the alleged victim’s statement to police [video surveillance of the alleged theft in Mr. Abu Laban’s case], despite numerous requests by the Applicant for it. The statement was recorded on video and obtained prior to the Applicant’s arrest [obtained around the time of arrest in Mr. Abu Laban’s case]. Many justice system participants – including the accused…and the public – deserve and should expect the Crown to seek out an answer to avoid re-occurrence of this kind in future cases. This approach would align with the framework’s prospective approach in taking proactive measures to remedy delay: Jordan at para. 108. While I may not be the first to raise these concerns, as a justice system participant, I share in the responsibility of helping to resolve an apparent Crown and police indifference to remedying the repeated failure to provide timely core disclosure: see R. v. Scott-Wolf, 2024 ONCJ 502 at paras. 57-59; R. v. Stefan, v. 2024 ONCJ 565 at para. 52; R. v. Smith, 2023 ONCJ 222 at para. 49; and R. v. Hotaki, 2023 ONCJ 261 at paras. 29-33.
2. The Crown and Judicial Pretrial Phase
12Turning to the crown and judicial pretrial phase, the Applicant advised at the September 26 court appearance that he would schedule and conduct a crown pretrial once core disclosure was received. Core disclosure, including video surveillance of the alleged theft, was provided to the Applicant by October 3. At the next three court appearances of October 31, December 5, 2023, and January 23, 2024, the Applicant advised that he still had not conducted either a crown or judicial pretrial. The latter was held on February 26, even though many earlier dates for a crown and judicial pretrial were available.
3. The Original Trial-Scheduling Phase
13Turning to the original trial-scheduling phase, a 3-day trial estimate was agreed to at the judicial pretrial held on February 26. Despite having the trial estimate form since that date, the Applicant attended the following two court appearances of March 19 and April 2 without having scheduled a meeting with the trial coordinator. The matter was adjourned to April 12 to permit scheduling of a meeting in the interim. That meeting was held some time between April 2 and 12 (the exact date is unknown, as neither party included a copy of the trial scheduling form in their application record).
14At the trial scheduling meeting, the parties secured a 3-day trial for April 14-16, 2025, a date 24 months after the Information was sworn (no evidence was presented on this application of whether any earlier dates were offered by the court). The Applicant advised that he would be advancing a s. 11(b) Charter application.
15As part of the court’s effort to reduce the backlog of cases in the region at that time, the Applicant’s case was one of many cases brought forward from their respective trial dates to offer earlier trial dates. This court appearance occurred on June 20, 2024. The court offered dates as early as July 2024, 15 months after the Information was sworn and below the Jordan presumptive ceiling, but neither the Applicant nor the Crown were available. However, an earlier 3-day trial of October 9-11, 2024, was secured, 18 months from the date the Information was sworn.
16At the July 12, 2024, court appearance, the Applicant advised that a s. 11(b) Charter application will not be brought.
4. The Adjournment of the First Trial Date
17Turning to the adjournment of the first trial date, the Applicant brought the matter forward to October 4, 2024, to seek an adjournment of the October 9-11 trial date. The Applicant’s counsel cited unanticipated personal reasons that necessitated an adjournment of the trial. The Crown consented to, and the presiding Justice granted, the adjournment. Counsel’s personal reasons need not be disclosed in these reasons as the Applicant and the Crown agreed in submissions that the delay caused by the adjournment of the trial is to be deducted from the total delay regardless of how the delay is labelled (the Applicant argued it was a discrete event whereas the Crown argued it was defence delay).
5. The First Trial-Rescheduling Phase
18Turning to the first trial-rescheduling phase, after the original trial date was vacated, the matter was adjourned for the Applicant to obtain new trial dates. The Applicant appeared in court on October 11 and November 1 and advised that he had not yet obtained a new trial date. The case was adjourned to November 14 for the Applicant to secure a new trial date in the interim. A meeting was confirmed with the trial coordinator for November 8. A new trial date of September 17-19, 2025, was secured at that time. This was the earliest date offered by the court.
6. The Adjournment of the Second Trial Date
19Turning to the adjournment of the second trial date, the Applicant brought an application on the first day of trial (September 17) due to receipt of new disclosure in the days leading up to and including the first day of trial. The items included the 911 call, notes related to receipts and appraisals of the alleged stolen property, a video statement from a new witness, notes of a forensic analyst and a 3359-page forensic report of the hardware device associated to the video surveillance camera from the location where the alleged theft occurred. The presiding judge granted the adjournment, finding that the Applicant did not have sufficient time to review the new disclosure to be able to proceed with the trial as scheduled. The judge, however, did not determine fault or attribute delay based on the Applicant and Crown having provided differing explanations for the untimely disclosure.
7. The Second Trial-Rescheduling Phase
20Turning finally to the second trial-rescheduling phase, after the second trial date was adjourned, a meeting was held with the trial coordinator on September 19 at which time a new trial date was secured for February 2-4, 2026. The court offered several earlier dates starting on October 20-22, 2025, and each month thereafter. The Crown was available for the first date offered. The Applicant’s first available date was January 5-7, 2025.
21Once the current trial date was secured, the Applicant indicated an intention to advance a s. 11(b) Charter application. A date for the application was confirmed for November 28, 2025. The application was heard at that time. I reserved my decision until today’s date.
III. ANALYSIS
a. The Jordan Framework
22The Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan outlined the framework by which delay is to be assessed under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The framework as it applies to the Ontario Court of Justice is summarized as follows.
23There is a presumptive ceiling of 18 months: Jordan at paras. 5, 46, 49, and 105. Delay above that mark is presumptively unreasonable, whereas delay below it is presumptively reasonable: Jordan at paras. 47-48, 68, 82 and 105.
24Delay is considered and calculated in different ways at different stages of the framework. At the outset, the total delay must be calculated. This period is calculated from the date of the charge to the end of the trial: Jordan at para. 60. The former equates with the date the Information is sworn: see R. v. Allison, 2022 ONCA 329 at paras. 35-43; R. v. Kalanj, 1989 CanLII 63 (SCC).
25Defence delay is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at paras. 49, 60, and 66.
26Defence delay can result from an explicit or implicit waiver or delay caused solely or directly by the defence’s conduct: Jordan at paras. 61, 63 and 66. An example of the latter is when the Crown and court are ready to proceed but the defence is not: Jordan at para. 64. However, legitimate defence conduct is not defence delay: Jordan at para. 65.
27When the delay is above the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to establish the presence of exceptional circumstances that justify the delay: Jordan at paras. 47, 68, 81 and 105. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the ensuing delay emanating from those circumstances cannot reasonably be remedied by the Crown: Jordan at para. 69. The Crown must show that it took reasonable steps to avoid the delay before the presumptive ceiling was surpassed: Jordan at para. 70. Those steps need not be successful in preventing the delay: Jordan at para. 70.
28Generally, exceptional circumstances fall into two groups: discrete events or particularly complex cases: Jordan at para. 71. The former includes medical emergencies or unexpected illnesses, whereas the latter includes cases with novel or complicated legal issues, voluminous disclosure or many witnesses requiring a lengthy trial: Jordan at paras. 77-78.
29Like defence delay, delay caused by exceptional circumstances is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at para. 75.
30When the delay is below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Applicant to show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable by establishing that it “took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings” and the case took “markedly longer than it reasonably should have”: Jordan at paras. 48, 82 and 105.
31Meaningful and sustained steps include seeking and setting the earliest available trial dates and giving notice when delay is becoming a problem: Jordan at para. 85.
32Whether a case took markedly longer considers multiple factors including the case’s complexity, local considerations, and whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings: Jordan at para. 87.
33Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling will be granted only in clear cases: Jordan at para. 83.
b. The Hanan Principle
34I have substantially reproduced below from Van Meeteren, supra at paras. 36-39, in which I summarized the principle in R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12 and subsequent cases that have interpreted the principle.
35In Hanan at para. 9, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule of attributing the entirety of ensuing delay to the defence after the rejection of an initial date because of unavailability. Instead, a contextual analysis was emphasized in which all relevant circumstances are to be considered to determine if and how the ensuing delay should be apportioned.
36In R. v. Jones, 2025 ONCA 103 at para. 32, the Court of Appeal noted that Hanan did not “adopt an inverse bright-line rule apportioning the defence with none of the delay”. The Court at para. 33 reiterated that all relevant circumstances must be assessed to decide how to apportion the delay among the parties: see also R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2024 ONCA 458 at paras. 5-7; R. v. Shaporov, 2025 ONCA 281 at para. 33; and R. v. M.E., 2025 ONCA 729 at paras. 17-18 and 26.
37In R. v. K.D., 2025 ONCA 639, the Court of Appeal further clarified the principle in Hanan. The Court at para. 46 noted, “it is not that the apportionment of delay is warranted in every case, but rather that the circumstances of every case must be considered to determine whether apportionment is warranted”.
38In R. v. Bowen-Wright, 2024 ONSC 293 at paras. 38-48, the summary conviction appeal court identified several factors that would inform any contextual analysis in the apportionment of ensuing delay after the rejection of an initial date. Those factors include the reason for the need to reschedule and whether it was caused by the defence; the extent to which the defence was available; and the reasons for the defence unavailability.
39In M.E., supra, in which it applied the principle in Hanan differently to two separate periods of delay. First, in setting an initial trial date, although the Defence was unavailable for several earlier dates the court offered and the crown was available, subsequent dates offered by the court that the Defence was available, but the crown was not, was held to be a relevant factor. The Court of Appeal at para. 16 stated, “all relevant circumstances, including the fact that on some proposed dates the Defence was not available and on others, the Crown was not available, should be considered”. The Court of Appeal apportioned the delay, with the initial period as defence delay and the subsequent period as crown delay.
40Second, in the setting of a trial continuation, although the Defence was unavailable for earlier dates offered, there were no further dates offered from the Defence’s unavailability to the date chosen. The Court of Appeal at para. 24, referenced its decision in K.D., supra, at para. 45, which noted “the defence cannot fairly and reasonably be held wholly responsible for a span of time largely comprising a period where the court was unavailable”. The Court of Appeal added “this is so even if the period of delay began because the defence was not available on the first date offered”. The Court of Appeal at para. 25 further added that both the defence and the crown failed to take steps to seek intervening dates from the court, which led to this period of delay being apportioned equally between the defence and the crown.
c. Jordan and Hanan Applied
41The total delay in the Applicant’s case is from April 6, 2023 (the date the Information was sworn) to February 4, 2026 (the anticipated end of trial). The total delay is 1035 days or 34 months.
42There are three periods of delay that are exclusively defence delay that are to be deducted from the total delay.
43First, after the applicant obtained core disclosure, aside from an acceptable amount of time to review disclosure and take necessary next steps (e.g., get updated instructions), which I find to be 14 days, the Applicant then unreasonably delayed scheduling and conducting a crown and judicial pretrial. The Applicant obtained core disclosure on October 3, 2023, yet waited 4.5 months to conduct a crown and judicial pretrial, the latter having been held on February 26, 2024. He first indicated his intention at the September 26 and October 31 court appearances to schedule and conduct a crown and judicial pretrial but returned subsequently on multiple occasions having failed not only to conduct but even schedule either pretrial. This 146-day period, minus 14 days for review, leaves 132 days. This entire remaining period is defence delay.
44Subtracting this 132-day period from the total delay of 1035 days leaves a net delay of 903 days.
45Second, after the Applicant conducted a judicial pretrial on February 26 and obtained a trial estimate form, the Applicant unreasonably delayed waiting to set a trial scheduling meeting. The meeting was held some time between the April 2 and April 12 court appearances. I calculate the applicable date as April 8, the midpoint between the two dates. This is a period of 42 days is defence delay.
46Subtracting this 42-day period from the net delay of 903 days leaves a remaining net delay of 861 days.
47Third, after the original trial date of October 9 was adjourned at the request of the Applicant, he did not attempt to secure a new trial date in a timely manner. It took until November 8 to schedule and conduct a trial scheduling meeting. This entire period of 30 days is defence delay.
48Subtracting this 30-day period from the net delay of 861 days leaves a remaining net delay of 831 days.
49I will next address other periods of delay.
50I begin with the crown and judicial pretrial phase.
51Contrary to the Crown’s submissions, the Applicant’s actions were entirely appropriate in insisting on core disclosure before conducting a crown or judicial pretrial, especially when the items included video surveillance of the alleged theft which is perhaps the most important item of disclosure in a theft prosecution where it is alleged there is video footage of the actual offence being committed. This core disclosure is necessary to allow for a meaningful pretrial. As I previously referenced in R. v. Narang, 2025 ONCJ 564 at para. 54, “requiring the Applicant to schedule a pretrial simply to remind the Crown, yet again, this time in a different forum, of its constitutional obligation to provide meaningful disclosure is a practice not worth endorsing.”. Accordingly, I do not count this period, in awaiting core disclosure to have a pretrial, as defence delay, when, as occurred in this case, the Applicant was diligent in making multiple requests for disclosure.
52I next address the adjournment of the first trial date.
53In applying the principle in Hanan to this period, I am to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether, and how, to apportion the delay. Relevant factors include the reason for the need to adjourn and whether it was caused by the defence and court availability in rescheduling the trial.
54Although the Applicant’s counsel’s unanticipated personal reasons necessitated an adjournment of the original trial date, in applying the principle in Hanan, I do not find the Applicant is responsible for the entire delay in rescheduling the trial as suggested by the Crown.
55The Crown’s submission attributing the entire delay to the Defence reflects the bright-line approach rejected in Hanan. The Crown’s position fails to account for the Crown’s and court’s ongoing role in ensuring any delay is mitigated.
56The trial scheduling meeting occurred on November 8, 2024, and a new trial date of September 17-19, 2025, was obtained. This is a period of 315 days. The Applicant is responsible for a significant portion of the ensuing delay since he was the sole cause of the adjournment of the trial. However, the only date offered by the court was 10 months away. On November 8, the total delay was already at 19 months at this stage in the proceedings. The Crown effectively accepted a single trial date offered 10 months away, even though the delay at that point was already over the presumptive ceiling. The Crown and court have any ongoing responsibility to ensure delay is minimized, regardless of who initially caused the delay. The Crown did not take any steps to prioritize the Applicant’s case including seeking an earlier date. I apportion the 315-day period as follows: 220 days (equivalent to approximately 70%) to the Applicant and 95 days (equivalent to approximately 30%) to the Crown (and court).
57Subtracting the 220-day period from the net delay of 831 days leaves a remaining net delay of 611 days.
58I next address the adjournment of the second trial date.
59In applying the principle in Hanan, the actions of both parties necessitated an adjournment of the second trial and, therefore, it is appropriate to apportion the ensuing delay.
60For example, the Crown inexplicably disclosed not one but two 911 calls of 7 minutes each in duration three juridical days before the second trial despite the Applicant’s multiple requests for the 911 call starting from May 10, 2023, nearly 2.5 years earlier. Further, the Crown’s submission that the calls are largely inaudible does not diminish their relevance. One of the calls was made by the alleged victim. The Applicant is entitled to listen to the calls to try to discern what is being said or consider retaining an expert to assist in ascertaining what is being said. A single word or phrase in either call may assist the Applicant in making full answer and defence.
61Similarly, even though the Crown only intended on tendering into evidence at trial the two extracted clips of the alleged theft, the Crown ultimately chose to disclose a 3359-page forensic report and related notes from the forensic analyst after the trial was scheduled to start. The Applicant was entitled to review the report and notes and determine whether and how they would be utilized. The Applicant may have wanted to retain his own forensic expert to see if additional clips could have been extracted from the hard drive despite the Crown’s expert not being able to do so. The untimely disclosure made it extremely difficult for the Applicant to be able to proceed with the trial as scheduled.
62The Applicant, however, shares responsibility for the adjournment of the second trial date.
63For example, several of the new disclosure items (e.g., notes related to receipts and appraisals; the new witness video statement) were the result of specific inquires made by the Applicant less than a month from the start of the second trial, which the Crown worked diligently to get the Applicant.
64The Applicant was silent in his pursuit of some of the outstanding items (e.g., 911 call) from the time of the adjournment of the first trial leading to the second trial, a period of nearly a year.
65The Applicant would have been aware of the existence of the “new” witness from the initial disclosure and that the witness had not initially provided a statement. The Crown only sought out a statement from the witness due to discussions the Applicant initiated with the Crown less than a month from the start of the second trial. The statement is only 5 minutes in length.
66The Applicant was not proactive in pursuing the contents of the video surveillance hard drive. Police examined the hard drive and were only able to extract two clips, which captured the alleged theft. Those clips were disclosed to the Applicant on October 3, 2023. The hard drive, which belonged to the Applicant, was then returned to him. The Applicant waited until September 13, 2024, less than a month before the first trial requesting “any and all videos to be relied upon by the Crown”. No further footage was provided because the Crown intended to rely only on the two clips. The Crown did not believe any more clips existed on the hard drive. The Applicant did not follow up on this request leading up to the second trial. On August 22, 2025, the Applicant wrote to the Crown and requested several items, which he prefaced with “there were some small bits of disclosure outstanding”. None of the items related to the video surveillance or hard drive.
67The 3359-page forensic report consists of the hard drive’s contents which are largely indiscernible and concluded that no further clips of the alleged theft beyond the two that were disclosed to the Applicant on October 3, 2023, existed on the drive. The report is essentially a raw data dump of likely irrelevant and indiscernible content.
68Like the adjournment of the first trial date, in applying the principle in Hanan, I find both parties are responsible for the delay caused by the need to reschedule the second trial date. As a result, it is appropriate to apportion the ensuing delay and based on the availability of the parties when setting the current trial date.
69The trial scheduling meeting occurred on September 19, 2025, and the current trial date of February 2-4, 2026, was obtained. This is a period of 140 days.
70The Crown and court were first available on October 20-22, 2025, a period of 33 days from the trial scheduling meeting. This period is non-defence delay and will not be subtracted from the net delay. The Applicant was first available on January 5-7, 2026, 77 days later. This period is properly defence delay and will be subtracted from the net delay.
71The Applicant was available for each successive date offered from January 5-7, 2026, up to the current trial date, which is when the Crown was next available after October 20-22, 2025. This is a period of 30 days. This period is non-defence delay and will not be subtracted from the net delay.
72Subtracting the 77-day period from the net delay of 611 days leaves a remaining net delay of 534 days or 17.5 months: see R. v. Shaikh, 2019 ONCA 895 at footnote 2 for the conversion of actual days to months.
d. Below the Ceiling Findings
73The net delay in the Applicant’s case is below the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months. The onus, therefore, is on the Applicant to show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable by establishing that he took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. The Applicant has not met his burden.
74With respect to the latter, and after having balanced the various factors referenced below, the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
75The Applicant’s case is not complex. It is a simple and straightforward case involving a single allegation of a theft captured on video surveillance. There is no novelty or legal complexity to the prosecution. Aside from the surveillance (two clips only), the main prosecution witness is the alleged victim. The three-day trial estimate is, in my assessment, an overestimation.
76Regarding local considerations, a case like the Applicant’s should not take 17.5 months to be completed. The Court in Jordan noted the presumptive ceiling is not an aspirational target and “there is little reason to be satisfied with a presumptive ceiling on trial delay set at 18 months[.] This is a long time to wait for justice.”: at paras. 56 and 57.
77In Peel region, recent cases with a net delay in the range of 16-17 months have been stayed, in part, due to the case taking markedly longer than required: see, for example, R. v. Sawh, 2022 ONCJ 15 at paras. 23-27 (17.2 months delay); R. v. Dhaliwal, 2019 ONCJ 761 at paras. 22, 35-39 (17 months, 20 days delay); R. v. Stefan, 2024 ONCJ 565 at paras. 21, 55 (17.1 months delay); R. v. Fonseca, 2022 ONCJ 119 at paras. 49 and 64 (16 months, 23 days delay); and R. v. R.M., 2024 ONCJ 491 (16.5 months delay).
78There are times when the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings and other times it did not. The Crown brought the Applicant’s matter forward after the first trial date was set to secure an earlier Jordan-compliant date. The Crown also made itself available for the earliest date, a month away, when scheduling the current trial date. However, the Crown failed to provide core disclosure in a timely manner and failed to take any steps to prioritize the Applicant’s case including seeking an earlier date when scheduling the second trial date. In the circumstances, the Crown did not take reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings throughout. However, this factor does not outweigh other factors such as the non-complexity of the case and local considerations that lead me to conclude that the case still took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
79With respect to meaningful and sustained steps, the Applicant did not take sustained steps to expedite the proceedings. There are times when the Applicant took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings. He attended the Jordan backlog court to reschedule the first trial date for an earlier date. He advised the Crown of his intention to bring a s. 11(b) Charter application, which initiated the backlog appearance. However, the Applicant’s steps were not sustained.
80The Applicant unreasonably delayed setting the first two trial dates. Regarding the first trial date, after having received core disclosure (October 3, 2023), the Applicant waited more than 6 months (April 8, 2024) before securing the first trial date. This period included having attended multiple court appearances expected to have scheduled and conducted a crown pretrial, judicial pretrial and trial scheduling meeting but needing to adjourn the case after having failed to do so. This period also included an unexplained missed court appearance which resulted in an adjournment of 7 weeks.
81Similarly, on October 4, 2024, after the Applicant sought and was granted an adjournment of the second trial date of October 9-11, 2024, the case was adjourned to allow the Applicant to secure a new trial date. The Applicant attended court on October 11 and November 1 expected to have scheduled and conducted a meeting with the trial coordinator but needed to adjourn the case after having failed to do so. It was not until November 8 that the second trial date was secured.
82After the second trial date (September 17, 2025) was adjourned, the Applicant did not set the earliest trial date. The trial scheduling meeting was on September 19. The court offered dates each month from October to the current trial date of February 2-4, 2026. The Crown was available in October. The Applicant’s first available date was not until January 5-7, 2026, nearly 4 months after the second trial date. Based on the history of the proceedings to that point, including the Applicant’s request to adjourn the first trial, not accepting (or being available for) an earlier date did not expedite the proceedings.
83The Applicant appeared content at times with the pace at which some items of disclosure were disclosed. I reference the 911 call. After the Applicant’s written request on September 26, 2023, the Applicant did not follow up for the 911 call until approximately August 2025, shortly before the second trial (September 17-19, 2025). This included an apparent willingness to proceed with the first trial (October 9-11, 2024) without the 911 call as no follow up in advance of the trial was made by the Applicant either at any of the intervening court appearances or in writing. It was only due to the Applicant’s counsel’s unanticipated personal reasons that the trial did not proceed as scheduled.
84As stated in Jordan, stays beneath the presumptive ceiling will be granted only in clear cases. For the reasons above, I do not find the Applicant’s case is such a case.
IV. CONCLUSION
85The net delay is 17.5 months and below the Jordan presumptive ceiling. The Applicant has failed to meet his onus and demonstrate that he took sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.
86For these reasons, the application for a stay of proceedings is dismissed.
Released: December 2, 2025
Signed: Justice Tomovski