Angela Chaisson

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that it had a duty to defend the respondent OSPCA in three separate actions alleging malicious prosecution, false arrest, and defamation arising from animal cruelty investigations.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded by policy clauses regarding willful violation of penal statutes and by the fortuity principle, which precludes coverage for intentional harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the OSPCA Act is not a penal statute, exceeding a search warrant is not a Criminal Code offence, and the fortuity principle did not apply because the policies expressly covered intentional torts like malicious prosecution and the plaintiffs did not plead that the OSPCA intended the specific harm suffered.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of documentary evidence in a criminal trial involving allegations of fraud at a Salvation Army distribution facility.

The Crown sought to admit thousands of documents obtained through internal audits and police investigations, including business records from the Salvation Army's Railside facility, emails, manifests, driver logs, invoices, and tax receipts.

The defendants challenged the admissibility of these documents on various grounds.

The court conducted a comprehensive voir dire to determine which documents could be admitted as business records under the Canadian Evidence Act, common law exceptions, or the principled approach to hearsay.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action arising from an internet article that repeated and endorsed allegations originally published in a national newspaper accusing the plaintiff of fabricating racist material to support human rights complaints.

The defendant republished the article on a website and added commentary portraying the plaintiff as corrupt and engaged in “phony-racism.” The court found the publication clearly defamatory and rejected the defences of fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication, holding that the article primarily asserted defamatory facts and that internet publication to the world was not an occasion of privilege.

The defendant had relied on a previously retracted newspaper article without conducting further verification.

General damages of $10,000 were awarded, and the defendant’s posted retraction and apology were found inadequate to reduce the damages.

Following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in a defamation action, the court determined the quantum of costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $121,000, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity costs of $30,000 to $40,000.

The court considered the plaintiff's offers to settle, post-judgment conduct, and the use of the simplified procedure, ultimately fixing costs at $65,000 for fees and $8,000 for disbursements.

The court also held that defamation is not a 'personal injury' for the purposes of the 5% pre-judgment interest rate under s. 128(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and applied the default rate of 1.3%.

The plaintiff, a law student, sued the defendant, a blogger and political commentator, for defamation arising from nine blog posts.

The posts related to a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal hearing involving Maclean's magazine, where the plaintiff testified.

The defendant repeatedly called the plaintiff a 'liar' and an 'anti-Semite' in his posts.

The court found the words were defamatory and that the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege failed, largely due to factual inaccuracies and the defendant's express malice toward the plaintiff's perceived associate.

The court awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, and ordered the removal of the defamatory words from the defendant's website.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sexual harassment, reprisal, and discrimination.

The Toronto Professional Fire Fighters' Association, Local 3888, filed a Request to Intervene to address non-monetary remedies and issues related to the collective agreement.

The respondents opposed the intervention.

The Tribunal granted the union intervenor status, noting its established practice of allowing a bargaining agent to intervene in applications alleging discrimination in employment.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.

The respondents requested to reactivate the human rights application after criminal charges against the personal respondent were withdrawn.

The applicant consented to the request.

The Tribunal granted the request and reactivated the application.

The respondents requested to defer the human rights application pending the outcome of criminal charges against the personal respondent for sexual assault and criminal harassment.

The applicant opposed the deferral, citing delay and psychological trauma.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, finding that the potential impact on the personal respondent's Charter right to remain silent and the need to avoid inconsistent findings of fact outweighed the applicant's concerns regarding delay.

The appellant, Mayor Robert Ford, appealed a decision declaring his seat vacant for violating the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA).

The application judge found the appellant breached the MCIA by speaking and voting on a council motion to rescind a previous council decision that required him to reimburse $3,150 in donations to his private football foundation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the original reimbursement order was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which only permits reprimands or suspensions of remuneration for Code of Conduct violations.

Because the financial sanction was a nullity, the appellant did not have a pecuniary interest when he voted to rescind it, and therefore did not contravene the MCIA.

The plaintiff brought a libel action against a municipal councillor arising from statements made to a newspaper editorial board concerning an untendered municipal contract awarded to a corporation associated with the plaintiff.

The court held that although the statements could in law be capable of referring to the plaintiff, the reasonable reader would not conclude that they did so.

The defendant spoke only about the corporation and repeatedly stated he could not accuse anyone or pinpoint wrongdoing.

The court further found that the statements expressed suspicion of corruption without factual assertion and, when read in context, did not convey a defamatory meaning.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish two essential elements of defamation: reference to the plaintiff and defamatory meaning.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.