COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Fairburn A.C.J.O., Paciocco and Wilson JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Lance Crossley
Appellant
Lance Crossley, acting in person
Frank Au, for the respondent
Heard: March 4, 2026
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Julianne A. Parfett of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, on June 27, 2023, and from the sentence imposed on December 14, 2023.
I. Overview
1The appellant was found guilty after a jury trial of one incident of threatening bodily harm, one incident of threatening to cause damage to property, two incidents of intimidation of a justice system participant and two incidents of criminal harassment. The threaten bodily harm and one of the criminal harassment counts were stayed at the Crown’s request. On the four remaining convictions, the appellant received a global sentence of two years and three months, less 90 days credit for pre-sentence custody. This was to be followed by three years’ probation. He has served the custodial portion of his sentence.
2The appellant argues that this court should order a new trial based on an alleged deficiency in the wording of one count in the indictment, errors in the jury charge and the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings, and the trial judge’s failure to inquire into his fitness to stand trial.
3I would dismiss the appeal. A properly instructed jury found the appellant guilty based upon an overwhelming evidentiary record. The evidence provided proof of all counts as particularized in the indictment. And there are no grounds to suggest that the appellant was unfit to stand trial.
II. Background
A. The appellant’s prior trials in 2019 and 2021
4The genesis of this matter is March 2018, when a statue of a Buddha in front of a Buddhist Temple in Ottawa was damaged with a metal bar bearing one of the appellant’s fingerprints. While the appellant received a warning after the damage to the statute, it was again damaged in May 2018. After the second event, the appellant was charged with mischief to religious property.
5The trial took place in the Ontario Court of Justice in April 2019. The investigating officer, Det. Evraire, testified. Following trial, the appellant was acquitted of the mischief charge because he could not be identified beyond a reasonable doubt as the man who damaged the statue. However, the trial judge found it “highly likely” that the appellant was that man and imposed a 12-month peace bond. The only conditions were that he stay away from the temple and that he keep the peace.
6On February 25, 2020, the appellant sent an email to Det. Evraire expressing his intention to damage the statue. He was then arrested and charged with breach of the common law peace bond and threats to damage property.
7The second trial again took place in the Ontario Court of Justice in January 2021. The same investigating officer, Det. Evraire, testified. The appellant was convicted of both offences.
B. The offences at issue in this appeal and the 2023 trial
8Following the January 2021 trial, the appellant sent a series of communications which form the backdrop for the convictions that are the subject of this appeal. The appellant wrote several emails to Det. Evraire, the investigating officer who testified at both trials. He also sent an email to the court and delivered a letter to the courthouse, both directed to the second trial judge’s attention.
9As noted, he was charged with of one incident of threatening bodily harm, two incidents of intimidation of a justice system participant, two incidents of criminal harassment, and one incident of threatening to cause damage to property.
10He was tried in the Superior Court of Justice before a judge and jury. The appellant refused to participate in his trial and remained silent throughout. Amicus curiae was appointed and took an active part in the trial.
11The appellant was found guilty on each count.
12There is no dispute that the communications contain threats to cause bodily harm.
13As for the intimidation of justice system participants, the communications are clear. The email to the judge includes reference to the appellant having issued a “command for God to slay Her Majesty”, a jeopardy which also extends to “her servants”, and warns that it is in the interests of “Her Majesty to have the command reversed before it is too late.” The letter includes the same threats.
14As for the emails to the police officer, similar threats were made, along with a demand that the officer “grease the wheels for my appeal of the conviction”. One of the emails states that “only if” the appellant’s demands are met would he “scale back on [his] campaign.” The appellant then asserts that he is “at war with Canada”, that “God is [his] ‘weapon’” and that he operates within the laws “EXCEPT where that law comes into conflict with God’s laws.”
15The criminal harassment convictions arose from the repeated communications and the threatening conduct.
16Finally, the conviction for threatening to damage property was based on the appellant’s assertion to his probation officer that he intended to destroy the Buddha statue.
17The appellant now appeals from his convictions.
III. Analysis
18At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant declined the assistance of duty counsel. He provided the court with 11 pages of well-articulated written submissions.
19In essence, he advances six grounds of appeal. I will address them in the order raised.
Grounds of appeal relating to count 6 in the indictment
1. The Crown proved the count as particularized
20First, the appellant argues that the Crown failed to prove the particulars of count 6 on the indictment. Therefore, I start by setting out count 6:
Lance Derek CROSSLEY on or about the 16th day of March in the year 2021 at the City of Ottawa in the East/De L’Est Region did, without lawful authority, engage in conduct, to wit threatening violence, with intent to provoke a state of fear in a witness, namely Detective Christopher EVRAIRE in order to impede the administration of criminal justice, contrary to Section 423.1, subsection (3) of the Criminal Code of Canada. [Emphasis added.]
21The appellant argues that the trial judge erred by focussing the jury’s attention on Det. Evraire’s role as a police officer, rather than his role as a “witness”. He points to two specific passages in the jury charge to make this point. The first involves an instruction that the jury should have no difficulty concluding that Det. Evraire is a “justice system participant” because he is a police officer. The second impugned passage instructs the jury to consider whether the appellant intended to cause a state of fear in the officer so as to impede the performance of his duty as a police officer. The trial judge provided examples of things that a justice system participant, but for the threat, “would otherwise have done in the performance of their duty.” These examples included “investigating or continuing to investigate offences involving [the appellant]”, “testifying in court against [the appellant]” and “continuing to be employed as a police officer.”
22The appellant’s complaint has to do with the particulars of count 6. He contends that the characterization of Det. Evraire as a “witness” in the indictment means that the intimidation had to be directed at Det. Evraire in his capacity as a witness, and could not relate to his duties as a police officer. As the appellant puts it in his written submissions, “In this case the Crown proved intimidation of a police officer and not intimidation of a witness as particularized in the charge wording.”
23The appellant relies on R. v. Saunders, 1990 CanLII 1131 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1020, a case in which the accused were charged with conspiracy to import heroin. The trial judge told the jury that they could convict if they were satisfied that the accused had conspired to import any kind of narcotic, even if the Crown failed to prove that the conspiracy related to heroin. The Supreme Court found that this was an error. Having particularized the offence as relating to heroin, the Crown was obliged to prove that the conspiracy in fact related to heroin and not to another drug. Explaining the reason for this requirement, McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote as follows, at p. 1023:
To permit the Crown to prove some other offence characterized by different particulars would be to undermine the purpose of providing particulars, which is to permit “the accused to be reasonably informed of the transaction alleged against him, thus giving him the possibility of a full defence and a fair trial”: R. v. Côté, 1977 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 8, at p. 13.
24There is no question that “the offence, as particularized in the charge, must be proved”: Saunders, at p. 1023. This rule operates along with the statutory requirement that indictments must contain “sufficient detail … to give to the accused reasonable information with respect to the act or omission to be proved against him and to identify the transaction referred to”: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 581(3).
25Here, the appellant’s argument is not that count 6 lacked particulars of the transaction alleged against him. Rather, he maintains that the offence as particularized in count 6 is different from the offence proved by the Crown at trial.
26As I understand it, the appellant’s argument has two prongs. First, the Crown’s case did not prove that he intended to provoke a state of fear in a “witness”, which is how the indictment describes Det. Evraire. Second, the characterization of Det. Evraire as a “witness” means that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to consider Det. Evraire’s role and duties as a police officer.
27In my view, this ground of appeal cannot succeed on either prong.
28First, the uncontradicted evidence at trial established that Det. Evraire was a witness in the appellant’s first two trials, in 2019 and 2021. The jury heard about Det. Evraire’s involvement as a witness from Det. Evraire himself. They were reminded of that evidence in the Crown’s closing submissions. And they knew that, just two days after Det. Evraire testified in the January 2021 trial, the appellant sent him an email with threatening language similar to that used in the email dated March 16, 2021. It follows that Saunders does not assist the appellant. Whereas the Crown in Saunders did not prove that the narcotic at issue was heroin, the Crown in this case proved that the target of the threatening emails was in fact a witness in the appellant’s prior trials.
29Second, the trial judge made no error in describing Det. Evraire as a police officer in the jury charge. Although count 6 does include the word “witness”, it goes on to name “Detective Christopher EVRAIRE” (emphasis added). As I see it, writing the rank of “Detective” into the indictment was not a matter of courtesy but rather gave a clear indication that this justice system participant was both a witness and a police officer. Including the participant’s full name also made it impossible for the appellant, or indeed for the jury, to be misled about the transaction referred to in count 6.
30Respectfully, I cannot accept the appellant’s submission that the jury charge “conflated” Det. Evraire’s role as a police officer and his role as a witness. Count 6 sets out that the appellant threatened Det. Evraire, who had indeed been a “witness” in his previous trials, “in order to impede the administration of criminal justice”. The trial judge properly recognized that Det. Evraire’s duties toward the administration of criminal justice encompassed “testifying in court against [the appellant]” and his investigative functions as a detective. There is a textual anchor for both duties in the indictment, and they are deeply intertwined in the context of this case. Det. Evraire was called to testify in the appellant’s trials because he was the investigating officer. In other words, his role as a witness was a function of his duties as a police officer.
31Therefore, as I read it, count 6 only made sense in the way that the trial judge understood it: the appellant intended to threaten a police officer who had been a witness at his trials in order to impede him in the performance of his duties toward the criminal justice system. Those duties might include, but were not limited to, testifying against the appellant.
32I would simply end with this observation. The best indication that the trial judge understood count 6, and correctly instructed the jury on how to approach that count, is the absence of any objection by the appellant and experienced amicus curiae, who was appointed to ensure that the self-represented appellant’s interests were attended to.
2. The trial judge properly instructed the jury on intimidation of a justice system participant
33The second issue also relates to count 6. The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by asking the jury to consider whether he threatened a justice system participant, even though the offence charged is “intimidation” of a justice system participant. The appellant maintains that, in light of the jury charge, he was found guilty of threatening and not of intimidating. He says that, as a result, his conviction for intimidating a justice system participant cannot stand.
34This ground of appeal cannot succeed. The trial judge charged the jury correctly. Although the offence is called intimidation of a justice system participant, intimidation can result from threats, as happened in this case. What matters is that the author of the threatening conduct intended to provoke a state of fear in the justice system participant in order to impede that person from performing their duties.
3. The appellant’s emails to Det. Evraire were admissible
35The third issue is another objection in relation to count 6. That count, as previously set out in these reasons, notes the commission of the alleged offence “on or about the 16th day of March in the year 2021.” The appellant objects to the fact that the Crown elicited evidence, specifically emails, outside of that time period.
36Contrary to the appellant’s objection, the history of the communications between the appellant and Det. Evraire was entirely relevant as context for the allegedly threatening email sent on March 16. There is no rule of evidence or otherwise that would exclude the communications from consideration by the trier of fact.
Grounds of appeal relating to all counts
4. No reversible error in the trial judge’s decision to admit evidence from the preliminary inquiry
37The fourth issue pertains to the admission of a police officer’s evidence pursuant to s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
38The officer, whom I will refer to as Cst. S, testified at the preliminary inquiry. The appellant was present and cross-examined her. The officer gave what can only be described as tangential evidence. In short, she was at the courthouse the day that the appellant dropped off the letter addressed to the judge who had presided over his second trial. Cst. S directed him to a particular counter. She later took receipt of the letter.
39There was no dispute at trial that the appellant wrote the letter and emails. In the letter, the appellant referred to himself in the first person: “Lance Crossley has issued the command for God to slay Her Majesty … Urgent action is therefore required. Lance Crossley is urgently appealing to [the January 2021 trial judge] to declare a mistrial.”
40At trial, the Crown brought a motion to admit into evidence the transcript of Cst. S’s evidence at the preliminary inquiry. She had retired from the police service sometime between her appearance at the preliminary inquiry and the trial.
41There is no dispute that she had cancer at that time. A letter from a physician was filed, explaining that she had cancer and would need a hair piece because of hair loss.
42In addition, the court learned through another officer that Cst. S had said that she was too ill to come to court and testify.
43Among other things, s. 715(1) allows that, where facts are proved on oath from which it can be reasonably inferred that a person is “so ill that [she] is unable to testify” at trial, the prospective witness can be excused from testifying where the witness’ evidence was taken in the presence of the accused at a preliminary inquiry. The trial judge invoked her jurisdiction pursuant to s. 715 and excused Cst. S from testifying.
44In her written ruling, the trial judge noted that the appellant was given the opportunity to make submissions on this issue, but chose not to.
45The trial judge ruled the preliminary inquiry testimony admissible because the appellant had had a full opportunity to hear and cross-examine Cst. S at the preliminary inquiry. In the trial judge’s view, there was nothing unfair about this request. There was evidence indicating that the officer had cancer and could not attend at trial because of her illness.
46The appellant claims that the trial judge erred by relying upon inadmissible hearsay evidence to reach this conclusion.
47This ground of appeal cannot succeed because this case cries out for the application of the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code. Given the peripheral nature of Cst. S’s evidence, combined with the overwhelming nature of the Crown’s case, even if the appellant is right about the alleged error, it did not have had any impact on the verdict. The threatening communications were crystal clear as to their origins. The emails to Det. Evraire came from an email address with the name “Lance Crossley”, were signed by “Lance Crossley” and their contents were similar to the letter that the appellant addressed to the judge and personally delivered to the courthouse. Identity was not an issue here. With or without Cst. S’s evidence, the appellant’s identification as the author of the emails and letter was a foregone conclusion.
5. Voluntariness
48The fifth issue is whether the trial judge erred in failing to hold a voluntariness voir dire respecting the appellant’s comments to Cst. S at the courthouse. For the same reasons just articulated, whether there should have been a voir dire or not, the curative proviso is operative. This was an overwhelming Crown case. Proof of identity was a foregone conclusion.
6. No reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was unfit to stand trial
49Finally, the appellant argues that the trial was unfair because the trial judge thought he suffered from a mental disorder, but she did not embark upon a fitness inquiry or order a fitness assessment.
50In my view, there was nothing here to suggest that the appellant was in need of a fitness assessment. Whether the trial judge was right or not about whether the appellant was living with a mental disorder, there was no evidence to suggest he was unfit. He attended all appearances on time and followed directions well. In this court, the appellant advanced a comprehensive and comprehensible position. His decision to remain silent at trial, which led to the appointment of amicus curiae, should not be equated with a lack of fitness.
51For the trial judge to have ordered a fitness hearing pursuant to s. 672.23(1) of the Criminal Code, she would have needed reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was unfit to stand trial. This would have required some evidence that the appellant had a mental disorder that made him unable to conduct a defence or to instruct counsel to do so: Criminal Code, s. 2; R. v. Bharwani, 2025 SCC 26, 505 D.L.R. (4th) 383, at para. 52. Having reviewed the record, I see no evidence of a fitness concern and I decline to infer one from the appellant’s choice to remain silent.
IV. Conclusion
52I would dismiss the conviction appeal. As the appellant advanced no submissions on the sentence appeal, I would also dismiss the sentence appeal.
“Fairburn A.C.J.O.”
“I agree. D.A. Wilson J.A.”
53I agree with my colleague on the disposition of all grounds of appeal except those addressing the particularization of count 6 on the indictment. I am persuaded that the Crown failed to prove the charged offence and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury relating to that count. I would allow the appeal in part, set aside the conviction, and order an acquittal on count 6.
54The principles at stake in this ground of appeal require jealous protection. Ours is an accusatorial system of criminal justice: see e.g., R. v. Swain, 1991 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at pp. 971-72. It does not conduct inquiries into whether accused persons have committed a crime. The issue in a criminal trial is whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the specific allegation that it is prosecuting: see R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 22; R. v. Batte (2000), 2000 CanLII 5751 (ON CA), 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para. 100. Indeed, the very jurisdiction of a judge to try and convict an accused person is partially derived from and extends no further than the specific allegation made against them: see R. v. Ladoucer, 2013 ONCA 328, 116 O.R. (3d) 64, at paras. 1, 18 and 28; Regina v. Drysdelle (1978), 1978 CanLII 2554 (NB CA), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 238 (N.B. C.A.), at p. 240; Rex v. Parker, 1939 CanLII 72 (ON CA), [1939] O.R. 531 (C.A.); and Canada (Minister of Justice and Attorney General) v. Kavaratzis (2006), 2006 CanLII 13237 (ON CA), 209 O.A.C. 180 (C.A.), at paras. 17-18, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 252. That is why our criminal justice system is often referred to as an accusatorial system — to distinguish it from inquisitorial prosecutions.
55Section 581(3) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, reflects the link between the allegation and what it is that the Crown must prove. It says:
(3) A count shall contain sufficient detail of the circumstances of the alleged offence to give to the accused reasonable information with respect to the act or omission to be proved against him and to identify the transaction referred to, but otherwise the absence or insufficiency of details does not vitiate the count.
56To be sure, the law no longer insists on the extreme technicality in pleading that it once did: The Queen v. Côté, 1977 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 8, at p. 13, and see Bolduc v. Attorney General of Quebec et al., 1982 CanLII 224 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 573. There are also generous powers of amendment in ss. 601 and 683(1)(g) of the Criminal Code: see R. v. Chamot, 2012 ONCA 903, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 91, at paras. 37-38; R. v. Brownson, 2013 ONCA 619, 7 C.R. (7th) 327, at paras. 20-34. But no amendment was sought here and the issue before us is not about the sufficiency of pleading. It concerns the charge Mr. Crossley was facing, and the criminal jeopardy he was properly under.
57The “transaction” alleged is described in count 6 as follows:
Lance Derek CROSSLEY on or about the 16th day of March in the year 2021 at the City of Ottawa in the East/De L’Est Region did, without lawful authority, engage in conduct, to wit threatening violence, with intent to provoke a state of fear in a witness, namely Detective Christopher EVRAIRE in order to impede the administration of criminal justice, contrary to Section 423.1, subsection (3) of the Criminal Code of Canada. [Emphasis added.]
58My colleague interprets this count as alleging that Mr. Crossley intimidated a police officer, who was a witness in Mr. Crossley’s previous trial, for the purpose of impeding his unparticularized duties as a police officer. In my view, this charge cannot reasonably be read this way. Such a reading deprives the term “witness” of any meaning by treating it as a gratuitous reference to the fact that Detective Evraire had testified against Mr. Crossley in the past. In keeping with the function of a charge, the underlined words in count 6 were inserted to describe the criminal “transaction” that was being alleged, namely “threatening violence, with intent to provoke a state of fear in a witness … in order to impede the administration of criminal justice” (emphasis added). The status of “witness” is not secondary. The term particularizes the objective of the threatened violence. The charge is therefore qua witness, not qua police officer generally. In other words, to fall within the charged offence, the threat had to be made for the purpose of impeding Detective Evraire’s role as a witness.
59In my view, it is plain that Detective Evraire’s name was not added simply to allude to the immaterial fact that he was a witness prior to the alleged threat, but to identify the specific act of threatening a witness that Mr. Crossley was being prosecuted for. That is why the charge says, “namely Detective Christopher EVRAIRE” (emphasis added). It is this clause that is the insertion or secondary feature of the allegation, not the term “witness”. Put otherwise, it adds particularity to the allegation by naming the victim of the threat, but it does not alter the nature of the threat or its alleged objective. Quite simply, if this was a charge encompassing threatening conduct that might impede Detective Evraire in performing any of his duties as a police officer, the words “in a witness, namely” would not have been added.
60The Crown is not obliged to particularize a count in an indictment so long as, in substance, the words are “sufficient to give to the accused notice of the offence with which he is charged”: Criminal Code, s. 581(2)(c). But as my colleague recognizes, when it chooses to particularize the charge, the Crown must prove the particular offence alleged: R. v. Saunders, 1990 CanLII 1131 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1020, at p. 1023; and see R. v. Robinson, 2018 ONCA 741, at para. 12. As McLachlin J. cautioned, “To permit the Crown to prove some other offence characterized by different particulars would be to undermine the purpose of providing particulars, which is to permit ‘the accused to be reasonably informed of the transaction alleged against him, thus giving him the possibility of a full defence and a fair trial’”: Saunders, at p. 1023, citing Côté, at p. 13. Without question, this charge was particularized, as the specific charged transaction is introduced using the language of particularity, the words “to wit”: see e.g., R. v. S.S., 2023 ONCA 130, 422 C.C.C. (3d) 277, at para. 2; R. v. Elliott, 2020 ONCA 589, at para. 8.
61I am therefore persuaded that the trial judge erred by failing to direct the jury on the need for the Crown to prove that Mr. Crossley threatened violence against Detective Evraire with intent to provoke a state of fear in him to impede his duties as a witness, since that was the charge that he faced. As a consequence, the Crown was wrongly permitted to prove some other offence characterized by different particulars, namely threatening Detective Evraire to impede the performance of his other duties as a police officer. Indeed, the trial judge wrongly expanded Mr. Crossley’s liability beyond the charged offence by inviting the jury to convict him if he threatened Detective Evraire for the purpose of impeding him in “investigating or continuing to investigate offences involving Lance Crossley” or “continuing to be employed as a police officer”. Neither of these duties bear any relation to Detective Evraire’s status as a witness, which expired prior to the charged threat being made.
62It bears repeating that at any point in the trial, the Crown could have sought to amend count 6 to conform to the evidence it was leading. It could have also sought a similar amendment on appeal. It did neither. It cannot now be permitted to secure a conviction on a different transaction than the one it alleged against Mr. Crossley.
63I cannot agree with my colleague that the failure of Mr. Crossley or experienced amicus to object to the trial judge’s instruction is an indication that the trial judge understood count 6 and correctly instructed the jury. In my view, the failure to object cannot be given any weight.
64First, the importance of a failure to object depends on “the nature of the alleged deficiency” in the instruction: R. v. Bailey, 2016 ONCA 516, 339 C.C.C. (3d) 463, at para. 56. The error here was not a minor one that might be perceived as not worth objecting to. It put Mr. Crossley in jeopardy for conduct he was not charged with committing. This was a purely legal error that had the effect of preventing the jury from properly relating the evidence to the elements of the offence. In general, a failure to object to this kind of deficiency is of little significance on appeal: see R. v. Papasotiriou, 2023 ONCA 358, 166 O.R. (3d) 266, at para. 125, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 273; R. v. McFarlane, 2020 ONCA 548, 393 C.C.C. (3d) 253, at paras. 89-91. Simply put, Mr. Crossley’s failure to object could not confer the trial judge with jurisdiction to try an offence that was not before her.
65Relatedly, it cannot be said that Mr. Crossley or amicus failed to object for tactical advantage: see R. v. S.C., 2023 ONCA 832, at para. 18. The Crown evidence was in, and it had failed to prove its case. Mr. Crossley had nothing tactical to gain by remaining silent, and everything to lose.
66In any event, Mr. Crossley was an unrepresented accused at trial and his failure to object cannot be given the kind of weight that a lawyer’s failure to object might attract in appropriate circumstances. Although amicus assumed many of the duties that would have been performed by Mr. Crossley’s lawyer if he had one, amicus was not his counsel. Mr. Crossley’s right to rely on appeal on a fundamental principle of criminal law should not be tied to whether a lawyer acting as a friend of the court raised the error at trial.
67In my view, the conviction must be set aside and an acquittal ordered. There is no basis to support a conviction after a retrial based on the evidence in this case. Detective Evraire was done testifying by the time the charged threat was made. His past status cannot satisfy the purpose alleged. And there is no evidence that the threat was linked by Mr. Crossley to the speculative prospect that Detective Evraire could conceivably have to testify against him again in the future. The demand Mr. Crossley made to Detective Evraire was to “grease the wheels for [his] appeal of the conviction” that had already occurred.
68I would therefore allow the appeal on count 6 alone, set aside that conviction, and order an acquittal.
Released: “July 24, 2026 JMF”
“David M. Paciocco J.A.”