COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Paciocco, Thorburn and George JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Shelley-Anne Stacey
Applicant (Respondent)
and
William Cyril Vey
Respondent (Appellant)
William Cyril Vey, acting in person
Shelley-Anne Stacey, acting in person
Heard: May 8, 2026
On appeal from the order of Justice Peter A. Douglas of the Superior Court of Justice, dated February 3, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONSC 664.
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, William Cyril Vey (“William”) and the respondent Shelley-Anne Stacey (“Shelley”) were in a three-and-one-half-year common law relationship. They were never married, had no children together, and did not enter into a cohabitation agreement. The trial judge noted that their relationship was not “stable” overall.
2In July 2015, Shelley moved into William’s home at 80 Bayswater Avenue in Richmond Hill (“the Bayswater property”). Two years later, William sold the Bayswater property, and the pair purchased a home at 19 Treetops Boulevard in Alliston (“the Treetops property”).
3The central issue at trial was a dispute over the proceeds of sale of the Treetops property. The trial judge held that William was unjustly enriched at Shelley’s expense, as there was a joint family venture, and Shelley was entitled to 41% of the proceeds of sale.
4William appeals the trial judge’s order. He claims the trial judge erred in finding that he was unjustly enriched at Shelley’s expense by the sale of the Treetops property, given that the property sold in 2019 for $150,000 less than its 2017 purchase price. Moreover, he submits that Shelley did not make meaningful contributions to the mortgage or household expenses to enrich William to her detriment.
5Second, he submits the trial judge erred in finding that the Treetops property was a joint family venture. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent, and joint contribution to a financial family enterprise to meet the requirements of a joint family venture: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269.
6Third, William submits the trial judge failed to explain how he arrived at the conclusion that Shelley was entitled to 41% of the monies from the sale of Treetops as the parties expressly registered their respective interests in the property as 90% to William and 10% to Shelley. This equity agreement was stipulated in writing and was never amended.
THE EVIDENCE AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AT TRIAL
The Bayswater Property
7When William and Shelley met, William had owned the Bayswater property for fifteen years. They resided in William’s home for almost two years until June 2017, when the Bayswater property was sold.
8The trial judge found that prior to the sale of the Bayswater property, Shelley made some improvements, including painting the garage, the front doors, the kitchen, dining room and main floor bathroom, repairing walls, painting the tenant suite, weeding the lawn and doing some landscaping. The trial judge held that these renovations were made to make the property ready for sale because it had been on the market without any offers.
9Some of these improvements were paid for by Shelley, while others were paid using their joint credit card for which she was 50% responsible. The parties also put $20,000 on a line of credit.
10Shelley claimed to have made additional contributions to the Bayswater property. William disputed those contributions and Shelley offered no documentation to substantiate them.
11Shelley claimed she was promised 20% of the value of the Bayswater property to reflect the work she had done to prepare the Bayswater property for sale and that $115,000 of the $230,000 net proceeds from the sale would be set aside as her portion of the downpayment on their new home.
12William disputed Shelley’s claim that she was entitled to 20% of the Bayswater property and there is no written agreement to support her claim. Further, William testified that he paid the mortgage, property taxes, and all other expenses related to the property and Shelley resided at Bayswater rent-free during the two years they lived there together.
The Treetops Property
13In July 2017, the parties purchased the Treetops property for the sum of $901,000. Proceeds from the sale of the Bayswater property were used to buy Treetops.
14William and Shelley entered into a written agreement which provides that they would hold the Treetops property as tenants in common, with ownership divided 90/10, in favour of William. The trial judge found that the parties obtained a joint mortgage because William did not qualify for individual financing. William claimed that the 10% registered in Shelley’s name was offered as a goodwill gesture, and not as compensation for the Bayswater property, and that the value of that interest significantly exceeded any contributions to home improvement made by Shelley.
15In April 2018, the parties discussed the possibility of changing the ownership in Treetops to a 59/41 division in favour of William, but no change to the 90/10 agreement was ever formalized.1
16The trial judge held however that:
[William] alleges there was an agreement between the parties in May/18 when refinancing Treetops that [Shelley] would be solely responsible for the Treetops mortgage and ownership would be shared 59/41 in [William]’s favour. He says that of the Treetops net proceeds of sale $328,991.40 [Shelley] would be entitled to 41%, or $134,886.47, but that this amount must be set off against her obligation to be fully responsible for the mortgage at sale in the amount of $375,200, leaving $240,313.53 owing by [Shelley] to [William]. The (sic) seeks his 59% share, being $194,104.93 plus $240,313.53 for a total of $434,418.46.
17This is not consistent with William’s written closing argument at trial where he explained the possibility of ownership change but that no ownership change was made and why:
[Shelley] suggested she become accountable for the entirety of the mortgage and this was discussed through the reasonable logic that a million dollar home doubling in value over 20 years would double her ‘investment’ of $375,000 (the approximate refinanced mortgage amount) should she have a 41% stake. Doubling in value over 20 years seemed easily probable as we had witnessed houses in the Bayswater neighbourhood increase by 50% in just two years. $375,000 calculates to approximately 41% of the purchase price of Treetops which was $901,000. The incentive for me was [Shelley] saying if the relationship didn’t work then she would pay the entire $375K personally from her share of whatever the house sold for. My trepidation at unnecessarily increasing the mortgage another $100,000 was eased by [Shelley] saying it would all be her responsibility.
The reason the 41/59 idea never got formalized was because after the mortgage was refinanced … [Shelley] pressured [me] to sign a 41/59 document that did not capture our agreed to arrangement that she would assume the entirety of the $375,000 debt herself. The 90/10 title arrangement is the only formal one agreed to and signed. [Emphasis added.]
18The Treetops property was refinanced in May 2018 in their joint names but no change in ownership interest was registered, although Shelley reached out to a real estate lawyer to attempt to set up a meeting to document the proposed change.
19During the two years they lived at Treetops, the trial judge found that Shelley hired a painter to paint the lower level, painted and decorated the bedrooms, arranged to replace a deck, and had a fence built between Treetops and the adjoining property which was paid from their joint line of credit. Some of these expenses were paid by Shelley while others were paid with a joint credit card, in addition to the line of credit.
20The Treetops property was sold in December 2019 for $752,000 with net proceeds of $328,991.40. The sale price was a significant loss compared to the $901,000 paid to purchase the property two years earlier.
21The parties each received $32,899.14 and the question at trial was how to divide the remaining $263,193.12 held in trust.
THE TRIAL JUDGE’S DECISION
22The trial judge held that Shelley gave something of value to William, including (i) her improvements to the Bayswater and Treetops properties, (ii) her acceptance of co-responsibility for the mortgage on the Treetops property without which the respondent would not have been able to secure financing, and (iii) payment of some carrying costs of the Treetops property. He held that:
[Shelley’s] efforts and payments were to the enrichment of [William] … and to her own resulting deprivation. She has not been otherwise compensated for her efforts or payments.
23He reviewed the communications between the parties including a text message from William to Shelley which reads, “we are selling the house in the spring as per the 59/41 agreement, once it’s solidified.” (Emphasis added). The trial judge recognized that the new equity arrangement was conditional. Nonetheless, he held, “I am not concerned” about the words “once it’s solidified” because “[o]n the strength of [Shelley’s evidence], I am satisfied no such condition was attached.” He did not refer to specific evidence in support of that conclusion.
24The trial judge held that Shelley’s efforts and payments enriched William to Shelley’s detriment. He held there was no juristic reason for the enrichment such as a contract or other legal obligation. The trial judge therefore concluded that William was unjustly enriched at Shelley’s expense.
25The trial judge supported his finding of unjust enrichment by finding that William and Shelley were engaged in a joint family venture. He noted that Shelley had access to some of William’s accounts, paid three of his child support claims, and assumed responsibility for some household expenses. He concluded there was a joint family venture, notwithstanding his finding that the relationship was not “stable” overall and punctuated by frequent breakups during the approximately three and one half years of the relationship.
26Finally, the trial judge calculated the monetary remedy for the unjust enrichment on his finding that the parties agreed that she would have a 41% net interest in the net proceeds of sale of the Treetops property.
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
27There are three issues on this appeal:
Whether the trial judge erred in holding that William was unjustly enriched;
Whether the trial judge erred in holding that there was a joint family venture; and
Whether the trial judge erred in granting Shelley 41% of the net proceeds from the sale of the Treetops property.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
1. There was no unjust enrichment in William’s favour
28To establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must establish (i) that the defendant gained a benefit or was enriched, (ii) the plaintiff was correspondingly deprived, and (iii) there is no juristic reason for the defendant’s enrichment: Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 303, at para. 37; Kerr, at para. 39. To establish an enrichment and corresponding deprivation, the moving party must show that they gave something to the defendant that the defendant kept. The benefit need not be permanent, but it must have enriched the defendant: Kerr, at para. 38.
29Even if there is enrichment and corresponding deprivation, that enrichment will not be unjust if there is a juristic reason for it: Kerr, at para. 40. There will be no juristic reason if the parties are in a joint family venture in which both parties have contributed to their overall accumulation of wealth, and the defendant retains a disproportionate share of the jointly earned assets after the relationship ends: Kerr, at para. 60.
30I will begin my analysis by considering whether the trial judge erred relating to the first two necessary conditions to an unjust enrichment. Was William enriched and did Shelley suffer a corresponding deprivation? In my view, the evidence does not reasonably support the finding that either of these conditions was met. In the section that follows, I will address separately, the issue of the trial judge’s joint family venture finding.
31The claim for unjust enrichment in this case was in respect of the sale proceeds of the Treetops property.
32In 2017, the Treetops property was purchased for $901,000 using William’s proceeds of sale from the Bayswater property. Shelley made no contribution to the purchase price. It is accepted that Shelley made some contributions to the Bayswater property, but they can only be characterized as modest. In furtherance thereof, she accepted a 10% interest in the Treetops property.
33In 2019, the Treetops property sold for $752,000, incurring a $150,000 total loss. As such, I agree with William’s position that he was not enriched by the sale. In fact, the uncontroverted evidence at trial was that William’s net worth and the value of the Treetops property declined significantly during this period.
34Moreover, evidence of Shelley’s contributions to Treetops were also limited. Shelley’s main contribution while the pair lived at Treetops, was in sharing liability for the mortgage. The trial judge also found that some of the improvements made to the property were paid for by Shelley, while others were paid using the joint credit card or line of credit. Shelley was compensated, however, for these contributions in receiving a 10% interest in the property without having contributed to its purchase price.
35In my view, a finding of unjust enrichment is not reasonable on this record and the trial judge erred in finding that William was enriched and that Shelley experienced a corresponding deprivation. For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and find that there was no unjust enrichment.
2. There was no joint family venture
36Moreover, I find the trial judge erred in holding that there was a joint family venture. In my view, on the evidence at trial, the requirements of a joint family venture could not reasonably be found to be met.
37Where wealth is generated through a joint family venture, calculation of the monetary award should be done according to the claimant’s proportionate share of the contributions. Joint venture claims are defined in Kerr as the product of economic integration, mutual effort, actual intention, and priority of the family. At paras. 87-88, Cromwell J. for the court held that:
[T]he analysis must take into account the particular circumstances of each particular relationship. Furthermore, as previously stated, there can be no presumption of a joint family venture. The goal is for the law of unjust enrichment to attach just consequences to the way the parties have lived their lives, not to treat them as if they ought to have lived some other way or conducted their relationship on some different basis. A joint family venture can only be identified by the court when its existence, in fact, is well grounded in the evidence. The emphasis should be on how the parties actually lived their lives, not on their ex-post facto assertions or the court’s view of how they ought to have done so. [Emphasis added.]
38There must be mutual, cooperative economic integration. Those factors are described in Kerr at paras 90-98 as follows:
One set of factors concerns whether the parties worked collaboratively towards common goals. Indicators such as the pooling of effort and team work, the decision to have and raise children together, and the length of the relationship may all point towards the extent, if any, to which the parties have formed a true partnership and jointly worked towards important mutual goals.
Another group of factors, related to those in the first group, concerns the degree of economic interdependence and integration that characterized the parties’ relationship (Birmingham; Pettkus; Nasser). The more extensive the integration of the couple’s finances, economic interests and economic well-being, the more likely it is that they should be considered as having been engaged in a joint family venture. For example, the existence of a joint bank account that was used as a “common purse”, as well as the fact that the family farm was operated by the family unit, were key factors in Dickson J.’s analysis in Rathwell. The sharing of expenses and the amassing of a common pool of savings may also be relevant considerations (see Wilson; Panara).
The parties’ conduct may further indicate a sense of collectivity, mutuality, and prioritization of the overall welfare of the family unit over the individual interests of the individual members (McCamus, at p. 366). These and other factors may indicate that the economic well-being and lives of the parties are largely integrated.
[T]he parties’ actual intent, express or inferred from the evidence, is the relevant consideration.
A final category of factors to consider in determining whether the parties were in fact engaged in a joint family venture is whether and to what extent they have given priority to the family in their decision making. A relevant question is whether there has been in some sense detrimental reliance on the relationship, by one or both of the parties, for the sake of the family. …The focus is on contributions to the domestic and financial partnership, and particularly financial sacrifices made by the parties for the welfare of the collective or family unit.
39In this case, the uncontroverted evidence is that William and Shelley had a short, unmarried relationship of three and one half years, that was not stable. Importantly, there were no children or other common family obligations.
40Moreover, there was no prioritization of the overall welfare of the family unit, extensive economic interdependence, or integration of finances to evidence planning for their joint economic well-being. While there were some joint accounts, there was significant financial independence, separation of income, no creation of a common pool of savings and no evidence of future planning or any joint interest save for the Treetops property.
41On the evidence the trial judge accepted, the requirements of mutual, cooperative economic integration of a joint family venture were not met.
42In my view, the trial judge erred in finding a joint family venture on these facts and I would allow this ground of appeal.
3. The trial judge erred in attributing 41% of the proceeds of sale to Shelley
43Where wealth is generated through a joint family venture, calculation of the monetary award should be done according to the claimant’s proportionate share of the contributions: Kerr, at 87. The monetary award can be quantified based on the monetary value of the services provided, or an a “value-survived basis”, according to the overall increase in the couples’ wealth during the relationship: Kerr, at para 49. As Cromwell J. explained in Kerr, at para. 73, “This means that a monetary remedy must match, as best it can, the extent of the enrichment unjustly retained by the defendant”.
44In this case, Shelley elected to have her damages quantified based on the value received, and that is what the trial judge purported to do. However, he failed to quantify the extent of the enrichment unjustly retained and instead, quantified the monetary award based on his finding that the parties had an agreement as to the share of their property.
45This is an appropriate approach to remedying a claim of breach of a domestic contract, but not for an unjust enrichment claim such as this.
46Second, and in any event, based on the evidence the trial judge erred in finding that the parties agreed to a 59/41 apportionment of interests in Treetops in favour of William.
47After Shelley arranged for the improvements to the Bayswater property and it was sold, and upon purchasing the Treetops property, William and Shelley signed an agreement to confirm that their respective financial interest in the Treetops property would be 90/10 in William’s favour and that both would be named on the Treetops mortgage. The agreement was registered on title and emailed to the real estate lawyer.
48In 2018, William and Shelley discussed a change to the agreement to reduce William’s interest in the Treetops property to 59/41 on certain terms, but no new agreement was signed. Shelley knew the agreement had not been changed as she made two appointments with the real estate lawyer in April 2018, but William did not attend to make the change. The parties did refinance the mortgage in May 2018, without changing the property interest.
49For these reasons, I find that there was no evidence the agreement was changed. The trial judge erred in finding that the 90/10 interest in the Treetops property in favour of William was modified and in the remedy he imposed.
CONCLUSION
50For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the order, and substitute an order dismissing Shelley’s application and requiring 90% of the proceeds of sale of the Treetops property be remitted to William.
Released: August 6, 2026 “D.M.P.”
“Thorburn J.A.”
“I agree. David M. Paciocco J.A.”
“I agree. J. George J.A.”